Expressive Politics: A Model of Electoral Competition with Animus and Cognitive Dissonance

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Abstract

We study a model of electoral competition that incorporates both the instrumental and expressive benefits of candidate position taking. In the model, voters care about standard policy concerns as well as two expressive considerations: the psychological costs of deviating from one’s own preferred policy and the psychological benefits of antagonizing an out-group. Whereas concerns about cognitive dissonance consistently temper candidate extremism, the effects of animus are non-monotonic—exacerbating policy divisions when baseline levels are low, and triggering one candidate’s capitulation (as distinct from both candidates’ moderation) when they are high. We further show that candidates become more polarized when a government routinely fails to translate policies into law; and that when communication channels are siloed, impediments to lawmaking also encourage candidates to stoke inter-group animosities. The findings have broad implications for our understandings of political polarization, partisan sorting and representation, fragmented media markets, and separation of powers.

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Electoral politics feature more than just narrow disagreements about policy. They also are infused with social and political identities, psychological needs and wants, and demonstrations of inter-group animosities—or what Brennan (2011) calls “expressive considerations.” Elections, thus understood, do more than just alter the direction of public policy-making. They also give voice to voters’ self-understandings and feelings about others.

What implications do these expressive considerations have for candidate position-taking and government lawmaking? When will candidates choose to inflame inter-group enmities and thereby amplify the political relevance of expressive considerations? And when, instead, will candidates counsel mutual understanding and tolerance? To investigate these matters, we study a model of electoral competition that incorporates both the instrumental and expressive benefits of position-taking in a setting that includes two distinct groups of voters. The instrumental benefits of position-taking flow from the policies that are ultimately implemented. The expressive benefits of position-taking, by contrast, derive from their mere articulation. Instrumental benefits of position-taking, as such, are probabilistic in nature, whereas expressive benefits are guaranteed.

In our model, expressive benefits assume two distinct forms: one that reflects the reputational and/or psychological costs of deviating from one’s own preferred policy; and another that captures the benefits of antagonizing an out-group that one does not merely disagree with, but that one actively dislikes. Just as voters wish to minimize their own cognitive dissonance, they occasionally derive pleasure in offending their opponents—something that, for some supporters of Donald Trump, takes the form of “rage farming” or “owning the libs and pissing off the media... That’s what we believe in now. There’s really not much more to it.”

Expressive considerations, we show, have very different effects on the positions that candidates assume. When voters care more about reducing cognitive dissonance, the two candidates reliably moderate their policy positions. But as inter-group animosities become inflamed, candidates may respond in very different ways. When baseline levels of animus are reasonably low, regardless of whether hostilities are mutual or the exclusive provenance of one group, the positions of the two candidates rapidly diverge, as voters reward policy extremism. But when baseline levels of animus are much higher and only felt by one group, marginal increases ultimately lead to one party’s utter capitulation to the other, leaving the portion of the electorate that experiences no animus devoid of meaningful political representation.

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1For more on a related distinction between the “intrinsic” and “instrumental” benefits of voting, see citetbrennan2008psychological.
The model also reveals how obstacles to public policymaking exacerbate polarization. When a candidate’s policy proposals are unlikely to become law—either because of legislative gridlock, political dysfunction, partisan intransigence, or institutional weaknesses of the office she seeks—the relative importance of expressive considerations increase. Candidates then have fewer incentives to moderate and deliver, instead, proposals that directly satisfy members of one group by antagonizing the members of the other. The model, as such, explains an essential aspect of Trump’s political appeal—particularly in 2016, when many voters were convinced that the political system was irredeemably broken but that Trump, at least, gave voice to their own policy convictions and their anger towards others, be they Democrats, immigrants, racial minorities, or members of the D.C. establishment (Howell and Moe, 2020; Sides et al., 2018; Webster, 2020).

Finally, the model clarifies the incentives of candidates to foment inter-group hostilities. When channels of communication remain broad and inclusive, we find in an extension that endogenizes animus, political candidates counsel mutual tolerance. Doing otherwise, after all, stimulate voters’ demand for policy extremism. But this rather salubrious result quickly falls apart when communication becomes siloed. While both candidates would be better off if overall animus was kept to a minimum, each candidate individually benefits from stoking anger within her affiliated group—particularly when impediments to lawmaking proliferate and voters assign less importance to the expressive benefits of voting for candidates with whom they agree. Lacking any disciplinary mechanism, comity quickly gives way to the lure of demagoguery.

1 Literature Review

Our model draws from and contributes to two distinct bodies of research: a formal literature on expressive voting and a predominantly empirical literature on the psychological foundations of political behavior.

1.1 Expressive Voting

Over the last quarter century, a substantial body of research has been devoted to “expressive voting;” or what Clark and Lee (2016) call “the emotional and/or moral satisfaction” that comes from participating in elections (for reviews, see Hamlin and Jennings 2011; 2018). By voting, this literature postulates, people do more than just improve the odds that one policy or another will be implemented. They also give voice to their feelings about themselves and others, which satiates a variety of psychological appetites for self-expression (Brennan, 2008).

By attempting to explain why rational actors would pay any cost to vote given the vanishingly
small probability that their ballots will alter the outcome of an election, much of this literature focuses on turnout (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Fiorina, 1976; Jones and Hudson, 2000). The mere act of participation, these scholars suggest, yields expressive benefits that may adequately compensate for the inconveniences of voting. Participation, however, is hardly guaranteed. When these expressive needs are not acutely felt, voters may opt to stay at home (Brennan, 2008; Schuessler, 2000). And when the positions of candidates sufficiently diverge from those of voters, even when one candidate is strictly preferred over another, alienation may set in and voters may be inclined to abstain (for examples, see Hinich et al. (1972); Adams et al. (2006)).

Expressive considerations, however, do more than just convince people to show up on Election Day. They also inform the votes that people actually cast. For instance, in Callander and Wilson’s (2006; 2008) model of context-dependent voting, a voter’s choice between two alternatives depends on the availability of other candidates in the choice set, such that the presence of a third anti-immigrant candidate, for example, may raise the salience of existing differences in immigration policy between the two main candidates. Other models seek to explain how instrumental and expressive considerations jointly translate into vote choices, whether by reference to people’s separate preferences for each (Brennan and Hamlin, 1998; Kamenica and Brad, 2014; Taylor, 2015) or the levels of popular support that different candidates from different groups receive within an electorate (Schuessler, 2000).4

Three features of this research warrant emphasis, the first of which concerns the sheer capaciousness of expressive considerations. Scholars recognize all manner of psychological phenomena as the potential subject of expressive voting, ranging from the joys of cheerleading (Aldrich 1997) to vitriol directed toward an out-group (Glazer, 2008). As Hamlin and Jennings (2011, 333) put it, expressive considerations could include any “aspect of the voter’s beliefs, values, ideology, identity or personality regardless of any impact that the vote has on the outcome of the election.” In many papers, therefore, expressive benefits are treated as a separate but undifferentiated category of voter preferences (Fiorina, 1976; Jones and Hudson, 2000). And even when specific interpretations are offered, they routinely collapse to a single parameter in a model of turnout or voting (Brennan, 2008; Kamenica and Brad, 2014).

Second, this literature does not characterize how specific instrumental and expressive preferences jointly inform the actions that candidates take. To vote at all, or to vote for a particular candidate, reliably yields both kinds of benefits.5 Instrumental and expressive benefits, as such, are not endogenously generated through the interactions of voters and candidates. Rather, they are

4For a related literature that focuses on labor strikes, see Glazer (1992).
5But for one exception, see Brennan (2008), which allows candidates to assume independent positions on instrumental and expressive dimensions of a policy choice. In this formulation, however, the position that a candidate takes on an expressive dimension in no way binds her to a particular course of action on an instrumental dimension.
presumed to come with the political territory.

Lastly, there is the referent of these expressive benefits. For most studies, it is the voter herself, as benefits come from the fulfillment of her own patriotism, sense of civic duty, or ideological consistency. A handful of studies, meanwhile, recognize the benefits of expressing views about others, such as the enmity one feels towards an out-group (Glazer, 2008). No one in this literature, however, examines the tradeoffs between different classes of expressive benefits. While voters in some of these models balance instrumental against expressive considerations, none confront the possibility that satisfying one expressive need comes at the cost of denying another.

1.2 Cognitive Dissonance and Animus

Though certainly not exhaustive, two expressive needs routinely inform our politics: one that affirms a person’s own ideological consistency, and another that affords an opportunity to distinguish oneself from the opposition. Each warrants some discussion.

Going back decades, psychologists have recognized the benefits of signaling one’s ideological purity; or, observationally equivalently, reducing the psychological burdens of inconsistency. When making choices of any kind, very much including political ones, people seek to minimize their cognitive dissonance. Simultaneously holding in mind two contradictory thoughts is cognitively taxing, and so too is acting in ways that expressively violate one’s core convictions. In electoral politics, consequently, the costs of voting for someone with whom one disagrees appear twice over: first, in the policy losses that may accompany her election; and second, in the cognitive dissonance that comes from acting in ways that do not accord with one’s principles or preferences.

Expressive considerations, however, are not exclusively about self-care. They also encourage attacks on a perceived out-group that one does not merely oppose, but that one actively dislikes (Webster, 2020). Recent studies on “affective polarization” lay out the basic argument as it relates to Democrats and Republicans in American politics (for a review, see Iyengar et al. (2019)). Rooted in social identity theory, this literature builds upon Henri Tajfel’s famous observation that members of an in-group will discriminate against an out-group “even if there is no reason for it in terms of the individual’s own interest” (1970, 99). Tajfel recognized that discrimination is “extraordinarily easy to trigger” even when groups are randomly assigned (102). In politics, however, groups and allegiances are hardly random. Rather, studies of affective polarization emphasize,

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6 For a review of much of the field’s early development, see Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999).
7 For a discussion of the cognitive rewards associated with casting votes for someone who reaffirms one’s ideological priors, see Beasley and Joslyn (2001).
8 For related studies in psychology, see (Pietraszewski et al., 2015, 2014). And for work on the centrality of anger as a mobilizing force in American politics, see (Valentino et al., 2011).
political parties offer powerful and salient social identities for many Americans (Mason, 2015; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016); so much so, in fact, that these “mega identities” have become wellsprings of partisan animus in contemporary American politics (Mason, 2018a,b; Iyengar et al., 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015).

It isn’t difficult to see how inter-group animosities can whet a person’s appetite for antagonism—a character trait that, along with agreeableness, defines one of the five main dimensions of human personality (Lynam and Miller, 2019). Members of an out-group, after all, are often perceived as not merely mistaken or wrong, but as inferior, immoral, or wicked. Compromising with them, as such, invites scorn (Davis, 2019), whereas antagonizing them is cause for minor celebration. Recall, then, the insignia “I really don’t care, do u?” written across a green jacket that Melania Trump famously wore in 2019 when she toured an immigration detention center holding children who had been separated from their parents. The first lady shrugged off the public firestorm around the sartorial selection. “I’m driving liberals crazy... You know what? They deserve it.”9 Attuned to her own expressive needs, the First Lady relished the opportunity to antagonize her husband’s political adversaries. Their outrage was her delight. As Adam Serwer put it in an Atlantic essay, “the cruelty is the point.”10

2 The Model

We envision an electorate with two distinct groups, $i = 1, 2$, that can be understood by reference to either their partisanship (such as Democrats or Republicans) or any other salient ascriptive characteristic (such as their race, religion, or language). A citizen in each of these two groups is characterized by an ideal point $\theta \in \mathbb{R}$.

From an ex-ante perspective, the distribution of ideal points is uncertain and determined by a shift-variable $M$, drawn from a distribution $F(\cdot)$ that is symmetric around zero, and has a non-decreasing (non-increasing) density to the left (right) of zero. A positive (negative) realization of $M$ denotes a shift of all voters’ ideal points to the right (left). Formally, for any realization $m$, the

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9As quoted in Wolko 2020.
10Adam Serwer, “The Cruelty is the Point: President Trump and his supporters find community by rejoicing in the suffering of those they hate and fear.” Atlantic, October 3, 2018. Nor do these dynamics appear to be confined to the Trump presidency. In another more recent Atlantic essay on the Republican Party’s communication strategies during the Biden Administration, Elizabeth Bruenig observed that “liberal hysteria is no longer an obstacle to good policy making or even an irritating by-product of the democratic process, but rather the desired outcome of almost all right-wing political rhetoric.” (“Lauren Boebert’s Gun Photo Is Doing Exactly What She Wanted.” Atlantic, December 8, 2021.) Or as Molly Jong-Fast observes, a Republican Party that remains in the thrall of Trump continues to make “a point of eschewing policy in favor of ‘owning the libs’ to garner likes, retweets, and small-dollar donations.” (“Owning the Libs Is the Only GOP Platform.” Atlantic, January 12, 2022.)
distribution of \( \theta \) for group \( i = 1, 2 \) is given by \( \Phi_i(\theta - m - \mu_i) \), where \( \Phi_i \) is symmetric around zero. Observe that, from an ex-ante perspective (i.e., before the realization of \( M \)), \( \mu_i \) is the expected median policy ideal point of group \( i \).

Let \( \phi_i \) and \( f \) be the pdfs of \( \Phi_i \) and \( F \), respectively. To guarantee that second-order conditions for the candidates’ optimization problems are satisfied, we assume that the distribution \( F \) has a strictly increasing hazard rate on its support, i.e., \( f(m)/(1 - F(m)) \) is strictly increasing in \( m \) (when \( F(m) \in (0, 1) \)).\(^{11}\) Finally, let \( q_i \) denote the fraction of the population that is of type \( i \).

Consistent with Hamlin and Jenning’s (2011, p. 650) observation that “expressive and instrumental motivations are best seen as joint inputs into an overall analysis of behavior,” our model incorporates a richer set of voter considerations than the canonical spatial voting model.

Specifically, the utility of a voter \( \theta \) in group \( i \) from voting for a candidate with proposed policy \( x \) is

\[
 u_{\theta, i}(x) = \alpha_i |x - \mu_{-i}| - \beta |x - \theta|. \tag{1}
\]

The first term here is the main innovation. Consistent with the literature on affective polarization, we recognize that voters from group \( i \) are motivated, to some degree, by a political dislike of the outgroup denoted \(-i\). We assume that this animus can be satisfied by voting for a candidate who espouses a position detrimental to their interests. \( \alpha_i \) is the weight on the animus utility and \( \mu_{-i} \) is the position of the median member of the outgroup. Clearly, setting \( \alpha = 0 \) reduces our model to the standard case in the literature where voters care only about policy in relation to their own ideal point.

The second term superficially corresponds to the standard spatial policy utility, though there is a slight twist here. In standard models, one may think of this policy utility either as expressive – people like to vote for the candidate whose policy they prefer – or as instrumental, i.e., they vote for the candidate they prefer based on the possibility that they might be pivotal for the election outcome, and in this case, even though it is very unlikely to arise in large elections, they strictly prefer to vote for the candidate whose policy is closer to their own ideal point.\(^{12}\)

In our model, the voters’ policy utility is also expressive, and thus can be directly compared with the first part. In fact, \( \alpha_i/\beta \) can be interpreted as a marginal rate of substitution at which

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\(^{11}\)This is a standard assumption that is satisfied, for example, for uniform and normal distributions.

\(^{12}\)This second interpretation is the one used in costly voting models, where the chance of influencing the policy outcome is what motivates (some) citizens to pay the opportunity cost of participating in the election. Consequently, costly voting models cannot explain positive participation rates in large elections, where the pivotality probability would go to zero even if preferences in the electorate are extremely closely matched. In contrast, a model in which voters’ payoff is expressive (i.e., arises from the act of voting) is consistent with the positive participation rates that we see, for example, in U.S. presidential elections even in those states where the outcome is not in question. A further indication of the importance of this utility component is that, in elections with multiple candidates, a significant number of voters cast their lots for candidates who have no chance of winning (“sincere voting”).
individual voters in group $i$ trade off their two expressive participation motives.

How can we think about the determinants of the relative magnitudes of $\alpha_i$ and $\beta$? Clearly, $\alpha_i$ is directly related to the degree with which group $i$ dislikes the outgroup. The parameter $\beta$ will depend on the cost of “cognitive dissonance” for a voter who votes for a candidate who espouses a policy position different from the voter’s own ideal position.

An important consideration for $\beta$ is the following. Suppose that the winning candidate only succeed in implementing their policy platform with probability $p$, while with probability $1-p$, the status quo remains in place. It is plausible that the (bulk of the) cognitive dissonance cost stems from the possibility of voting for a candidate and then having to live under that candidate’s disliked policy. Thus, the more dysfunctional the political system in terms of the chance that the electoral policy platforms of the winning candidate can be implemented (i.e., the lower is $p$), the smaller this cost, and thus the lower is $\beta$.

In order for us not to deal with knife-edge cases, we assume that $\alpha_i \neq \beta$ for $i = 1, 2$. If a voter’s $\alpha_i$ is exactly equal to $\beta$, then such a voter is completely indifferent between many policies, which would make characterizing the voters’ and candidates’ optimal choices more cumbersome.

The two candidates’ ideal points $\theta_L$ and $\theta_R$ are (without loss of generality) normalized to be symmetric around zero, $\theta_L = -\theta_R$. The candidates are entirely policy-motivated, with utility $u_P(x) = -|x - \theta_P|$, $P \in \{L, R\}$, where $x$ is the implemented platform. While candidates themselves harbor no animus against any group, they are aware that voters’ do, and thus rationally consider voters’ reactions when they (simultaneously) choose their policy positions $x_L, x_R \in \mathbb{R}$.

### 3 Voter behavior

In most models of electoral competition, candidates face a standard tradeoff: by moderating their policy position, they increase their probability of winning; but conditional on winning, candidates increase their utility by adopting a more extreme policy position. The introduction of different forms of expressive benefits, we find, alters this tradeoff in interesting and non-obvious ways.

To determine how candidates’ positions affect their probability of winning, we need to find the cutoff value $m(x_L, x_R)$ for the shift parameter for which the election ends in a tie, given platforms $x_L$ and $x_R$. The first step towards this objective is to identify and analyze the behavior of indifferent voters within our framework.

The voter type $\theta$ in group $i$ who is indifferent between the candidates is given by

$$\alpha_i|x_L - \mu_i| - \beta|x_L - \theta| = \alpha_i|x_R - \mu_i| - \beta|x_R - \theta|.$$  \hfill (2)
Note first that if \(x_L = x_R\), then (2) holds for all \(\theta\)—i.e., all voters are indi
different between the candidates, exactly as in the case with standard voter preferences. Intuitively, the introduction of expressive preferences does not change this result, because they are not based on a direct “partisan” preference for candidates “associated” with the voter’s in-group or out-group, as in Adams and Merrill (2003) and Erikson and Romero (1990). Rather, expressive preferences work through the candidates’ proposed policies, and if both candidates indulge voters’ appetite for antagonism equally, each voter is rendered indifferent between the candidates on this dimension.

If, by contrast, \(x_L \neq x_R\), we obtain the following result:

**Lemma 1** Let \(x_L < x_R\). Then the group \(i\) voter who is indifferent between candidates located at \(x_L\) and \(x_R\) is given by

\[
\bar{\theta}_i = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\alpha_i}{\beta} \mu_j + \frac{\beta - \alpha_i}{\beta} \cdot \frac{x_L + x_R}{2} & \text{if } x_L < \mu_j < x_R; \\
\frac{x_L + x_R}{2} + \frac{\alpha_i}{\beta} \cdot \frac{x_R - x_L}{2} & \text{if } \mu_j \geq x_L, x_R; \\
\frac{x_L + x_R}{2} - \frac{\alpha_i}{\beta} \cdot \frac{x_R - x_L}{2} & \text{if } \mu_j \leq x_L, x_R.
\end{cases}
\]

All proofs are in the Appendix.

We can begin to see how expressive considerations inform candidate position-taking. Let \(\bar{x} = \frac{x_L + x_R}{2}\) be the midpoint between the candidates’ positions. Without voter animus (\(\alpha_i = 0\)), the cutoff voter’s position is at \(\bar{\theta}_i = \bar{x}\), just like in the standard model. Now suppose, instead, that group \(i\) voters feel animus (\(\alpha_i > 0\)) towards a right-leaning out-group, and consider the case where \(\mu_j > \bar{x}\). By Lemma 1, we have that \(\bar{\theta}_i > \bar{x}\), so a group \(i\) voter with policy ideal point \(\theta = \bar{x}\) strictly prefers candidate \(L\). Intuitively, Candidate \(L\)’s policy hurts the out-group \(j\) more than Candidate \(R\)’s position because \(\mu_j > \bar{x}\). Increasing \(\alpha_i\) or decreasing \(\beta\) increases the gap between \(\bar{\theta}_i\) and \(\bar{x}\).

In contrast to the standard model, ours yields some overlap in the policy preferences of the supporters of the left and right candidates. Consider Figure 1, which assumes that the two groups’ medians are located symmetrically around zero at \(-1\) and \(1\) for groups 1 and 2, respectively;\(^{13}\) and that the candidates’ policies are distinct and symmetric around zero. Then (3) implies that \(\bar{\theta}_1 > 0\) and \(\bar{\theta}_2 < 0\), as shown.

It is instructive to compare our model with one in which each voter has a partisan attachment to one of the two parties; that is, on top of the payoff from policies, a Republican partisan receives an additional fixed, non-policy payoff from Republicans winning office, as do Democratic partisans.

\(^{13}\)Note that the aggregate distribution of voter types \(\theta\) can again be single-peaked. In particular, this is always true in the case of normal distributions.
from Democrats winning office. In such a model of partisanship, overlap also arises, because some Democratic partisans who are policy-wise closer to the Republican position will nonetheless vote for a member of their own party, just as similarly situated Republican partisans do the same.

The nature of this overlap, however, is quite different from the one that arises in our model. In the partisan model, partisanship matters most when the parties assume the same policy positions; that is, the size of the overlap in the partisan model reaches its maximum when the voter, from a pure policy perspective, is indifferent between the parties. In such a setting, almost all Democratic and Republican partisans (irrespective of their policy preferences) vote for Democrats and Republicans, respectively. In terms of the voters’ ideological positions, the overlap is complete. If, instead, the policy difference between the parties is large, then partisanship plays a smaller role because, for most people, the policy utility difference between the parties outweighs the partisan payoff.

In our model, by contrast, the overlap results from voters’ animus toward one another. If the parties’ policy positions are indistinguishable from one another, neither candidate provides much of an advantage in antagonizing the out-group. In this case, the cutoffs of both groups are very close to the average party position, and the overlap is minimal. If, instead, the difference between the parties’ positions is large, then one of the candidates is significantly worse for the out-group, and many in-group voters are willing to support that candidate even if it comes at the cost of some policy utility. Of course, the behavior among voters of the other group is symmetric. Thus, in our model, large policy differences between parties result in a large overlap in the two groups’ voting behavior.

Knowing the indifferent voter in each group allows us to determine \( m \), the critical value of the
shift parameter $M$ that determines which candidate wins the election. The election ends in a tie if

$$q_1 \Phi_1 \left( \bar{\theta}_1 - m - \mu_1 \right) + q_2 \Phi_2 \left( \bar{\theta}_2 - m - \mu_2 \right) = \frac{1}{2},$$

(4)

and the left (right) party wins for smaller (larger) values of $M$. In Lemma 2, we explicitly solve equation (4) for $m$ when the groups are equal sized and have the same preference distributions.

**Lemma 2** If $q_1 = q_2$ and $\Phi_1 = \Phi_2$, then the state at which the election ends in a tie is

$$m(x_L, x_R) = \frac{\bar{\theta}_1 + \bar{\theta}_2 - \mu_1 - \mu_2}{2},$$

(5)

where $\bar{\theta}_i$ is defined in (3).

In combination with Lemma 1, Lemma 2 reveals that animus among voters reduces candidates’ incentives to moderate in electoral competition. To see this crucial result, suppose for example that $\theta_L < x_L < x_R < \theta_R$ and hence

$$m(x_L, x_R) = \frac{\alpha_1 \mu_2 + \alpha_2 \mu_1}{2\beta} + \frac{\beta - 0.5(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)}{\beta} \cdot \frac{x_L + x_R}{2}.$$

(6)

If $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 0$, then the factor in front of the average policy position (i.e., $\frac{x_L + x_R}{2}$) simplifies to one, while this factor shrinks as $\alpha_i$ increases. Thus, in a world with animus, the marginal shift of the indifferent voter that a candidate can attract by moderation, and thus the candidate’s electoral benefit of moderation, is smaller than in a world without animus. By contrast, the candidate’s cost of moderation only depends on their policy preferences and is thus the same as in the standard model.

4 **Equilibrium Analysis**

In this section, we assume that the groups are of equal size, located symmetrically around zero (i.e., $\mu_2 = -\mu_1 = \mu$), and that the candidates’ ideal positions are also symmetric around zero ($\theta_L = -\theta_R$). Furthermore, we focus on a politically salient case in which candidates are more extreme than the medians of the two population groups (Fowler et al., 2022), and that there is some intermediate amount of uncertainty about the position shift parameter—that is, $\mu_2 < 1/(2f(0)) < \theta_R$.

Candidate $L$ and $R$ solve, respectively,

$$\max_{x_L} -F(m(x_L, x_R))(x_L - \theta_L) - (1 - F(m(x_L, x_R)))|x_R - \theta_L|,$$

(7)
max \( -F(m(x_L, x_R))|x_L - \theta_R| - (1 - F(m(x_L, x_R)))|x_R - \theta_R| \). \hfill (8)

As in most models of position choice, a candidate here trades off the benefits of positioning closer to his ideal point (good in case of victory) against the costs of reducing his winning probability. Note that \( p \), the probability that the policy is implemented, does not enter the optimization problems because candidates, being purely office-motivated, focus on those cases where their position can be implemented.

Suppose that \( x_L < -\mu \) and \( x_R > \mu \). Substituting \( \mu_2 = -\mu_1 = \mu \) into equation (6) implies

\[
m = \frac{\mu(\alpha_1 - \alpha_2)}{2\beta} + \frac{\beta - \bar{\alpha}}{\beta} \frac{x_L + x_R}{2},
\]

where \( \bar{\alpha} = (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)/2 \) denotes the average level of animus.

### 4.1 Low to Moderate Levels of Baseline Animus

Having established preliminaries, we now consider a situation in which inter-group animus is not especially large. In particular, let \( \bar{\alpha} \leq \beta \).

Is there an equilibrium in which both candidates adopt positions between their respective ideal points and zero? As proved in Lemma 3 in the Appendix, for an interior equilibrium with \( x_L > \theta_L \) and \( x_R < \theta_R \), the following first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient:

\[
- f(m(x_L, x_R)) \left( \frac{\beta - \bar{\alpha}}{2\beta} \right) (x_L - x_R) - F(m(x_L, x_R)) = 0, \hfill (10)
\]
\[
- f(m(x_L, x_R)) \left( \frac{\beta - \bar{\alpha}}{2\beta} \right) (x_R - x_L) + (1 - F(m(x_L, x_R))) = 0. \hfill (11)
\]

When we add these equations, the first terms of both equations cancel out, such that \( F(m) = 1/2 \). Thus, we see that in equilibrium both candidates win with probability 1/2, and hence \( m = 0 \). Using this, (9) and (10) imply

\[
x_L = -\frac{\beta + f(0)\mu(\alpha_1 - \alpha_2)}{f(0)(2\beta - \alpha_1 - \alpha_2)}; \hfill (12)
\]
\[
x_R = \frac{\beta + f(0)\mu(\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)}{f(0)(2\beta - \alpha_1 - \alpha_2)}. \hfill (13)
\]

Averaging (12) and (13), the expected policy position is

\[
\frac{x_L + x_R}{2} = \frac{\mu(\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)}{2\beta - (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\mu \Delta \alpha}{2\beta - \bar{\alpha}}, \hfill (14)
\]
where $\Delta \alpha = \alpha_2 - \alpha_1$ is the animus difference, and $\bar{\alpha} = (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)/2$ is the average animus.

We now want to identify the parameter values for animus under which candidates choose interior positions, and those for which candidates choose their ideal points. Without loss of generality, assume that $\Delta \alpha \geq 0$ (the case where $\Delta \alpha < 0$ is analogous).

In this case, by (14), the expected policy is right-of-center. This implies that, as $\bar{\alpha}$ increases, $x_R$ will reach $\theta_R$ before $x_L$ reaches $\theta_L$. A further marginal increase in $\bar{\alpha}$ then only decreases $x_L$, while keeping $x_R$ at $\theta_R$. This result is formally stated in the following proposition:

**Proposition 1** In the symmetric model (i.e., $\theta_R = -\theta_L$, $\mu_2 = -\mu_1 = \mu$), let $\mu < 0.5/f(0) < \theta_R$ and $\Delta \alpha \geq 0$. Then there exists $k_1 \leq k_2 < \beta$ (where $k_1$ and $k_2$ are given by (20) and (21) in the Appendix, respectively), such that the following holds:

1. There exists an equilibrium. The equilibrium is unique for all $\bar{\alpha} \leq \beta$.

2. If $\bar{\alpha} < k_1$, then $x_L$ and $x_R$ are given by (12) and (13), respectively. Each candidate wins with probability 0.5.

3. If $k_1 < \bar{\alpha} < k_2$, then $x_R = \theta_R$ and $x_L > \theta_L$.

4. If $k_2 < \bar{\alpha} \leq \beta$, then $x_L = \theta_L$ and $x_R = \theta_R$. Candidate $R$’s winning probability is $F(\Delta \alpha/\beta) \geq 0.5$.

5. Changing $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$ can only change the candidates’ winning probabilities if it changes $\Delta \alpha$.

Proposition 1 shows that increasing animus leads to polarization between candidates, even though the candidates themselves are only policy-motivated. The intuition here is straightforward: as animus increases, voters in both groups become less willing to switch to the candidate associated with the out-group, and therefore both candidates have less incentive to moderate.

Figure 2 displays the equilibrium policy positions when animus is symmetric, i.e., $\bar{\alpha} = \alpha_1 = \alpha_2$. Initially, as animus increases, both candidates deviate from one another by equal measure. These deviations, moreover, steadily increase until both candidates simultaneously reach their ideal points $\theta_i, i = L, R$. Throughout, Proposition 1 stipulates, both candidates have an equal probability of winning.

Now consider a situation with asymmetric animus. In Figure 3, we assume that the left-wing group 1 does not feel any animus against group 2 ($\alpha_1 = 0$). We then increase group 2’s animus against group 1, so that $\Delta \alpha > 0$. Again, we find that both candidates’ policy positions become more extreme. In contrast to Figure 2, however, Candidate $R$ reaches her ideal point $\theta_R$ before
Figure 2: Symmetric animus. Candidate positions when $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \bar{\alpha}$: $\theta_R = 1.5$, $\theta_L = -1.5$, $\beta = 1.5$, $F \sim N(0, 0.5)$.

Candidate $L$. Further, unlike in the symmetric case, Candidate $R$’s probability of winning the election also increases when animus increases.

Lastly, we evaluate the comparative statics on the weight as signed to cognitive dissonance, $\beta$. Remember that one of the interpretations was that a higher probability that a candidate’s proposed policy would be implemented translates into a higher $\beta$. For example, an increased probability that a proposed policy does not just irritate an out-group, but that it is actually implemented, would result in a higher weight on the cognitive dissonance cost because it would be costly for the voter to know that he voted for a policy that he now has to live with and does not like.

**Corollary 1** Consider an interior equilibrium where positions are determined by (12) and (13), and assume $\Delta\alpha \geq 0$. As $\beta$ increases,

1. Polarization, $x_R - x_L$, decreases, and the average policy, $0.5(x_R + x_L)$, moves towards zero.

2. Candidate $R$, the candidate associated with the group with stronger animus, becomes more moderate. Candidate $L$ becomes more moderate if and only if $\bar{\alpha} > f(0)\Delta\alpha$.

The corollary shows that candidates are less likely to indulge voters’ appetite for antagonism when $\beta$ increases; polarization decreases, and the average policy moves closer to the center. Furthermore,
candidate $R$, who is aligned with voters who harbor animus, always moderates whenever either of these parameters increases. By contrast, candidate $L$, who is aligned with voters who harbor no animus, becomes more moderate if and only if $\bar{\alpha} > f(0)\Delta\alpha$.

Intuitively, an increase in $\beta$ does not affect the candidates’ utilities directly, but it does increase the marginal voter’s cost of posturing. Thus, voters react more strongly to candidate positions, which generally encourages candidates to moderate their positions.

### 4.2 High Levels of Baseline Animus

We now consider the case where animus becomes large, i.e. $\bar{\alpha} > \beta$. Establishing equilibrium existence here is significantly eased when the set of policies that candidates can choose is bounded. We therefore assume that $x_L, x_R$ are restricted to the interval $[-X, X]$, where $X > \theta_R$. All other preliminaries carry through as before.

Our first proposition considers a symmetric setting in which $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$ (i.e., $\Delta\alpha = 0$) and is the natural extension of Proposition 1 above. As before, an increase in animus leads to higher polarization between the candidates. In this instance, though, candidates’ policy position do not converge to their ideal points. Rather, candidates cater to voters’ heightened animus by assuming...
positions that are even more extreme than their ideal points; and for \( \alpha \) sufficiently large, candidates choose the most extreme policies available, \(-X\) and \(X\), respectively.

**Proposition 2** Let \( \theta_R = -\theta_L; \mu_2 = -\mu_1 = \mu; \) and \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha > p + \beta \). Furthermore, suppose the set of feasible positions is given by \([-X, X]\), where \(X > \theta_R\). Then,

1. for an interior equilibrium, the first-order conditions (24) and (25) are necessary and sufficient;

2. there exists \( k > \beta \), such that for all \( \alpha > k \), \(x_L = -X\) and \(x_R = X\).

Intuitively, when \( \bar{\alpha} > \beta \), voters become more willing to vote for a candidate who proposes a policy farther away from their ideal point as long as it harms the out-group. In such a setting, the trade-off between electability and their policy preferences drives candidates to positions that are more extreme than not only voters’ ideal positions, but also their own.

When we allow members of the two groups to experience different levels of animus towards one another, the results change substantially. Consider a setting in which only group 2 dislikes group 1, i.e., \( \alpha_1 = 0 \), and let \( \alpha_2 \) be large. To simplify the argument, let us further assume that both \( \Phi \) and \( F \) have bounded support. In this scenario, we find, increases in animus do not cause the candidates to polarize. To the contrary, they produce a political environment in which both candidates cater to the policy interests of the group consumed with anger.

Why is this so? Suppose, by way of contradiction, that candidate positions are at \(-X\) and \(X\), respectively. Then, (3) implies that \( \bar{\theta}_2 = -\alpha_2 \mu / \beta \) goes to \(-\infty \). Thus, bounded support of the type and shock distribution implies that all voters in group 2 support Candidate \( R \). Further, if the support of \( F \) is not too large compared to the distribution \( \Phi \), it follows that a strictly positive share of group 2 voters supports Candidate \( R \). Consequently, Candidate \( R \) wins with probability 1. This outcome, however, cannot happen in equilibrium. To see why, consider a deviation by Candidate \( L \) to a position that is slightly to the left of \(X\). Then \( L \)’s winning probability becomes strictly positive, and thus \(x_L < X\) is implemented with strictly positive probability. Hence \(x_L = -X, x_R = X\) is not an equilibrium. Instead, the equilibrium is asymmetric, with Candidate \( L \) choosing \(x_L \in (\mu, \theta_R)\), while Candidate \( R \) chooses \(x_R > \theta_R\).

We formalize this intuition in the following proposition:

**Proposition 3** Suppose that \( \Phi \) and \( F \) have bounded support. Let \( \theta_R = -\theta_L, \mu_2 = -\mu_1 = \mu, \) and \( q_1 = q_2 = 0.5 \). Policies are restricted to the interval \([-X, X]\) where \( \theta_R < X < \theta_R + 2\mu \). For any fixed \( \alpha_1 \), there exists \( k > 0 \) such that for \( \alpha_2 > k \), the unique equilibrium has the following features:
1. the positions of both candidates converge to $\theta_R$ as $\alpha_2 \to \infty$;

2. positions satisfy $\mu < x_L < \theta_R < x_R$;

3. and Candidate L is more likely to win than Candidate R.

Figure 4 illustrates the implications of Proposition 3 for the case that group 2 (on the right) harbors animus against group 1, but not vice versa. As $\alpha_2$ increases, the two candidates do not moderate to a position between their respective ideal points. Rather, we see Candidate R assuming less extreme positions that are closer to her ideal point, while Candidate L deviates sharply from her preferred policy. Asymptotically, the two candidates converge to $\theta_R$ (marked by the dashed line), as Candidate L (who is aligned with the harmonious, and now abandoned, voters in group 1) capitulates to Candidate R (who is aligned with the enraged, and now accommodated, voters in group 2).

In the right panel we present Candidate R’s winning probabilities, where the dashed line is the limit predicted by Proposition 3. Candidate R’s winning probability increases in $\alpha_2$, but it remains much less than 0.5. By moving to the right, we find, Candidate L accepts significantly inferior policy positions in order to increase her chances of winning. The result is a political landscape in which the candidate who is aligned with the only group that harbors large amounts of animus wins relatively rarely, but remains perfectly content with the outcome as the other candidate does her policy bidding.\textsuperscript{14}

5 Endogenous Animus

In addition to responding to people’s pre-existing antipathies, politicians also stoke them.\textsuperscript{15} To clarify the conditions that support such activity, we adapt our baseline model to allow a candidate to manipulate the amount of animus one group of voters feels about another (or both feel about each other).

When endogenizing $\alpha_i$, candidates’ behavior depends on whether increases in animus felt by one group can occur without affecting the other; or whether, instead, levels of animus are commonly experienced across both groups. In the latter case, wherein a candidate can only increase $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$ by the same amount, inflammatory speech has no benefit. As Proposition 1 indicates, if $\alpha = \alpha_1 = \alpha_2$ and $\alpha$ is increased but remains below $\bar{\alpha}$, then both candidate positions become more

\textsuperscript{14}Proposition 3 further indicates that the limiting policy, as well as the winning probabilities, are independent of $\beta$. The latter follows, because the limit cutoff value $m^*$ is determined solely by $\theta_R$ and the distribution $F$.

\textsuperscript{15}For example, Ash et al. (2017) examine how members of Congress allocate time across different issues in their floor speeches, and they find that US senators focus on divisive issues when they are up for election.
extreme, but the candidates’ ex-ante expected utilities do not change. If $\alpha$ is raised above $\tilde{\alpha}$, then both candidates are actually worse off. Consequently, if a candidate pays any cost associated with increasing animus, then $\alpha = 0$ is optimal.

Things look very different, however, when candidates communicate through segregated communication channels. When an increase in the animus felt by one group does not automatically induce equivalent increases felt by the other, candidates may have incentives to foment inter-group hatred—at least under some well-specified conditions. To see this, suppose again that both groups have the same size ($q_1 = q_2 = 1/2$), with $\mu_2 = -\mu_1 = \mu$, and that $\phi$ and $f$ are symmetric. Again, consider the setting of Section 4.1 in which candidates are symmetric ($\theta_R = -\theta_L$) and $\mu < 0.5/f(0) < \theta_R$. The only difference now is that each candidate can choose, at cost $c(\alpha_i) = b\alpha_i$, the level of $\alpha_i$ in the group with which she is ideologically aligned. After this choice becomes common knowledge, the game proceeds as before with the candidates adopting positions, voters selecting a winner, and proposed policies being implemented probabilistically.

Remember that, for equilibria with $\theta_L < x_L < x_R < \theta_R$, the policy positions are given by (12) and (13). We first analyze whether there exist equilibrium animus levels $\alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2$, such that
policies are strictly between $\theta_L$ and $\theta_R$.

For such an equilibrium to exist, the winning probabilities must be $1/2$ even if $\alpha_1 \neq \alpha_2$. In the first stage, therefore, Candidate $R$ solves $\max_{\alpha_2} 0.5x_L(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) + 0.5x_R(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) - b\alpha_2$, subject to (i) $x_R(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) < \theta_R$ and (ii) $x_L(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) > \theta_L$. Note that (14) implies that this function is strictly convex in $\alpha_2$. Hence, the solution is either at $\alpha_1 = 0$ or at a point where constraints (i) or (ii) bind. A similar argument holds for Candidate $L$.

For larger $\alpha = \alpha_1 = \alpha_2$, both candidates choose policies at their respective ideal points. The cutoff value for which this occurs is given in (15) below. Once $\alpha$ exceeds another threshold $\tilde{\alpha}$, also defined in (15), no equilibrium exists unless policies are restricted to some compact interval $C = [-X, X]$. If this interval is sufficiently large, then candidates do not have an incentive to raise animus to a level where policies reach the boundary of this set. Thus, in the following we assume that policies are exogenously bounded, but that these bounds are not binding. This ensures that equilibria are defined in all subgames, but the subgames in which the bounds matter are off the equilibrium path.

Proposition 4, whose remaining steps are proved in the Appendix, summarizes the candidates’ decisions about whether to stoke animus.

**Proposition 4** Suppose that $\theta_R = -\theta_L$, $\mu_2 = -\mu_1 = \mu$, the distribution and size of groups is identical, and $\mu < 1/(2f(0)) < \theta_R$. Let

$$\tilde{\alpha} = \beta \left(1 - \frac{1}{2\theta_R f(0)}\right).$$

Then,

1. in any subgame perfect and symmetric pure strategy equilibrium, animus is either $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 0$ or $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 \geq \tilde{\alpha}$;

2. there exists $\tilde{b} > 0$ such that a subgame perfect, pure strategy equilibrium with no animus ($\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 0$) exists if and only if $b \geq \tilde{b}$. The cost cutoff $\tilde{b}$ is strictly increasing in $\beta$.

Proposition 4 reveals that any increase in animus will occur rapidly if the cost of increasing animus or the candidates’ policy preferences fluctuate over time. A very slight change in these underlying fundamentals may move the candidates from a situation in which widespread comity prevails ($\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 0$) to one in which candidates incite significant inter-group hostilities.

Note also that a candidate’s interest in stoking animus depends upon the weight that voters assign to concerns about cognitive dissonance, $\beta$. When $\beta$ increases, the second point of Proposition 4 shows, the cost threshold at which a candidate no longer invests in animus increases. As a
result, candidates choose lower levels of animus when voters are particularly concerned about the costs of cognitive dissonance.

6 Discussion

By embedding a richer voter utility function within a standard model of electoral competition, we discover new facts about the origins of partisan polarization, the dynamics of partisan sorting and representation, the animosities that roil our new, more fragmented media landscape, and the electoral consequences of separation of powers.

Partisan Polarization. Our model speaks most directly to an empirical phenomenon that has long puzzled scholars of American politics: namely, why the two major parties have grown increasingly polarized at a time when voters, in the main, have remained ideologically moderate (Ansolabehere et al., 2006; Fiorina et al., 2008; Fowler et al., 2022; Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015). To reconcile these two facts, scholars have offered a variety of explanations that implicate the rise of money in politics (e.g., Baron (1994); Moon (2004); Ensley (2009)), changes in partisan coalitions (Levendusky, 2009), political activists (Layman et al., 2010), partisan primaries (Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015, 2018; Hirano et al., 2010; Krasa and Polborn, 2018), rule changes within Congress (Theriault, 2008; Polborn and Snyder Jr, 2017), increasing partisan competition (Lee, 2009), and growing wealth and income inequality (McCarty et al., 2016). To the mix, we add another that focuses our attention squarely on the voters’ expressive needs.

Expressive considerations are not of a piece. Moreover, we show, they pull in different directions. As voters care more about minimizing cognitive dissonance, our model reveals, candidates assume increasingly moderate positions. But as voters’ animosities toward an out-group grow, regardless of whether such animosities are reciprocated, candidates drift to the extremes. A political world in which anchoring beliefs seem less important and inter-group hostilities become inflamed, our model reveals, supports rising levels of polarization.

Notice, too, how the voters themselves drive these changes. Whereas much of the existing literature on the causes of polarization points towards external factors that push against the otherwise moderating influence of voters (for a review, see McCarty (2019), chapter 5), and whereas a vast behavioral literature suggests that ill-informed and politically naive voters blindly follow members of their own party or reflexively reject members of the opposition (e.g., Achen and Bartels (2017)), our model reveals how policy polarization can result from political elites exploiting divisions among voters that are unrelated to policy. To draw a straight line from polarized elites to

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17 For further discussion of these and other potential causes of polarization, see Barber and McCarty 2018; McCarty 2019.
an electorate, one need not reject the possibility that voters hold relatively moderate policy views; nor must one adopt an especially dim view of voters’ agency or knowledge. Rather, one need only recognize the expressive needs that inform people’s voting behavior.

Partisan Sorting and Representation. A substantial body of work investigates when voters sort themselves into parties that best represent their policy preferences; and when, instead, voters support a party with which they merely share some allegiance or identity (see, e.g., (Levendusky, 2009)). Our model clarifies how expressive considerations affect both the propensity of voters to ally themselves with a party that may not represent their policy views well, and the implications their choices have for candidate behavior.

Animus, we show, reifies partisanship and other ascriptive characteristics. As animus towards an out-group increases, voters are inclined to stick with the party with which they are associated, even when the other party does a better job of representing its policy views. Recognizing these calculations by voters, the candidates tack toward their ideal points and, if animus is sufficiently severe and symmetric, beyond. Meanwhile, when animus is high and asymmetric, we see party allegiances hold even as the substantive representation of one group’s policy views altogether evaporates. As a result, rising levels of animus strengthen the appeal of parties that are either ideologically extreme or indistinguishable from one another.

The New Media Landscape. Much has been written about the downsides of an increasingly fragmented media market in which consumers self-select into self-affirming news environments (for reviews, see Prior (2013); Winneg et al. (2014); Barberá (2020)). In this new media landscape, it is argued, communication is channelled through enclaves of like-minded individuals. Opportunities for persuasion, mutual understanding, and even the shared recognition of common facts all run in short supply. The result, say some, is a polity that is increasingly divided and “a breeding ground for extremism” (Sunstein, 2018, 71).18

Our model highlights yet another pathology associated with the proliferation of these exclusionary channels of political communication. Recall how candidates behave when given the opportunity to manipulate inter-group tensions. When their actions affect voters’ understandings of both groups, as assuredly occurs when they are viewed by an entire electorate, candidates seek to temper animosities. By increasing the animus felt by all voters, candidates are driven to the extremes of the policy spectrum without recovering any clear electoral reward. But when candidates can target their messages to voters more closely associated with their own group, their incentives suddenly shift. A candidate is more likely to win re-election, after all, when voters’ enmity toward a group associated with the opposition grows. Rather than counsel inter-group tolerance and

18 But see Barberá (2020) for a discussion of empirical studies that suggest that cross-cutting interactions occur more frequently than is usually supposed.
understanding, therefore, candidates in this setting stoke voters’ animosities toward an out-group.

It is clear to see how the new media landscape puts us squarely in this latter world. But notice the source of the polarization that arises. The problem is not just that voters only hear views from political elites with whom they are aligned. The problem also is that voters are not privy to other communications in which their group is the target of hostilities. This structural asymmetry, in which voters rarely hear what the opposition is saying about groups to which they are affiliated, encourages political elites to foment inter-group hatreds. Changes in the media environment, as such, do not just facilitate new patterns of communication and behavior, as documented by the existing empirical literatures on the media. These changes also alter the political incentives for political elites to stoke animosities within an electorate.

**Separation of Powers.** Our model reveals an interesting, under-appreciated, and vaguely ironic pathology of systems of separated power, which deliberately impede the translation of campaign promises into established law. In the United States, the Constitution’s framers divided power among the various branches of government not just to guard against the accumulation of authority in any single individual or faction. They did so, also, as a check against the worst impulses of what they considered to be an ill-informed, unreasoning electorate. Through staggered elections and the distribution of state power across multiple and sometimes overlapping jurisdictions, it was thought, the government—and by extension, the nation itself—would be afforded some measure of protection against the turbulences and follies of popular sentiment.

James Madison makes the point most forcefully in *Federalist Paper 10*. In it, he recognizes the unavoidable “propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities” that yield factions intending to “vex and oppress each other.” Unable to extinguish the “impulse of passion,” the government instead must seek to control its effects. Because “the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed,” Madison insists, “relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.” And the primary way of doing that is through the separation of powers.

At one level, Madison’s design plainly succeeds. Separation of powers makes it nearly impossible for any one individual, no matter where she resides within the federal government, to advance a policy agenda all on her own. Consequentially, the outcome of any single election bears only weakly on the production of public policies, and the damage wrought by a would-be demagogue is mitigated.

Our model, however, reveals two other ways in which separation of powers agitates the very political forces that Madison sought to contain. To begin, notice the effect that separation of powers has on candidate position-taking. Precisely because the probability of implementation is relatively small in systems of separated powers, voters have a relatively low cost of insincere posturing (i.e., a low $\beta$ in the language of our model). Thus, candidates have greater incentives to indulge the
voters animus—the baser passions and animosities, that is, that Madison lamented. Rather than suppressing these expressive considerations, separation of powers unleashes them into the polity. Precisely because the probability of policy change is relatively low in systems of separated powers, candidates have greater incentives to craft positions that are designed, ever more, to antagonize—or “vex,” to borrow Madison’s nomenclature—the opposition. And to do so, the candidates assume ever more increasingly extreme policy positions.

Another effect arises when animus is endogenized. As Proposition 4 tells us, the propensity of candidates to stoke inter-group rivalries decreases when the probability that a proposal becomes law is small (so that $\beta$ is small). To the extent that separation of powers impedes lawmaking, therefore, it serves as a font of incendiary public appeals.

Separation of powers, we now can see, functions at different registers. In ways Madison plainly intended, this institutional design impedes the designs of a demagogue. But in ways he obviously did not, this same institutional design increases the chances that demagoguery takes hold in the first place.

7 Conclusion

We study a model of electoral competition in which candidates’ positions matter not just for the production of policy, but also for the affirmation of voters’ self-understandings and group enmities. By incorporating both instrumental and expressive considerations into the voter’s utility, we recover reasonably clear comparative statics on candidate position-taking, electoral fortunes, and the manipulation of inter-group animosities. Because the model does not incorporate candidate entry, all of these effects derive from changing electoral incentives.

Whereas concerns about cognitive dissonance discourage candidate extremism, we show, inter-group animosities encourage it. When the stakes of an election are low, either because insufficient power is vested in an office or because other (un-modeled) political entities stand in its way, candidates can be expected to indulge voters’ expressive needs and wants. And when candidates can target their communications, they have individual incentives to inflame inter-group tensions, even though doing so makes them collectively worse off.

As candidates intermittently accommodate or aggravate voters’ expressive needs, extremism and demagoguery take root. From the very beginning, the nation’s founders worried that politicians might “flatter [citizens’] prejudices to betray their interests,” as Alexander Hamilton famously wrote in Federalist 71. Less appreciated, though, were the risks that either siloed channels of political communication or a system of separated powers might hasten this eventuality. Our model
excavates such possibilities and illuminates their consequence for electoral politics.
References


8 Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1. In case that $\mu_j < x_L, x_R$ or $\mu_j > x_L, x_R$, simplifying (2) yields

$$\beta|x_R - \bar{\theta}_i| - \beta|x_L - \bar{\theta}_i| = \begin{cases} 
\alpha(x_R - x_L) & \text{if } \mu_j < x_L, x_R \\
-\alpha(x_R - x_L) & \text{if } \mu_j > x_L, x_R
\end{cases}$$

(16)

If, on the left-hand side, the two terms inside the absolute values are either both positive or both negative, the equation simplifies to $\alpha = \beta$ (i.e., the case that all individuals are indifferent between all policy positions), or $\alpha = -\beta$, a contradiction since both parameters are positive by assumption.

Thus, consider the case $x_L < \bar{\theta}_i < x_R$. Simplifying (2) then yields the expressions in the statement of the lemma.

In case that $x_L < \mu_j < x_R$, attempting $\bar{\theta}_i < x_L, x_R$ or $> x_L, x_R$ leads to an immediate contradiction. Thus, conjecture that $\bar{\theta}_i \in [x_L, x_R]$. Then, simplifying (2) yields the expression in the statement of the lemma. ■

Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that the distributions $\Phi_i$ are symmetric around zero. Thus, if $q_1 = q_2$ and $\Phi_1 = \Phi_2$ then (4) holds if and only if $\bar{\theta}_1 - m - \mu_1 = -(\bar{\theta}_2 - m - \mu_2)$. Solving this equation for $m$ yields (5). ■

Lemma 3

1. If $\bar{\alpha} < \beta$ then:

(a) any solution to the first-order conditions (10) or (11) solves the candidates’ optimization problems.

(b) any solution to the first-order conditions (24) or (25) is a local Nash equilibrium.

2. If $\bar{\alpha} > \beta$ then:

(a) (10) and (11) have no solution. In particular, Candidate L’s expected payoff is strictly decreasing in $x_L$, while Candidate R’s is strictly increasing in $x_R$.

(b) any solution to the first-order conditions (24) and (25) solves the candidates’ optimization problems. Further, the solutions depends on $x_L$ and $x_R$ only through the average $\bar{x} = (x_L + x_R)/2$.

(c) Any solution to (29) and (30) is a local Nash equilibrium if $x_L \geq \mu$. 29
Proof of Lemma 3. First consider the first-order condition (10), and let $x^*_L$ be a solution for given $x_R$. We show that, if this first order condition holds for $L$ or $R$, respectively, then the left-hand side is decreasing in $x_L$ and $x_R$, respectively in the neighborhood of any solution of the first order condition.

Suppose that $\bar{\alpha} > \beta$. Then the left-hand side of (10) is strictly negative, i.e., increasing $x_L$ lowers Candidate $L$’s expected payoff, while (11) is strictly negative, i.e., Candidate $R$’s expected payoff strictly increases with $x_R$. This also implies that there is no solution to the first-order condition in this case.

Now suppose that $\bar{\alpha} < \beta$. Dividing both sides of (10) by $\dfrac{1}{1-F(m)}$, and using the symmetry of the distribution $F$ yields

\[
\frac{f(-m)}{1-F(-m)} \left( \frac{\beta - \bar{\alpha}}{2\beta} \right) (x_R - x_L) - 1.
\] (17)

Equation (9) implies that $m$ is strictly increasing in $x_L$. Because $F$ has a monotone hazard rate, $f(-m)/(1 - F(-m))$ is decreasing in $x_L$. Similarly, $x_R - x_L$ is decreasing in $x_L$ and hence the fact that $\beta - \bar{\alpha} > 0$ implies that (17) is decreasing in $x_L$. Thus, if (10) is zero at $x^*_L$, then (24) is strictly positive for $x_L < x^*_L$, and strictly negative when $x_L > x^*_L$. Thus, any solution to the first order condition (10) maximizes Candidate $L$’s utility, i.e., is a global maximum.

The argument for Candidate $R$’s first order condition (11) is similar. In this case, we divide both sides of (11) by $1 - F(m)$ and again use the fact that the hazard rate is monotone.

Now consider the first-order condition (24) for Candidate $L$. Suppose that $x_L + x_R > 2\theta_L$. For the first-order condition to hold, $\bar{\alpha} > \beta$. Now divide the left-hand side of (24) by $F(m)$ and use symmetry of the distribution to get

\[
\left( \frac{\beta - \bar{\alpha}}{2\beta} \right) \dfrac{f(-m)}{1-F(-m)} (x_R + x_L - 2\theta_L) + 1.
\] (18)

Because $\bar{\alpha} > \beta$ equation (9) implies that $m$ decreases as $x_L$ is increased. Hence, $f(-m)/(1 - F(m))$ increases with $x_L$. Similarly, the third factor in (18) is strictly increasing in $x_L$. Thus, the product of these two positive factor is strictly increasing. Because $\bar{\alpha} > \beta$ it follows that (18) is strictly decreasing in $x_L$. We can therefore again conclude that any solution to the first order condition is a global maximum. (The argument for Candidate $R$ is analogous.)

Now suppose that $x_L + x_R < 2\theta_L$. Then $\bar{\alpha} < \beta$. We can rewrite (18) as follows

\[- \left( \frac{\beta - \bar{\alpha}}{2\beta} \right) \dfrac{f(-m)}{1-F(-m)} (2\theta_L - x_L - x_R) + 1.
\] (19)

Because $\bar{\alpha} < \beta$ it follows that $m$ increases as $x_L$ is increased. Thus, $f(-m)/(1 - F(-m))$ decreases
with \(x_L\). Similarly, \(2\theta_L - x_L - x_R > 0\) and decreasing in \(x_L\). Because the first factor in (19) is strictly negative, it follows that (19) is strictly increasing. Thus, a solution to the first order condition is a minimum in this case. Again, a similar argument applies for Candidate \(R\).

Finally, suppose that (29) and (30) are satisfied. Similar arguments again show the left-hand sides of the equations are strictly decreasing at any solution. Thus, any solution to both equations is a local equilibrium if \(x_L > \mu\).

**Proof of Proposition 1.** First, suppose that \(\bar{\alpha} < \beta\). Lemma 3 implies that neither (24) nor (25) applies. Thus, we have the following possibilities: (i) both (10) and (11) must be satisfied; (ii) only one of the first-order condition holds, while the other candidate chooses a policy at his ideal point; (iii) both candidates are at their respective ideal policy positions.

Case (i) is discussed in the text, and the formulas for \(x_L\) and \(x_R\) are derived. It is also immediate that the equilibrium is unique. Further, this type of equilibrium exists for all \(\bar{\alpha} < k_1\), where \(k_1\) is given by the value of \(\bar{\alpha}\) that makes \(x_R\) equal to \(\theta_R\). This yields

\[
k_1 = \beta \left(1 - \frac{1}{2\theta_R f(0)} - \frac{\mu \Delta \alpha}{2\theta_R} \right).
\]

(20)

When \(\bar{\alpha}\) increases above \(k_1\), Candidate \(R\)'s position remains at \(x_R = \theta_R\). Lemma 3 implies that Candidate \(L\)'s position is given by the solution of the first-order condition (10) if we substitute \(x_R = \theta_R\). Note that, if \(\bar{\alpha} = \beta\), then (9) implies that the cutoff realization \(m = -\Delta \alpha / \beta\), and is therefore independent of \(x_L\) and \(x_R\). Thus, the solutions of maximization problems (7) and (8) are \(x_L = \theta_L\) and \(x_R = \theta_R\), respectively. Thus, as \(\bar{\alpha}\) increases above \(k_1\), we must eventually reach the point where \(x_L = \theta_L\). At this point, the first order condition (10) must hold with equality. Raising \(\bar{\alpha}\) and keeping \(x_L = \theta_L\) immediately implies that the left-hand side of (10) becomes strictly negative.

Furthermore, the cutoff value for \(\bar{\alpha}\) is given by

\[
k_2 = \beta \left(1 - \frac{1 - F \left(\frac{\mu \Delta \alpha}{2\beta}\right)}{f \left(\frac{\mu \Delta \alpha}{2\beta}\right) \theta_R} \right).
\]

(21)

Note that \(k_2 > k_1\) if \(\Delta \alpha > 0\), because \(F\) has a monotone hazard rate, and hence \((1 - F(m))/f(m) < (1 - F(0))/f(0) = 1/(2f(0))\).

For \(\bar{\alpha} = \beta > k_2\), the change in a candidate’s position has no impact on the election probability. In particular, (9) implies that the cutoff is given by \(m = -\mu \Delta \alpha/(2\beta + 2\rho)\).

Lemma 3 indicates that only (24) and (25) can apply if \(\bar{\alpha} > \beta\). Thus, for \(\bar{\alpha} \leq \beta\) we get the cases that we just analyzed.
Proof of Corollary 1. Differentiating (13) with respect to $\beta$ yields

\[
\frac{\partial x_R}{\partial \beta} = \frac{[f(0) (2\beta - 2\bar{\alpha})] - 2f(0)[\beta + f(0)\mu(\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)]}{[f(0) (2\beta - \alpha_1 - \alpha_2)]^2} = \frac{-2f(0)[\bar{\alpha} + f(0)\mu\Delta\alpha]}{[2f(0) (\beta - \bar{\alpha})]^2},
\]

which is always negative. Thus, an increase in $\beta$ leads to a leftward shift in $x_R$. Similarly,

\[
\frac{\partial x_L}{\partial \beta} = -f(0) (2\beta + \Delta\alpha) - [\beta - f(0)\mu\Delta\alpha]2f(0) = \frac{2f(0)[\bar{\alpha} - f(0)\Delta\alpha]}{[2f(0) (\beta - \bar{\alpha})]^2}.
\]

This is positive if and only if the term in square brackets is positive; thus, in particular, if $\Delta\alpha$ is sufficiently close to zero. ■

Proof of Proposition 2. When $\alpha$ is large, $x_L < \theta_L$ and $x_R > \theta_R$ then the following first-order conditions are clearly necessary for an equilibrium.

\[
-f(m(x_L, x_R)) \left( \frac{\beta - \bar{\alpha}}{2\beta} \right) (2\theta_L - x_R - x_L) + F(m(x_L, x_R)) = 0, \tag{24}
\]

\[
-f(m(x_L, x_R)) \left( \frac{\beta - \bar{\alpha}}{2\beta} \right) (2\theta_R - x_R - x_L) - (1 - F(m(x_L, x_R))) = 0. \tag{25}
\]

Furthermore, by Lemma 3, these first-order conditions are, in fact, sufficient conditions for an equilibrium. This proves the first claim.

Note that we can replace $x_L$ and $x_R$ in (24) and (25) by the average policy $\bar{x} = (x_L + x_R)/2$. The same is true for (9). Thus, we have an overdetermined system, because there are three equations but only two variables $\bar{x}$ and $m$. As a consequence, these first order conditions can only be satisfied for some values of $\bar{x}$, and they will not hold if $\bar{x}$ becomes sufficiently large.

Then, the left-hand side of (24) becomes strictly negative, while the right-hand side of (25) becomes strictly positive at $x_L = -X$ and $x_R = X$. Thus, in equilibrium both players choose the most extreme policy positions available and win with probability 0.5. ■

Proof of Proposition 3. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that the critical value of $m$ is given by (9) if $x_L < -\mu < \mu < x_R$. If $\mu < x_L < x_R$ then the cutoff is given by

\[
m(x_L, x_R) = \frac{x_L + x_R}{2} - \frac{x_R - x_L}{2} \frac{\bar{x}}{\beta}, \tag{26}
\]

First, suppose that $x_L < -\mu$ and $x_R > \mu$. Then the first-order conditions (24) and (25) apply.
Subtracting (24) from (25) and substituting the result into (25) we get the following two equations:

\[ 2\theta_R f(m) \left( \frac{\bar{\alpha} - \beta}{\beta} \right) = 1; \quad (27) \]
\[ \frac{\theta_R - \bar{x}}{2\theta_R} = 1 - F(m). \quad (28) \]

In addition, \( m \) is given by (9).

For every \( \bar{\alpha} > \beta \) there is a unique \( \bar{x} \) that solves (28). Let \( \Delta \alpha \geq 0 \). Then (9) implies \( m \leq 0 \) for \( \bar{x} = 0 \), which implies \( 1 - F(m) \geq 0.5 \). Hence, the left-hand side of (28) is less or equal to the right-hand side. Next, let \( \bar{x} = -\theta_R \). Then the left-hand side of (28) is one, and therefore at least as large as the right-hand side. Hence, by continuity there exists a \( \bar{x} \) that solves (28).

To show uniqueness, note that the left-hand side of (28) is strictly decreasing in \( \bar{x} \). Further, (9) implies that increasing \( \bar{x} \) decreases \( m \) because \( \bar{\alpha} > \beta \). Thus, \( 1 - F(m) \) increases, which implies that the solution \( \bar{x}(\alpha_2) \) is unique.

Next, (9) implies that \( m \) is strictly decreasing in \( \alpha_2 \) and hence \( 1 - F(m) \) is increasing when \( \bar{x} > -\mu \) while the reverse is true when \( \bar{x} < -\mu \). Thus, \( \bar{x}(\alpha_2) \) is decreasing in \( \alpha_2 \) when \( \bar{x}(\alpha_2) > -\mu \) and increasing when \( \bar{x}(\alpha_2) < -\mu \). Hence, \( \bar{x}(\alpha_2) \) remains bounded for large \( \alpha_2 \). Thus, (28) implies that \( F(m) \) remains bounded away from 0 and 1. This, in turn, implies that \( f(m) \) is bounded away from 0 for large \( \alpha_2 \). However, this implies that the left-hand side of (27) goes to infinity as \( \alpha_2 \to \infty \). Hence, no solution to the first order conditions exists for large \( \alpha_2 \), and hence no equilibrium with \( x_L < \theta_L < \theta_R < x_R \)

It is easy to see that equilibria with \( x_L = \theta_L \) or \( x_R = \theta_R \) also cannot exist for large \( \alpha_2 \). A similar argument shows that equilibria with \( -\mu < x_L < \mu < x_R \) does not exist.

Thus, it remains to consider the case where \( \mu < x_L < \theta_R < x_R \). The first-order conditions are given by

\[ -f(m(x_L, x_R)) \left( \frac{\beta + \bar{\alpha}}{2\beta} \right) (x_L - x_R) - F(m(x_L, x_R)) = 0, \quad (29) \]
\[ -f(m(x_L, x_R)) \left( \frac{\beta - \bar{\alpha}}{2\beta} \right) (2\theta_R - x_R - x_L) - (1 - F(m(x_L, x_R))) = 0, \quad (30) \]

where \( m \) must satisfy (26). The first-order conditions immediately imply

\[ \frac{x_L + x_R}{2} = \theta_R - \frac{(1 - F(m))\beta}{f(m)(\bar{\alpha} - \beta - \mu)}, \quad (31) \]
\[ \frac{x_R - x_L}{2} = \frac{F(m)\beta}{f(m)(\bar{\alpha} + \beta)}, \quad (32) \]
Substituting (31) and (32) into (26) and rearranging terms yields:

\[ f(m)(\theta_R - m) = \frac{\bar{\alpha} F(m)}{\bar{\alpha} + \beta} + \frac{\beta (1 - F(m))}{\bar{\alpha} - \beta} \]  

(33)

Dividing both sides of (34) by \( F(m) \) and using symmetry yields

\[ f(-m)(\theta_R - m) = \frac{\bar{\alpha} F(m)}{\bar{\alpha} + \beta} + \frac{\beta (1 - F(m))}{F(m) (\bar{\alpha} - \beta)} \]  

(34)

For \( m = \theta_R \) the left-hand side of (34) is less than the right-hand side. Now let \( m = 0 \). Then the left-hand side of (34) is equal to \( 2f(0)\theta_R \). Further, the right-hand side is decreasing in \( \bar{\alpha} \) and converges to 0.5 as \( \bar{\alpha} \to \infty \). Hence, for large \( \bar{\alpha} \) the right-hand side is less or equal to 1. However, by assumption \( \theta_R > 2f(0) \). Hence the left-hand side of (34) is strictly larger than 1. Hence, by continuity there exists an \( m > 0 \) that solves the equation. Further, because the left-hand side is decreasing in \( m \) while the right-hand side is increasing for large \( \bar{\alpha} \), it follows that the solution is unique.

Finally, to show that we have an equilibrium, it remains to check that it is not optimal for Candidate \( L \) to deviate to a position \( x_L < \mu \). The above argument shows that we have solution to the candidates’ optimization problem if the cutoff value of \( m \) is given by (26). Suppose that Candidate \( L \) deviates to \( x_L \) with \( -\mu \leq x_L \leq \mu \). Then the cutoff \( \bar{\theta}_1 \) is still described by the same formula, i.e., the third case in (3). The cutoff for \( \bar{\theta}_2 \) changes from the third case to the first case in (3). Denote these values by \( \bar{\theta}_{2,3} \) and \( \bar{\theta}_{2,1} \). Then

\[ \bar{\theta}_{2,3} - \bar{\theta}_{2,1} = \frac{\alpha_2 (\mu + x_L)}{\beta} \geq 0, \]

with the strict equality holding for \( x_L > -\mu \). Lemma 2 implies that the cutoff \( m = 0.5(\bar{\theta}_1 + \bar{\theta}_2) \). Thus, the cutoff is higher under \( \bar{\theta}_{2,3} \) than \( \bar{\theta}_{2,1} \). Thus, if we replace (26) by the actual equation for \( m \) the utility of Candidate \( L \) is decreased. Because a deviation is not optimal with cutoff (26) it is also not optimal for the actual cutoff equation.

Next, suppose that Candidate \( L \) deviates to \( X < x_L < -\mu \). Then the fact that \( x_L \) is closer to \( -\mu \) than \( x_R \) implies that \( \theta_2 \to -\infty \) as \( \alpha_2 \to \infty \). Therefore as discussed in the text, group 2 does not vote for Candidate \( L \) and Candidate \( L \) always loses, i.e., policy \( x_R \) is implemented with probability 1. In contrast, in the proposed equilibrium Candidate \( L \) wins with positive probability with policy \( x_L < x_R \).

Taking the limit of (33) for \( \alpha_2 \to \infty \) (and hence \( \bar{\alpha}_2 \to \infty \)) the equation becomes \( f(m)(\theta_R - m) = F(m) \) which determines the equilibrium cutoff in the limit. Again, it follows that \( m > 0 \), i.e.,
Candidate L’s winning probability exceeds 0.5.

\[ \text{Proof of Proposition 4.} \] The argument that an interior equilibrium (i.e., \( \theta_L < x_L < x_R < \theta_R \)) cannot exist is in the main text. Next, note that, if the boundaries of the interval of policies \( C \) are sufficiently large, then it is not optimal to choose a level of \( \alpha_i \) at which the policy moves to the boundaries. Thus, if we consider symmetric equilibria, we can focus on the case where \( x_R = -x_L = \theta_R \), or where \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 0 \) and therefore \( x_L = -x_R = 1/(2f(0)) \).

If \( x_L = -x_R \) then (9) implies
\[
m = \frac{\mu(\alpha_1 - \alpha_2)}{\beta}. \tag{35}\]

Let \( \hat{\alpha} \) be the value at which (24) and (25) hold for \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \hat{\alpha} \). Thus, \( \hat{\alpha} \) is defined by
\[
f(0)\theta_R \left( \frac{\hat{\alpha} - \beta - p}{\beta} \right) = \frac{1}{2}. \tag{36}\]

For \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \hat{\alpha} \) and choice of policies with \( x_L \leq \theta_L < \theta_R \leq x_R \) and \( x_L + x_R = 0 \) is optimal. For larger \( \alpha_i \) the solution is \( x_L = x_R = \hat{x} \).

Further, let \( \tilde{\alpha} \) be the value at which (12) and (13) are equal to \( \theta_L \) and \( \theta_R \), respectively for \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \tilde{\alpha} \). Thus, \( \tilde{\alpha} \) solves
\[
\frac{\beta}{2f(0)(\beta - \tilde{\alpha})} = \theta_R. \tag{37}\]

Hence, \( \tilde{\alpha} \) and \( \hat{\alpha} \) are given by (15).

In an equilibrium, with \( \tilde{\alpha} \leq \alpha \leq \hat{\alpha} \) Candidate R’s choice of \( \alpha_2 \) must satisfy
\[
\max_{\alpha_2} -F \left( \frac{\mu(\alpha_1 - \alpha_2)}{\beta} \right) (\theta_R - \theta_L) - b\alpha_2. \tag{38}\]

The derivative of (38) at \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 \) is \( f(0)\mu(\theta_R - \theta_L)/\beta - b \), which is independent of \( \alpha_2 \). Thus, in equilibrium either \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \tilde{\alpha} \) or \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \hat{\alpha} \).

In an equilibrium with \( \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 0 \) Candidate R’s utility is
\[
-\frac{1}{2} \left( \theta_R - \frac{1}{2f(0)} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \left( \theta_R + \frac{1}{2f(0)} \right) = -\theta_R. \tag{39}\]

If \( \alpha_1 = 0 \) then \( \tilde{\alpha}_2 \) at which \( x_R = \theta_R \) is given by
\[
\tilde{\alpha}_2 = \beta \frac{2\theta_R f(0) - 1}{f(0)(2 + \theta_R)}. \tag{40}\]
Convexity implies that, if we start with $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 0$, and Candidate $R$ deviates, then we only have to consider deviations to $\alpha_2$ where $x_R = \theta_R$, i.e., to $\tilde{\alpha}_2$. Note that $\tilde{\alpha}_2$ is increasing in $\beta$ and $p$. Further, substituting (40) into the objective of (39) yields

$$-F \left( -\frac{\mu(-1 + 2\theta_R f(0))}{(2 + \theta_R f(0))} (\theta_R - \theta_L) - b\tilde{\alpha}_2. \right)$$

(41)

Thus, utility after the deviation is decreasing in $\beta$ and $p$, because $\tilde{\alpha}_2$ is strictly increasing in these parameters. Hence the cost cutoff that supports and equilibrium with no animus, $\bar{b}$, is strictly decreasing in $\beta$ and $p$. ■