Voter Attention and Electoral Accountability *

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Abstract
What sorts of policy decisions do voters pay attention to, and why? And how does rational voter attention affect the behavior of politicians in office? We extend the Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) model of electoral accountability to allow the voter to choose when to pay costly attention to learn the consequences of the incumbent’s policy. We find that the voter will pay the most attention in close races, when the instrumental value of information about incumbent performance is greatest. When the voter’s cost of attention is “intermediate,” she will pay different levels of attention to different policies, and generally pay more attention to an unpopular policy than a popular one. This asymmetric attention can improve accountability by giving a moderately strong incumbent an opportunity to be “caught in the act of being good” after choosing an unpopular policy. However, it can also harm accountability by leading a moderately strong incumbent to categorically avoid the unpopular policy to evade voter scrutiny. This negative effect can be sufficiently strong to harm the voter’s overall welfare, providing a novel rationale for why subsidizing information about government performance may unintentionally harm voters. Finally, we find that rational voter attention can never induce “fake leadership,” i.e., a moderately weak incumbent choosing an unpopular policy precisely because it draws more scrutiny, hoping that the voter discovers an accidental policy success.

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1 Introduction

The performance of the democratic process depends both on what information voters possess and on how they use it. There is a long-standing debate in the elections literature about voters’ competence to collect and process information (see Lupia et al. (1998)). Correspondingly, scholars have developed a variety of models to better understand how different types of political information affect voter behavior and electoral accountability (e.g. Maskin and Tirole (2004), Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001), Ashworth and Shotts (2010), Demirkaya (2019)). However, nearly all such works assume that once information enters the public domain – whether it be via news media, public figures, or academic centers – it is “free” for voters to collect, interpret, and incorporate into their decisionmaking.

In reality, however, voters must actually choose to spend some of their limited time and attention consuming and interpreting political information. In this paper we seek to understand how this “attention constraint” affects voter behavior and democratic performance. To do so we build directly on the electoral accountability model of Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001). In this model, a representative voter seeks to evaluate an incumbent’s degree of expertise at identifying good policies (rather than his degree of preference alignment as in Maskin and Tirole (2004)). This leads a career-concerned politician to pander by choosing the ex-ante “popular” policy (i.e., the policy favored by the prior) even when she privately believes it to be incorrect to try and signal that expertise (see also Prat (2005)). To this model we add an ability for the voter to learn about the consequences of the incumbent’s policy by paying costly attention after it is implemented. Thus, while our voter need not base her vote on the incumbent’s policy choice alone, she must expend costly effort if she wishes to base her vote on something more.

Our first key insight is that the disposition of a rational voter’s attention is not neutral; instead, it will depend on exactly which policy the incumbent chose in a particular way. The reason is that a rational voter is looking for something when she chooses to pay attention; specifically, she is looking for information that would reverse her voting intention given the
policy she observed. Thus, if her intention is to retain the incumbent, then she will only pay attention to find *negative information* that would justify replacing him. Conversely, if her intention is to replace the incumbent, then she will only pay attention to find *positive information* that would justify retaining him. Thus, it is not necessarily a more or less popular policy that will elicit the most attention, but rather the policy the voter believes is most likely to yield an outcome that would change her voting intention.

Having established how and why a rational voter will pay different levels of attention to different policies, we next consider how this “asymmetric attention” affects incumbent behavior. In the baseline Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) model, the incumbent’s decisions are distorted by an incentive to pander by choosing the popular policy to signal expertise. When the voter can choose to pay attention, however, there may be an additional incentive that distorts the incumbent’s policy choice – to manipulate the voter’s attention. This effect is consistent with an empirical literature showing that incumbents take anticipated media attention into consideration when choosing policy (Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018), Kaplan, Spenkuch and Yuan (2019)), and in principle could bias the incumbent both toward or away from a popular policy. For example, if the incumbent expects to be replaced absent additional information, but also thinks that the unpopular policy will draw more voter scrutiny, then he may choose it despite privately believing it is wrong to effectively “gamble for resurrection,” (Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2019), hoping that both his private beliefs are wrong and that the voter will learn of his accidental success. Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) term this sort of behavior “fake leadership,” and show that it can occur when the unpopular policy exogenously draws more scrutiny than the popular one.

Our first result is that rational voter attention cannot induce an incumbent to pursue fake leadership – even though rational attention can be asymmetric, favor the unpopular policy, and distort the incumbent’s policy choices. The intuition is as follows. A moderately strong incumbent will have an incentive to avoid attention (fearing that a policy failure will get him replaced) while a moderately weak incumbent has an incentive to seek it (hoping
that a policy success will get him retained). But the voter’s willingness to pay attention also
depends on the possibility that learning the policy outcome will reverse her current voting
intention. Thus, if the incumbent is moderately strong, it is the unpopular policy will elicit
the most voter attention (since she thinks it is most likely to fail), while if the incumbent is
moderately weak it is the popular policy that will do so (since she thinks it is most likely
to succeed). Consequently, when the incumbent has an incentive to seek attention it is
specifically pandering that will draw it, and when he has an incentive to avoid attention it
is again pandering that will deflect it.

We next examine the voter’s equilibrium pattern of attention. We find that the voter is
likeliest to pay attention when the incumbent and challenger begin evenly matched, and her
attention decreases as the election becomes imbalanced in either direction. The reason is
simple; attention is most valuable for improving selection when the voter is most uncertain
about her optimal vote. In addition, the ex-ante unpopular policy generally elicits more voter
attention than the popular one, despite the fact that the popular policy is associated with
pandering. The reason is that it is harder for the voter to “catch” a low-ability incumbent
trying to pander than it is for her to “discover” a high-ability incumbent exercising leadership.
The former is so incompetent that he might accidentally succeed when he merely intended
to pander (thereby escaping detection), but the latter will always succeed when exercising
leadership by virtue of his expertise. Our model thus provides a rational basis for why
unpopular policies might effectively maximize voter engagement, in contrast to explanations
based on voter emotions or cognitive biases (Healy and Malhotra 2013).

We last consider how voter attention affects pandering and voter welfare. We find that
the voter’s ability to learn about outcomes via costly attention (weakly) benefits her when
paying attention is either “cheap” or “very costly” – when it is cheap the voter will always
pay attention (which aligns the incumbent’s incentives), and when it is very costly she never
will (leaving the incumbent’s incentives unchanged). However, when the cost of paying
attention is intermediate the voter will only sometimes do so, which can exacerbate or
induce pandering; either by incentivizing a moderately strong incumbent to pander to avoid the attention the unpopular policy brings, or a moderately weak incumbent to pander to seek the attention that the popular policy brings. Under these circumstances, the voter’s ability to learn about policy consequences through costly attention will harm accountability and may also harm voter welfare. An interesting implication is that seemingly benign interventions to improve either the availability or accuracy of policy information might nevertheless harm voters, if they also exacerbate the voters’ propensity to pay different levels of attention to different policies. This result contrasts starkly with a large theoretical and empirical literature arguing that greater availability of political information will improve incumbent behavior (see Ashworth (2012) for a review).

2 Related Literature

Our model is closely related to a growing literature that studies the effect of transparency and strategic information revelation on electoral accountability. Key works include Prat (2005) – who argues that transparency about incumbent policy choice can worsen accountability but transparency about incumbent performance will generally improve it – and Fox and Van Weelden (2012) – who show that information about performance can also worsen accountability if “getting it wrong” is exogenously costlier with some policies than with others. Many works also consider strategic information acquisition and revelation of information by third parties, including news agencies (Ashworth and Shotts 2010, Warren 2012, Wolton 2019) and opposition parties (Demirkaya 2019).

Our model differs from these works by studying endogenous information acquisition by the voters themselves. In these features our model relates to several large literatures that span across political science, economics, public finance, and accounting which study auditing in principal-agent relationships using the technology of costly state verification (Townsend 1979), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Border and Sobel (1987), Halac and Yared (2020)). In these models a principal can strategically acquire information about an agent’s hidden actions or consequences thereof, which can induce better compliance. Within political economy
and political science, such models have been applied most widely to the study of bureaucracy (Weingast and Moran 1983, McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, Banks 1989) and the judicial hierarchy (see Kastellec (2017) for a review). Notably, in many such models auditing improves the agent’s incentives by increasing the chance she is caught deviating from the principal’s wishes; for example, in the judicial hierarchy model of Cameron, Segal and Songer (2000), a higher court (the principal) only reviews cases decided by a lower court (the agent) when noncompliance is most likely, with reversal of the lower court as the punishment. Similarly, in our model attention can induce better accountability by increasing the risk that the agent will be caught pandering. However, it can also improve accountability by making an agent more likely to be “caught in the act of being good” – that is, having actually followed the principal’s wishes despite seeming to have made an inferior policy choice.¹

Our model also relates to several works studying voter attention in the context of two-candidate platform competition. Several models adopt the technology of rational inattention (in contrast to costly state verification),² and find that a voter’s attention is responsive to both her personal stakes in an election as well as her pivot probability (Martinelli 2006, Matějka and Tabellini 2016). In contrast, Prato and Wolton (2016; 2018) study a representative voter facing a two-sided process of information transmission – that is, one in which learning about candidate platforms requires both costly attention from the voter and costly communication by the candidates. Their works share the property that voter attention decisions are crucially shaped by the relative standing of the candidates, as well as the insight that “well-intentioned interventions aimed at decreasing the cost of acquiring political information might prove ... counterproductive.” However, the central finding in Prato and Wolton (2016) – that “Goldilocks voters” with a moderate interest in politics will maximize voter welfare – is the exact opposite of our own finding that such voters will inflict the greatest harm on accountability, by virtue of their differential willingness to pay attention

¹Relatedly, see Border and Sobel (1987) for how rebates can be used to improve incentives to truthfully report income in a model of tax auditing.

²The RI approach was initiated by Sims (1998) in macroeconomics and has been applied in fields as diverse as finance, labor economics, and behavioral economics (Mackowiak, Matějka and Wiederholt 2021).
to different policies. Moreover, their models cannot generate predictions about how voters’
attention will be affected by politicians’ actions since they are initially unobservable.

The only works of which we are aware to study voter attention in an electoral accountability context are Li and Hu (2021), Trombetta (2020), and Blumenthal (2022). The first contains similar intuitions to our analysis about voters’ incentives to get informed; attention is useful only if it might lead voters to change their decisions. However, their setup (multiple voters with heterogeneous horizontal preferences) and scope (they mainly investigate the effects of increased polarization on accountability) are very different from our own. The second and third are closer in spirit to our analysis, and both feature a representative voter (like us). Crucially however, they are built on a fundamentally different accountability problem akin to Maskin and Tirole (2004), in which incumbents are differentiated by their preferences (whether they match the voters) rather than their abilities. The nature of the voter attention decision in each of these models is also very different than in ours. In Blumenthal (2022) the voter commits to her attention level before observing the incumbent’s action, and it is optimal for her to only pay partial attention to align the incumbent’s incentives while minimizing her costs. In our model, in contrast, the voter’s attention decisions are purely driven by selection concerns because she cannot commit to her attention level before observing the politician’s policy choice. In Trombetta (2020) the voter chooses to allocate her attention between policy choice and policy consequences; the central result is that voters pay too much attention to choices relative to consequences. This margin of choice is absent in our model but would be interesting to examine in future work.

3 The Model

We consider a two-period model with an election at the end of the first period.3 There are two candidates – an Incumbent (I) and Challenger (C) – and a representative voter (V).

3Many career concerns models of electoral accountability employ a reduced form representation of the voter, challenger, and second period in which the incumbent’s interim reputation must exceed an exogenous (deterministic or probabilistic) threshold to be reelected. We choose to explicitly model these elements in order to provide a precise microfoundation for our analysis of voter welfare.
To avoid pronoun confusion we refer to the politicians as “he” and the voter as “she.”

In each of two periods, nature draws a state of the world $\omega \in \{A, B\}$ that determines which of two potential policies $y \in \{A, B\}$ is “correct,” i.e., maximizes voter welfare.

**Information and Types** The prior that $\omega = A$ in each period is $\pi > \frac{1}{2}$, implying that the voter is ex-ante inclined towards $A$; we therefore refer to $A$ as the “popular” policy. Politicians, on the other hand, receive informative private signals about the state $s \in \{A, B\}$. Specifically, each politician $j \in \{I, C\}$ may be either of high or low ability $\lambda_j \in \{H, L\}$; a high ability politician ($\lambda_j = H$) learns the state with certainty ($P(s = \omega | \lambda_j = H) = 1$), while a low ability politician ($\lambda_j = L$) receives a noisy but informative signal, where $P(s = \omega | \lambda_j = L) = q > \pi$. A politician’s ability is his private information, and we denote the prior probability that the incumbent (challenger) is high ability as $\mu (\gamma)$.

**Actions** In each period the current officeholder chooses a policy $y \in \{A, B\}$, which is observable to the voter. After the first period the voter chooses to retain the incumbent or to elect the challenger. However, before making this decision (but after observing the politician’s policy choice) the voter also chooses whether to “pay attention” to the incumbent’s policy choice ($\alpha \in \{0, 1\}$) by learning its consequences (i.e. her payoff), which costs $c > 0$.

**Utilities and Preferences.** In each period the voter’s utility is $U_V = 1_{y=\omega} - \alpha \cdot c$; i.e., the voter always wants the politician to match the state, and “paying attention” costs $c$. Politicians are assumed to policy-motivated but only if in office (as in Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001)); that is, in each period a politician receives a payoff of 1 if *both* the policy matches the state and they are the current officeholder, and otherwise receive 0. This utility transparently combines “policy” and “office” motivations, and can be thought of as a reduced-form representation of politicians who separately value policy and office, have policy preferences that match the voters, and officeholding benefits sufficiently strong to ensure a

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4While the assumption of a representative voter is standard in the literature, it is effectively stronger in our model with costly information acquisition because the probability that an individual voter is pivotal in a large electorate is infinitesimal, but the cost of information acquisition is not. However, see Bruns and Himmler (2016) for a game theoretic justification for costly information acquisition in large electorates.
willingness to sacrifice on policy to retain office even when facing a high ability challenger. Finally, players have a common discount factor \( \delta \in (0, 1) \).

**Sequence of the Game**

1. Nature determines each politician’s type and reveals it to her
2. Nature determines a current state \( \omega \)
3. The incumbent \( I \) observes a current signal and chooses a current policy \( y \)
4. The voter \( V \) observes the policy \( y \) and chooses whether to pay attention \( \alpha \in \{0, 1\} \)
   - If \( \alpha = 1 \) the voter \( V \) learns her payoff \( U_V \) and pays cost \( c \)
   - If \( \alpha = 0 \) the voter \( V \) learns nothing and pays no cost
5. The voter \( V \) either reelects the incumbent \( I \) or elects the challenger \( C \)
6. Steps (2)-(5) repeat, and the game ends

The solution concept is Sequential Equilibrium.

**4 Preliminary Analysis**

In the last period, whoever holds office will follow his signal regardless of his ability (since \( q > \pi \)) and the voter will never pay attention, since its only value is to help decide whether to retain the current officeholder.

**Incumbent’s First Period Strategy** In the first period, the incumbent \( I \) chooses a first-period policy \( y = x \) with \( x \in \{A, B\} \) as a function of his private signal \( s \in \{A, B\} \) and ability \( \lambda_I \in \{L, H\} \). When doing so he may face a tradeoff between matching the state and getting reelected. However, the only benefit of reelection in our model is the opportunity to maximize the voter’s future welfare. Consequently, a high-ability politician always strictly prefers to follow his first-period signal, since no increased likelihood of being able to maximize the voter’s welfare “tomorrow” is worth sacrificing the voter’s welfare for sure “today” (recall that \( \delta < 1 \)). Correspondingly, we only introduce notation for the policy choices of a low ability incumbent; let \( \sigma_s \) denote the probability that a low-ability incumbent chooses policy \( A \) after signal \( s \in \{A, B\} \).
**Voter’s First Period Retention**  After observing the incumbent’s first period policy $y = x$, the voter forms an interim belief $\mu^x \in [0,1]$ about the probability the incumbent is high-ability using Bayes’ rule. This belief then determines her optimal probability of retaining the incumbent $\nu^x \in [0,1]$ if she chooses not to pay attention. We term $\nu^x$ the voter’s *posture* toward the incumbent following policy $x$, since it reflects how favorably she treats him after choosing $x$ should she decline to pay attention. If $\nu^x = 1$ (always reelect) we call the voter’s posture *fully favorable*; if $\nu^x \in (0,1)$ (sometimes reelect) we call it *somewhat favorable*; if $\nu^x = 0$ (always replace) we call it *adversarial*.

**Voter’s First Period Attention**  The voter must also choose whether to pay attention after observing policy $y = x$ by paying cost $c > 0$ to learn the *outcome* of the incumbent’s policy in the form of her resulting utility $U_V$. Because the voter fully and freely observes the incumbent’s policy choice, and the voter’s payoff is deterministic conditional on the policy and state, this is equivalent to the voter learning the state. We therefore equivalently describe a voter who pays attention as one who learns the state, and let $\rho^x$ denote the probability she pays $c$ to learn it after policy choice $x$.

Since the voter cannot commit *ex-ante* to when she will pay attention, she only takes into consideration how attention can help her select “good” incumbents rather than discipline “bad” ones. Consequently, she will only pay attention in equilibrium if doing so might reveal information that would persuade her to make a different retention decision from her posture $\nu^x$. An immediate implication is that *if* the voter is choosing to pay attention after some policy $x$ ($\rho^x > 0$), she must also prefer to retain an incumbent revealed to have matched the state and replace one revealed to have mismatched it (with at least one preference strict). This simple observation allows us to omit notation for the probability that the voter retains (replaces) an incumbent revealed to have matched (mismatched) the state.
4.1 The Incumbent’s Problem

We first analyze the calculus of a low-ability incumbent. His utility from choosing policy $x \in \{A, B\}$ given some information $\mathcal{I}$ is:

$$EU^x_T = P(\omega = x|\mathcal{I}) + \delta q \left( (1 - \rho^x) \nu^x + \rho^x P(\omega = x|\mathcal{I}) \right)$$

The contemporaneous benefit of choosing $x$ comes from the possibility that it matches the state, which the incumbent believes is the case with probability $P(\omega = x|\mathcal{I})$. The future benefit (discounted by $\delta$) is the value of being reelected $q$ (the probability a low-ability incumbent’s future signal will be correct) times the probability of reelection after choosing $x$. This probability, in turn, is equal to the voter’s posture $\nu^x$ if the voter doesn’t pay attention (with probability $1 - \rho^x$) and the probability $P(\omega = x|\mathcal{I})$ that $x$ is actually correct if the voter does pay attention (with probability $\rho^x$). Two features of $EU^x_T$ are worth highlighting.

First, the incumbent’s payoff from choosing policy $x$ is strictly increasing in his private belief $P(\omega = x|\mathcal{I})$ that it is correct, implying that a low-ability incumbent must be weakly more likely to choose a policy when his signal indicates it. A low-ability incumbent’s choices can therefore only be distorted in two mutually-exclusive ways: (i) by sometimes choosing the popular policy $A$ even when his private information indicates the unpopular policy $B$ is correct ($\sigma_A = 1$ and $\sigma_B \in (0, 1)$), which Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shottts (2001) term “pandering,” or (ii) by sometimes choosing the unpopular policy $B$ even when his private information indicates the popular policy $A$ is correct ($\sigma_A \in (0, 1)$ and $\sigma_B = 0$), which Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shottts (2001) term “fake leadership.” Second, more voter attention after policy $x$ makes the incumbent’s utility from choosing it depend less on the voter’s posture $\nu^x$, and more on the true likelihood $P(\omega = x|\mathcal{I})$ that it is correct. Thus, greater voter attention to policy $x$ will make it less electorally advantageous if the voter’s posture toward $x$ is favorable ($\nu^x = 1$), and more electorally advantageous if it is adversarial ($\nu^x = 0$).
4.2 The Voter’s Retention Problem

In both the baseline version of Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) (henceforth CHS model) and in our model, the incumbent’s policy decision is distorted by the voter’s attempt to evaluate his ability from that decision. We first briefly review the logic of this effect as well as the equilibrium of the CHS model, in which $\rho^A = \rho^B = \rho$ exogenously. For expository clarity we focus specifically on the case of $\rho = 0$, i.e., the state is never revealed to the voter before the election after either policy (the case of $\rho > 0$ is qualitatively similar).

After the incumbent chooses policy $y = x \in \{A, B\}$, the voter will base her retention decision on her posterior belief that the incumbent is high ability $\mu^x$ given his policy choice. Since politicians are differentiated by expertise, the voter also thinks that the more-accurate judgements of a high-ability incumbent are likelier to favor policy $A$, simply because that policy is ex-ante believed to be superior. Finally, if the voter also thinks that the incumbent will always follow his own best judgment regardless of his ability (i.e. $\sigma_A = 1 > \sigma_B = 0$, in which case we denote posterior beliefs as $\tilde{\mu}^x$), then she will rationally interpret the popular policy $A$ as “good news” about the incumbent’s ability, and the unpopular policy $B$ as “bad news.” When these interpretations are strong enough to affect the voter’s retention decisions, i.e., $\gamma \in (\tilde{\mu}^A, \tilde{\mu}^B)$, a low-ability incumbent will have an incentive to pander.

In the CHS model absent attention (with $\rho = 0$ exogenously), whether the preceding effect indeed causes pandering in equilibrium depends on whether the quality $q$ of a low-ability incumbent’s information is below a threshold $\hat{q} \in (\pi, 1)$, which affects the effective cost of pandering in terms of foregone policy success.\textsuperscript{5} Equilibrium in the CHS model is then as follows and depicted in Figure 1.

Observation 1. Let $\sigma^*_N$ denote equilibrium pandering in the CHS model. If a low-ability incumbent is far ahead of or behind the challenger ($\gamma \not\in [\tilde{\mu}^B, \tilde{\mu}^A]$), or receives sufficiently-accurate signals ($q \geq \hat{q}$), he is truthful ($\sigma^*_N = 0$). Otherwise he panders ($\sigma^*_N > 0$).

\textsuperscript{5}In the CHS model increasing $\rho > 0$ simply increases $\hat{q}$. 
• If the incumbent is ahead of the challenger ($\gamma \in (\bar{\mu}_B, \bar{\mu})$) then the voter always reflects after A ($\nu^A = 1$) and only sometimes after B ($\nu^B \in (0, 1)$).

• If the incumbent is behind the challenger ($\gamma \in (\mu, \bar{\mu}_A)$), then the voter sometimes reflects after A ($\nu^B \in (0, 1)$) and never after B ($\nu^B = 0$).

4.3 The Voter’s Attention Problem

The distinctive feature of our model relative to CHS is that the voter need not rely only on the incumbent’s policy choice when voting; she may also pay costly attention to learn the consequences of that policy (i.e., the state $\omega$). How the voter rationally allocates her attention, and how this affects the incumbent’s behavior, is the focus of our analysis. To begin, let $\mu^x_\omega$ denote the voter’s posterior belief that the incumbent is high ability after he chooses policy $x$ and the state is revealed to be $\omega$. If the incumbent is revealed to have mismatched the state, then the voter infers he is definitely low ability ($\mu^x_{\bar{x}, \omega} = 0$), since a high-
ability incumbent receives a perfect signal and always follows it.\textsuperscript{6} If instead the incumbent is revealed to have matched the state, then the voter infers he is high ability with probability

\[
\mu^x = \Pr (\lambda_I = H | y = x, \omega = x) = \frac{\Pr (y = x | \omega = x, \lambda_I = H) \Pr (\lambda_I = H)}{\Pr (y = x | \omega = x)}
\]

where \( \Pr (y = x | \omega = x, \lambda_I = L) \) is the probability that a low-ability incumbent chooses policy \( x \) when it is actually correct.\textsuperscript{7} Thus, discovering that the incumbent’s policy \( x \) is correct is always “good news” about his ability, but the more biased low-ability incumbents are known to be toward that particular policy, the less informative that news is.

Next recall that the voter chooses to pay attention after seeing the incumbent’s policy choice; thus, the value of attention must derive from the possibility that it will change her voting decision. A crucial implication is that what the voter is looking for when she pays attention depends crucially on how she planned to vote absent that attention, i.e., her posture. Specifically, if she planned to retain the incumbent absent attention \( (\mu^x \geq \gamma) \), then her only reason to pay attention after \( x \) is to discover that it actually failed \( (\omega \neq x) \) and the incumbent should be replaced. We thus refer to the value of attention under these circumstances as the value of “negative attention” and denote it \( \phi^-_x \). Conversely, if she planned to replace the incumbent absent attention \( (\mu^x \leq \gamma) \), then her only reason to pay attention after \( x \) is to discover that it actually succeeded \( (\omega = x) \) and the incumbent should be retained. We thus refer to the value of attention under these circumstances as the value of “positive attention,” and denote it \( \phi^+_x \). We then have

\[
\phi^-_x = \delta (1 - q) \cdot \Pr (\omega \neq x | y = x) (\gamma - \mu^x_-)
\]

\[
\phi^+_x = \delta (1 - q) \cdot \Pr (\omega = x | y = x) (\mu^x_+ - \gamma)
\]

To interpret, first observe that the expected net benefit of choosing a high vs. low ability officeholder for the second period is \( \delta (1 - q) \). The value of negative attention is then this

\textsuperscript{6}Note that if a low-ability incumbent always chooses \( A \), then policy \( B \) being revealed to mismatch the state is off-equilibrium path, and the stated beliefs require the application of sequential equilibrium.

\textsuperscript{7}This is equal to \( q \sigma_A + (1 - q) \sigma_B \) if \( \omega = A \) and \( q (1 - \sigma_B) + (1 - q) (1 - \sigma_A) \) if \( \omega = B \).
benefit, times the probability $\Pr(\omega \neq x|y = x)$ of discovering a policy failure, times the difference in probabilities $\gamma - \mu_x^x$ that the incumbent and challenger are high ability conditional on that failure. Similarly, the value of positive attention is $\delta (1 - q)$, times the probability $\Pr(\omega = x|y = x)$ of discovering a policy success, times the difference in probabilities $\mu_x^x - \gamma$ the incumbent and challenger are high ability conditional on that success.

Finally, it is easily verified that $\phi^- < \phi^+_\gamma$ when the voter has a strictly favorable posture following $x$, and $\phi^- > \phi^+_\gamma$ when the voter has a strictly adversarial posture following $x$. Thus, the “true” value of attention following $x$ (denoted $\phi^x$) is just the minimum of $\phi^-_\gamma$ and $\phi^+_\gamma$, and a voter best-response is as follows.

**Lemma 1.** The voter’s strategy is a best response if and only if $\forall x \in \{A, B\}$

- her posture following $x$ is strictly favorable (adversarial) when $\mu^x > (\gamma)\gamma$

- she always (never) pays attention following policy $x$ when the cost of attention $c$ is strictly greater than (less than) the true value of attention $\phi^x = \min\{\phi^x_-, \phi^x_+\}$

- after paying attention to policy $x$, she

  - never retains an incumbent who mismatched the state

  - always (never) retains an incumbent who matched the state when $\mu^x > (\gamma)\gamma$

4.3.1 Attention absent pandering

To clarify how rational voter attention works we last briefly consider equilibrium when there is no ex-ante popular policy ($\pi = \frac{1}{2}$).

**Lemma 2.** If $\pi = \frac{1}{2}$, then in equilibrium the incumbent is truthful ($\sigma_A = 1 > \sigma_B = 0$). After either policy $x \in \{A, B\}$ the voter always pays attention when $c < \phi$ and never pays attention when $c > \phi$, where

$$\phi = \delta(1 - q) \cdot (\gamma(1 - \mu)(1 - q) - \max\{\gamma - \mu, 0\})$$
Absent an ex-ante difference between the two policies, the voter’s equilibrium of the incumbent cannot depend on his policy choice. Consequently, the incumbent never panders. Despite perfect accountability, however, it is still sometimes rational for the voter to pay attention in equilibrium to uncover a low-ability incumbent’s mistakes and improve selection.

Figure 2 depicts the value of attention as a function of the challenger’s reputation $\gamma$ (holding the incumbent’s reputation $\mu$ fixed). If the incumbent is initially stronger than the challenger ($\mu > \gamma$), then the value of attention derives from the possibility of discovering that the incumbent’s policy mismatched the state and he is therefore low ability. Consequently, the value of attention $\phi$ is (locally) increasing in the prior $\gamma$ that the challenger is high ability. Conversely, if the incumbent is initially weaker than the challenger ($\mu < \gamma$), then the value of attention derives from the possibility that the incumbent’s policy matched the state, and he is therefore sufficiently likely to be high ability to justify retention. Consequently, the value of attention $\phi$ is (locally) decreasing in the prior $\gamma$ that the challenger is high ability, and becomes 0 when the incumbent is so weak that even matching the state cannot gain him reelection ($\mu_x^+ = \frac{\mu}{\mu+(1-\mu)q} \leq \gamma$). Finally, the voter pays the most attention when the race is closest ($\mu = \gamma$), as she has the most to gain from learning about the incumbent’s ability.

5 Preliminary Results

Recall that there are two ways a low-ability incumbent might distort his policy choices in equilibrium – (a) by sometimes choosing the popular policy $A$ even when he privately believes $B$ is correct ($\sigma_B > 0, \sigma_A = 1$), i.e., “pandering,” or (b) by sometimes choosing the unpopular policy $B$ even when he privately believes that $A$ is correct ($\sigma_B = 0, \sigma_A < 1$), i.e., “fake leadership.” While only pandering can occur in the baseline CHS model, voter attention introduces two additional forces that could distort the incumbent’s policy choices toward fake leadership as well – an incentive for an initially-strong incumbent to avoid attention, and an incentive for an initially-weak incumbent to seek it. Indeed, in an extension considered in Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) in which the voter exogenously pays more attention after the unpopular policy $B$ ($\rho^A = 0 < \rho^B = 1$), fake leadership can occur when a weak
low-ability incumbent chases the attention that $B$ brings, hoping it will reveal him to have matched the state despite ignoring his private signal. Our first main result, however, is that rational voter attention can never induce fake leadership; even though such attention is both generically asymmetric, and can distort the incumbent’s policy choice.

**Proposition 1.** *In an equilibrium of the rational attention model, a low-ability incumbent never exercises fake leadership, i.e., chooses policy $B$ after observing signal $A$.*

It is far from obvious that rational voter attention can induce or exacerbate pandering, but never induce fake leadership. The intuition is as follows.

When a low-ability incumbent is believed to be engaging in fake leadership ($\sigma_B = 0, \sigma_A < 1$), then (as is the case under truthfulness), the popular policy $A$ will be taken as a favorable signal about her competence, and the unpopular policy $B$ as an unfavorable one ($\mu^B < \mu^A$).

Now suppose first that the incumbent and challenger are sufficiently apart that the voter
would not condition retention on policy choice absent attention \( \gamma \notin (\mu^B, \mu^A) \); this can happen either because the incumbent is so weak that the voter will replace him regardless \( \mu^A < \gamma \), or because the incumbent is so strong that the voter will retain him regardless \( \mu^B > \gamma \). In the former case, attention effectively functions as a “reward”; in addition, the voter will pay more attention after the popular policy \( A \), since it is the one she believes to be more likely to succeed, and only success will change her retention decision. In the latter case, attention effectively functions a “punishment”; in addition, the voter will pay more attention after the unpopular policy \( B \), since it is the one she believes to be most likely to fail, and only failure will change her retention decision. However, in either case, \( A \) will be more electorally advantageous; when the incumbent prefers to seek attention (because he is weak) it is \( A \) that will draw it, while when he prefers to avoid attention (because he is strong) it is again \( A \) that will deflect it. Thus, fake leadership cannot be optimal.

Suppose next that the incumbent and challenger are sufficiently close that the voter will condition retention on policy choice absent attention \( \gamma \in (\mu^B, \mu^A) \). Under these conditions, the allocation of voter attention that would maximize the relative appeal of \( B \) would be if she paid full attention after both policies (since attention after \( B \) would effectively be a reward and after \( A \) a punishment). But then a low-ability incumbent could only be reelected by actually succeeding, so following her signal would maximize both her likelihood of success and her electoral prospects, and fake leadership again could not be optimal.

5.1 Leadership and Pandering with Rational Attention

Having established that rational voter attention can only distort the incumbent’s incentives toward pandering and never fake leadership, we next more closely examine why and when rational attention will eliminate or induce pandering in equilibrium. To conduct this exercise it is sufficient to keep track of the values of attention \( \phi^x \) when the voter believes the incumbent to be truthful \( \sigma_B = 0 < \sigma_A = 1 \); consistent with our previous notation we denote these as \( \bar{\phi}^x \), recalling from Lemma 1 that \( \bar{\phi}^x = \min\{\phi^x_-, \phi^x_+\} \).
5.1.1 How Rational Attention Can Induce Leadership

In the CHS model, a low-ability incumbent will pander if and only if: (1) he begins relatively even with the challenger \((\gamma \in (\mu^B, \bar{\mu}^A))\) (so that the voter will condition retention on policy choice), and (2) the quality of his information is sufficiently poor to make pandering profitable \((q < \hat{q})\). The latter condition is equivalent to:

\[
\delta q > P(\omega = B|s = B) - P(\omega = A|s = B),
\]

which states that the net future benefit \(\delta q\) of reelection exceeds the net current benefit \(P(\omega = B|s = B) - P(\omega = A|s = B)\) of following signal \(B\). These two conditions, however, no longer suffice to ensure pandering when the voter can also choose to pay attention. For instance, if the incumbent expects the voter to always pay attention, then he will simply exercise his best judgement, anticipating that his reelection will depend only on whether he achieves a policy success.

More interestingly, it turns out that voter attention after only one policy can also restore the incumbent’s incentive to be truthful. The reason is that attention after \(A\) functions as a punishment for choosing the popular policy (relative to simply retaining the incumbent outright), while attention after \(B\) functions as a reward for choosing the unpopular one (relative to simply replacing the incumbent outright). It turns out either form of asymmetric attention will restore a low-ability incumbent’s incentive to be truthful (relative to just basing retention on policy) if and only if

\[
P(\omega = B|s = B) - P(\omega = A|s = B) \geq \delta q \cdot P(\omega = A|s = B),
\]

or if the net current benefit of following signal \(s = B\) exceeds the net future benefit \(\delta q\) of reelection, times the probability \(P(\omega = A|s = B)\) that signal \(s = B\) is wrong. The intuition is simple; under either form of asymmetric attention, pandering will actually yield an electoral benefit only when the incumbent’s private signal of \(B\) is actually wrong. The stated condition in turn holds if and only if a low-ability incumbent’s quality of information \(q\) exceeds a threshold \(\bar{q} \in (\pi, \hat{q})\), which yields the following result characterizing when introducing
rational attention will eliminate pandering (i.e., “induce leadership”) in equilibrium.

**Lemma 3.** When \( \gamma \in (\bar{\mu}^B, \bar{\mu}^A) \) and \( q < \hat{q} \) – so that the incumbent panders in the CHS model – attention will induce leadership in equilibrium i.f.f. either

1. a low-ability incumbent receives “moderate” quality information (\( q \in [\bar{q}, \hat{q}] \)) and the voter has an intermediate cost of attention (\( c \in (\min \{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\}, \max \{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\}) \))

2. the voter has a low cost of attention (\( c \leq \min \{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\} \))

Figure 3 indicates the regions of the parameter space within which voter attention changes whether a low-ability incumbent is truthful or panders in equilibrium.\(^8\) The challenger’s reputation \( \gamma \) is on the x-axis, while the voter’s cost of attention \( c \) is on the y-axis; the relevant region for the present discussion is the vertical band where \( \gamma \in (\bar{\mu}^B, \bar{\mu}^A) \). In the lower white pentagon the voter pays full attention even when she thinks that low-ability incumbents do not pander in order to catch their mistakes; in equilibrium this induces the incumbent to be truthful regardless of his information quality. In the upper two dashed triangles the voter pays asymmetric attention when believing that low-ability incumbents do not pander, which restores his incentive to be truthful when his information quality is moderate (\( q \in [\bar{q}, \hat{q}] \)). In the larger left triangle, attention restores leadership by effectively rewarding the incumbent for choosing the unpopular policy, while in the smaller right triangle, it does so by effectively punishing the incumbent for choosing the popular one.

### 5.1.2 How Rational Attention Can Induce Pandering

In the CHS model, a low-ability incumbent is always truthful when he starts out so far ahead of or behind the challenger that the voter will not base retention on policy, i.e. \( \gamma \notin (\bar{\mu}^B, \bar{\mu}^A) \). However, attention can induce pandering in equilibrium because the voter may choose to condition attention on policy choice even though she would not condition retention on it. This can give a strong incumbent an incentive to pander to avoid attention

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\( ^8\)Note it does not also identify the regions where both models exhibit pandering, but to different degrees.
Figure 3: Regions where attention eliminates or induces pandering in equilibrium

or a weak incumbent an incentive to pander to seek it, which yields the following result characterizing when rational attention will introduce pandering in equilibrium.

**Lemma 4.** When $\gamma \notin (\bar{\mu}^B, \bar{\mu}^A)$ – so that the incumbent exercises leadership in the CHS model – rational attention will induce pandering in equilibrium if a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information ($q \in [\pi, \bar{q}]$) and the voter’s cost of attention is “intermediate”, i.e., $c \in (\min \{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\}, \max \{|\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B|\}x$.

The two darkly shaded triangles in Figure 3 indicate the regions of the parameter space where rational attention induces pandering. When the incumbent begins sufficiently ahead of the challenger, a voter with an intermediate cost of attention will subject the unpopular policy $B$ to extra scrutiny when she believes that a low-ability incumbent does not pander, inducing a low-ability incumbent to sometimes pander to avoid it. Conversely, when the incumbent begins sufficiently behind the challenger, a voter with an intermediate cost of
attention will grant the popular policy \( A \) extra attention when she believes that a low-ability incumbent does not pander, inducing a low-ability incumbent to sometimes pander to receive it. Finally, rational voter attention is generally tilted toward the unpopular policy; it is therefore more likely to lead a strong incumbent to “play it safe” than a weak incumbent to “gamble for resurrection” with it.

6 Main Results

We now characterize equilibrium in a series of steps. Henceforth we denote \( \sigma_B \) (the probability a low-ability incumbent panders) as simply \( \sigma \), and explicitly denote the dependence of the values of attention \( \phi^*_e(\sigma) \) and \( \phi^*(\sigma) = \min\{\phi^e_-(\sigma), \phi^e_+(\sigma)\} \) on this quantity. In this notation, \( \tilde{\phi}^e_\sigma \) may be equivalently written as \( \phi^*_e(0) \). In the Appendix we show that equilibrium pandering in the rational attention model is generically unique and denote it \( \sigma^*_N \).

6.1 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Attention

We first give necessary and sufficient conditions for the voter to pay “symmetric” attention in equilibrium – i.e., the same level of attention (full or none) after either policy. These conditions may be written in terms of equilibrium pandering \( \sigma^*_N \) in the CHS model.

Proposition 2. In an equilibrium of the rational attention model, the voter pays the same level of attention after both policies (\( \rho^A = \rho^B \)) if and only if either:

- \( c < \min\{\phi^A(0), \phi^B(0)\} \), so that the voter pays full attention after both policies (\( \rho^A = \rho^B = 1 \)) and the incumbent never panders

- \( c > \max\{\phi^A(\sigma^*_N), \phi^B(\sigma^*_N)\} \), so that the voter pay no attention after either policy (\( \rho^A = \rho^B = 0 \), and the incumbent panders to the same degree \( \sigma^*_N \) as in the CHS model

The two disjoint symmetric attention regions are depicted in Figure 4, which graphs the values of attention after each policy, both when the incumbent is believed to be truthful, and when the incumbent is believed to be pandering at level \( \sigma^*_N \). (Recall that \( \sigma^*_N > 0 \), i.e. there is pandering in equilibrium, if and only if \( \gamma \in (\bar{\mu}^B, \bar{\mu}^A) \) and \( q < \hat{q} \). The darkness of
the lines indicates the policy (dark for A, light for B), while the texture indicates expected incumbent behavior (solid for truthful, dashed for pandering at level $\sigma_N^\ast$). When the cost of attention is below the value of attention after both policies $\phi^A(0) = \min \{\phi_-^A(0), \phi_+^A(0)\}$ and $\phi^B(0) = \min \{\phi_-^B(0), \phi_+^B(0)\}$ if the voter believes the incumbent to be truthful, then the voter will pay attention after both policies in equilibrium, and the incumbent will indeed be truthful. Conversely, when the cost of attention is above the value of attention for both policies $\phi^A(\sigma_N^\ast) = \min \{\phi_-^A(\sigma_N^\ast), \phi_+^A(\sigma_N^\ast)\}$ and $\phi^B(\sigma_N^\ast) = \min \{\phi_-^B(\sigma_N^\ast), \phi_+^B(\sigma_N^\ast)\}$ if the voter believes the incumbent to be pandering at level $\sigma_N^\ast$, then the voter will pay no attention after either policy in equilibrium, and the incumbent will behave as in the CHS model. Within the dotted subset of this region, this behavior will involve pandering. Finally, when both of these conditions fail, the equilibrium will exhibit asymmetric attention. An additional insight generated by Figure 4 is that the voter is likeliest to pay attention (specifically, she will at least sometimes pay attention for the largest range of possible costs) when the incumbent and challenger are evenly matched, and her willingness to pay attention decreases as the election becomes more imbalanced in either direction.

6.2 Which Policy Receives More Attention?

We next characterize which policy will elicit more attention in equilibrium; this requires taking into consideration that the expected level of pandering $\sigma$ affects the value of attention after both policies. Consequently, let $\sigma_{x,s}^{x',s'}$ denote the level of pandering that satisfies the equality $\phi^x(\sigma_{x,s}^{x',s'}) = \phi^{x'}(\sigma_{x,s}^{x',s'})$ where $x \in \{A, B\}$ and $s \in \{-, +\}$; so for example, $\sigma_{A-}^{B+}$ is the level of pandering that will induce the voter to place an equal value on negative attention after policy A and positive attention after policy B.\(^9\)

**Proposition 3.** Suppose that the voter pays asymmetric attention in equilibrium ($c \in (\min \{\phi^A(0), \phi^B(0)\}, \max \{\phi^A(\sigma_N^\ast), \phi^B(\sigma_N^\ast)\})$). Then she will pay strictly more attention to $B$ when $c > \phi^{B+}_+(\sigma_{A-}^{B+})$, and strictly more attention to $A$ when $c < \phi^{B-}_+(\sigma_{A-}^{B+})$.

The regions of the parameter space within which the voter pays more attention to $B$ vs.\(^9\)In the Appendix we derive these quantities more precisely and prove key properties.
Figure 4: Regions with symmetric and asymmetric attention in rational attention model

$A$ are also depicted in Figure 4. A rational voter clearly exhibits a strong attentional bias toward the unpopular policy, which is surprising given that it is the popular policy chosen by the “panderers” she may wish to catch. The intuition is as follows.

First, recall that the voter is more willing to pay attention to the unpopular policy $B$ when the incumbent is strong ($\gamma < \mu^B$) since she is looking for failure, while she is more willing to pay attention to the popular policy $A$ when the incumbent is weak ($\gamma > \mu^A$) since she is looking for success. Second, the voter is also more willing to pay attention ceteris paribus when the incumbent is strong vs. weak; the reason is that failure is better evidence that a strong incumbent should be replaced than success is that a weak incumbent should be retained. Together, these imply that the gap in the voter’s willingness to pay attention to $B$ vs. $A$ when the incumbent is strong is larger than the gap in her willingness to pay attention to $A$ vs. $B$ when the incumbent is weak; this explains why the asymmetric attention region is larger when the incumbent is strong. Finally, when the incumbent is neither strong nor weak
then the voter is looking for different things after each policy – she is looking for failure after A to catch panderers, but success after B to discover leaders. However, it is harder to catch panderers than it is to discover leaders – an incompetent panderer might accidentally achieve a policy success, but a competent leader will always do so.

6.3 Equilibrium Characterization

We now fully characterize equilibrium, separately considering when a low-ability incumbent receives moderate quality \((q \in [\bar{\mu}_B, \bar{\mu}_A])\) vs. poor-quality \((q \in (\pi, \bar{q}))\) information.

**Asymmetric attention with moderate-quality information**

When a low-ability incumbent receives moderate quality information, equilibrium in the asymmetric attention region is as follows.

**Proposition 4.** Suppose that the voter pays asymmetric attention in equilibrium and a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality information. Then absent attention the voter retains the incumbent after A \((\nu^A = 1)\) and replaces him after B \((\nu^B = 0)\).

- Suppose the voter is willing to pay attention to only one policy given an expectation of truthfulness \((c < \max(\phi^A(0), \phi^B(0)))\). Then in equilibrium the incumbent is truthful, and the voter pays full attention after only one policy \((\rho^B = 1 \text{ or } \rho^A = 1)\).

- Suppose the voter is unwilling to pay any attention after either policy given an expectation of truthfulness \((c > \max(\phi^A(0), \phi^B(0)))\). Then in equilibrium the incumbent panders \((\sigma^*_R > 0)\) but strictly less than in the CHS model \((\sigma^*_R < \sigma^*_N)\), and the voter pays some attention after only one policy \((0 = \rho^A < \rho^B < 1 \text{ or } 0 = \rho^B < \rho^A < 1)\).

Equilibrium in the asymmetric attention region when a low-ability incumbent receives moderate quality information is depicted in Figure 5; as before, the darkness of the lines indicates the policy (dark for A, light for B), while the texture indicates expected incumbent behavior (solid for truthful, dashed for pandering at level \(\sigma^*_R\)). When a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality information, even asymmetric attention is sufficient to restore his
incentive to be truthful; as previously described, this can be either because attention after $B$ functions as a reward for choosing the unpopular policy, or because attention after $A$ functions as a punishment for choosing the popular policy. Consequently, the incumbent will indeed be truthful when the voter is willing to pay attention after one or both policies given an expectation of truthfulness. When the voter is not willing to pay attention under these circumstances, but is willing to pay some attention if she expects pandering at level $\sigma_N^*$, then equilibrium involves partial attention after one policy – just enough to make a low-ability incumbent indifferent over pandering. The incumbent in turn panders, but just enough to make the voter indifferent over paying attention after one policy.

**Asymmetric attention with poor-quality information**

When a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information, asymmetric attention can exacerbate the incentive to pander. As a consequence, rational attention can have a variety of equilibrium effects; it can decrease pandering that would have occurred absent
attention, induce pandering that would not have occurred absent attention, and even worsen pandering that would have already occurred absent attention.

**Proposition 5.** Suppose the voter pays asymmetric attention in equilibrium and a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information; then he always panders in equilibrium ($\sigma^*_R > 0$).

- If $c > \phi^B_+ (\sigma^B_{A-})$, then he panders to avoid the attention the unpopular policy brings
  - When $c < \min \{\phi^A_-(\sigma^B_{A-}), \phi^A_-(\sigma^A_{A-})\}$, the voter always pays attention after policy $B$ and sometimes after policy $A$ ($\rho^B = \nu^A = 1 > \rho^A > 0$)
  - When $c \in [\phi^A_-(\sigma^A_{A-}), \phi^B_-(\sigma^A_{A-})]$, the voter always pays attention after policy $B$ and sometimes retains but never pays attention after policy $A$ ($\rho^B = 1 > \nu^A > \rho^A = 0$)
  - When $c > \max \{\phi^A_-(\sigma^B_{A-}), \phi^B_-(\sigma^A_{A-})\}$, the voter sometimes pays attention after policy $B$ and never after policy $A$ ($\nu^A = \nu^B = 1 > \rho^B > \rho^A = 0$)

- If $c < \phi^B_+ (\sigma^B_{A-})$, then he panders to seek the attention that the popular policy brings
  - When $c < \phi^A_+ (\sigma^B_{A+})$, the voter always pays attention after policy $A$ and sometimes after policy $B$ ($\rho^A = 1 > \rho^B > \nu^B = 0$)
  - When $c > \phi^A_+ (\sigma^B_{A+})$, the voter sometimes pays attention after policy $A$ and never after policy $B$ ($1 > \rho^A > \nu^A = \rho^B = \nu^B = 0$)

Asymmetric attention equilibria when a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information are depicted in Figure 6. Within each area where the voter pays more attention to a given policy ($A$ or $B$), there are up to three “types” of equilibria differentiated by the overall level of attention. Despite this complexity, the overall pattern is one in which pandering is most severe when the voter’s cost of attention is *intermediate*, because this is when she has the greatest propensity to pay different levels of attention to different policies.

Specifically, in the first type of equilibrium, the voter pays a high level of attention because it is relatively cheap – always after one policy and sometimes after the other. Here, raising
the cost of attention exacerbates the voter’s propensity to pay different levels of attention to different policies, and consequently worsens pandering. In the second type of equilibrium the voter pays a low amount of attention because it is relatively costly – sometimes after one policy and never after the other. Here, raising the cost of the attention diminishes the voter’s propensity to pay different levels of attention to different policies, and consequently diminishes pandering. In the third type of equilibrium (which can only occur when the voter also pays more attention to \(B\)), the voter pays a medium amount of attention because its cost is intermediate – always after \(B\) and never after \(A\). Here, the level of pandering is unaffected by the cost of attention, but is worse than in the CHS model if incumbent is initially strong \((\mu > \gamma)\).

\(^{10}\)When the voter is paying more attention after \(B\), pandering may also become so severe that the popular policy \(A\) becomes an unfavorable signal about the incumbent’s ability.
6.4 Voter Welfare

Since rational voter attention can worsen accountability, we conclude by comparing the voter’s equilibrium utility in the rational attention and CHS models. This can be interpreted in two ways. First, it could represent the difference between a setting in which the voter’s attention costs are low enough that the ability to pay attention meaningfully impacts her behavior, and one in which those costs are so prohibitive that it is as if paying attention is impossible. Second, it could represent the difference between a setting in which there are media sources that actually contain useful information about incumbent performance, and one in which those media sources are either absent or uninformative.

To ease the exposition we first provide a simplified characterization of the voter’s utility difference between the two models that exploits properties of equilibrium.

Lemma 5. The voter’s equilibrium utility difference between the rational attention and CHS models may be written as

\[ U_V^R - U_V^N = \Pr(y = A) \cdot \max \{ \phi_s^A - c, 0 \} + \Pr(y = B) \cdot \max \{ \phi_s^B - c, 0 \} \]

\[ - (1 - \mu) (q - \pi) (\sigma_R^* - \sigma_N^*), \quad \text{where } s = - \text{ if } \gamma \leq \mu \text{ and } s = + \text{ if } \gamma \geq \mu \]

All quantities are evaluated with respect to \( \sigma_R^* \) unless explicitly indicated otherwise.

The voter’s utility difference between the two models consists of two components. The first is the second-period selection benefit of being able to learn the policy outcome and make a better-informed retention decision. This benefit in turn consists of the unconditional probability \( \Pr(y = x) \) that each policy will be chosen, times the value of attention \( \phi_s^x \) conditional on that policy being chosen less the cost \( c \) of attention.\(^{11}\) The second component is the first period accountability cost of increased pandering \( \sigma_R^* - \sigma_N^* \) (which is actually a

\(^{11}\) Worth noting is that the selection benefit is calculated as if the voter will always have a favorable posture (adversarial) posture toward an initially strong (weak) incumbent, even if these are not her equilibrium postures in the rational attention model. The reason is that they are her equilibrium postures in the CHS model. To clarify the implications of this subtlety, consider an initially-strong incumbent who panders in both models (so \( \gamma \in [\mu_B, \mu] \)), but to a lesser degree in the rational attention model (so \( \mu_B < \gamma \) and \( \rho_B = 1 \)). Then in equilibrium the voter actually looks for positive information after policy \( B \), so the true interim benefit of attention is \( \phi_s^B \). The expression in Lemma D.1 then embeds an additional selection benefit \( \phi_s^B - \phi_s^B \) that the voter would enjoy from reduced pandering were she to deviate to paying no attention after \( B \).
benefit if attention reduces pandering). With this characterization in hand, it is then simple to state the welfare consequences of attention of rational voter attention.

**Proposition 6.**

- *When a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality information, the voter is always weakly better off in the rational attention model, and strictly better off i.f.f. she pays some attention in equilibrium* ($\exists \rho^x \in \{A, B\}$ s.t. $\rho^x > 0$).

- *When a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information, there is a unique cost cutpoint $\tilde{c}(\gamma)$ such that the voter is strictly worse off in the rational attention model i.f.f. $c \in (\tilde{c}(\gamma), \max\{\phi^A(\sigma^*_N), \phi^B(\sigma^*_N)\})$.*

When a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality information, attention weakly improves accountability. Consequently, in equilibrium the ability to learn via attention always weakly benefits the voter, and strictly benefits her when she actually pays some attention in equilibrium (since attention always results in better accountability, and sometimes better selection as well). Conversely, when a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information, rational attention can involve a tradeoff between worse accountability and better selection. To see this, Figure 7 recreates Figure 6 but also indicates the two regions where rational voter attention strictly harms voter welfare. The intuition for the location and shape of these regions is as follows.

First, within the two regions (one where $A$ receives more attention and another where $B$ receives more attention) where the voter’s attention is also low ($1 > \rho^x > 0 = \rho^* \gamma$), she is worse off in the rational attention model; she gets no selection benefit from paying attention (since she either strictly or weakly prefers not to in equilibrium), but suffers a strictly positive accountability cost (since attention worsens pandering). Next, either lowering the cost of attention $c$ or shrinking the difference in candidate reputations $|\gamma - \mu|$ improves voter welfare through some combination of better selection and accountability. Finally, along the boundary of the region where the voter pays full attention, she must be strictly better off in the
rational attention model; in equilibrium she enjoys a strictly positive selection benefit, but no accountability cost (since the incumbent is truthful).

7 Conclusion

In this paper we consider a variant of the political agency model of Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) in which the voter must pay an attention cost to learn the consequences of the incumbent’s policy. Our model is intended to study political accountability in environments where it is not information about incumbent performance that is scarce, but rather the voters’ attention in consuming and processing that information.

Our key findings are as follows. First, rational voter attention will be asymmetric across different policies when the voter’s cost of attention is intermediate. The reason is that the voter’s willingness to pay attention is determined by her belief that it will uncover information that reverses her voting intention, and these beliefs generically differ across different policies.
Specifically, if the voter’s current intention is to retain the incumbent, then she will only pay attention to uncover a failure that would justify replacing him. Alternatively, if her current intention is to replace the incumbent, then she will only pay attention to uncover a success that would justify retaining him. Second, a rational voter will pay the most attention in ex-ante close races in which she is most uncertain ex-ante about her optimal vote. Third, a rational voter is more willing to pay attention after an unpopular policy than a popular one. The reason is that the prospects for discovering a “leader” who chose the unpopular policy are better than the prospects for uncovering a “panderer” who chose the popular policy.

Fourth, rational attention can improve electoral accountability – by “rewarding” the incumbent for choosing the unpopular policy, “punishing” the incumbent for choosing the popular policy, or both. However, it can also harm electoral accountability, by giving a strong incumbent an incentive to choose the policy that evades attention, or a weak incumbent an incentive to choose the policy that draws it. This will occur in particular when the cost of attention is intermediate, so that the voter has the greatest propensity pay different levels of attention to different policies. Rational voter attention can thus worsen pandering and harm voter welfare relative to when the voter cannot learn about policy consequences at all. However, it cannot induce “fake leadership” (choosing the ex-ante unpopular policy to draw or evade attention) as uncovered in the original Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) model with exogenous information revelation.

Our positive results about rational voter attention yield several empirical implications. First, voters should be expected to pay more attention in close races; not because they are more “excited,” but because they are most uncertain about the correct vote. Second, if paying attention is interpreted as an increase in political media consumption, then unpopular policy choices in a given issue domain should drive political media consumption in that domain. Finally, the model adds to the set of conditions under which incumbents can be expected to follow public opinion; if voters’ consumption of political information is sensitive to policy choice – because races are close, and because paying attention is somewhat but not
prohibitively costly – then strategic incumbents will be more likely to follow public opinion
to shape those consumption choices. Our model also adds to a small but growing literature
that identifies reasons why improving the voters’ informational environment – either with
more accurate or more accessible political information – may be a double edged sword for
both politicians and voters (Prato and Wolton (2016), Trombetta (2020)). In our model,
both politicians and voters may be harmed by such improvements if they exacerbate the
voters’ propensity to apply different levels of scrutiny to different policies.

Finally, our model suggests several avenues for future research; we comment on two in
particular. First, a now large literature considers voters’ choices over the consumption of
biased media (e.g. Suen (2004), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011)). Our model can be extended
in this direction by allowing the voter to choose between two binary noisy signals of the
policy outcome when she pays attention – one that is biased in favor of the incumbent, and
another that is biased against. Since a key feature of the model is that the voter is looking
for something in particular when she pays attention, such an extension could shed light on
how voters’ choice of media is influenced by both an incumbent’s actual policy choices and
his competitive environment.

Second, an existing literature examines what sort of media landscape best promotes in-
formed voting and accountability (Ashworth and Shotts 2010, Wolton 2019). An extension of
our model could shed further light on this question by having the voter choose whether to pay
attention to a noisy (rather than perfect) binary signal about incumbent performance, and
analyzing features of the conditional probability distribution over this signal that improve
or maximize voter welfare once her rational attention decisions are taken into consideration.
In particular, the logic of the model suggests that accountability may provide a novel ra-
tionale for biased media information (Calvert 1985) when voters have cognitive constraints;
to counteract the voter’s natural propensity to apply different levels of scrutiny to different
policy choices. We hope to explore these and other avenues in future work.
References


Supporting Information for
Voter Attention and Electoral Accountability

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A Preliminary Analysis

We first conduct a general preliminary analysis of the model; the proof of main text Lemma 1 characterizing a voter best response is contained herein.

To more easily accommodate ex-ante agnosticism as to whether a low-ability incumbent distorts his policymaking toward the popular policy $A$ or the unpopular policy $B$ in equilibrium, we rewrite a low-ability incumbent’s strategy as $\eta = (\eta^A, \eta^B)$, where $\eta^x$ for $x \in \{A, B\}$ denotes the probability that the incumbent chooses policy $y = x$ after receiving signal $s = \neg x$. Hence, using our main text notation $\eta^A = \theta_B$ is the probability of "pandering" and $\eta^B = 1 - \theta_A$ is the probability of "fake leadership." We also use $\theta = (\theta^A, \theta^B)$ to denote the entire vector of a voter strategy, where $\theta^x = (\nu^x_0, \rho^x, \nu^x, \nu^x_{-x})$ for $x \in \{A, B\}$.

The Incumbent’s Problem To formally characterize a low-ability incumbent’s best responses we first introduce notation to describe the electoral consequences of choosing each policy $x \in \{A, B\}$ given a voter strategy $\theta$. Let

$$ v^x_I(\theta^x) = (1 - \rho^x)\nu^x_0 + \rho^x (P(\omega = x|I)\nu^x + P(\omega \neq x|I)\nu^x_{-x}) $$

denote a low-ability incumbent’s expected probability of reelection after choosing $x \in \{A, B\}$ when he has information $I$ about the state and the voter uses strategy $\theta^x$ in response to
first-period policy $x$. Applying the notation in the main text we have $EU^x_I = P(\omega = x|I) + \delta q \cdot \nu^x(I; \theta_x)$. Next, let $\Delta^x_I(\theta) = v^x_I(\theta^x) - v^{\neg x}_I(\theta^{\neg x})$ denote a low-ability incumbent’s net gain in the probability of reelection from choosing $x$ vs. $\neg x$ when he has information $I$ and the voter uses strategy $\theta = (\theta^x, \theta^{\neg x})$. Finally, let

$$\Delta^x_I = \frac{\Pr(\omega = x|I) - \Pr(\omega = x|I)}{\delta q},$$

and observe that $\Delta^x_{a=x} > 0 \forall x \in \{A, B\}$ since $q > \pi$, yielding the following best-response.

**Lemma A.1.** A low-ability incumbent’s strategy $\eta = (\eta^A, \eta^B)$ is a best response to $\theta$ i.f.f. $\Delta^x_{a=x}(\theta) > (\eta^A, \eta^B) \Rightarrow \mu^x = 1(0) \forall x \in \{A, B\}$

**The Voter’s Problem** When the voter is initially called to play, she has observed the incumbent’s first-period policy choice $x$, and must choose her likelihood of paying attention $\rho^x$ and of retaining the $\nu^x_0$ incumbent should she choose not to pay attention. Should she choose to pay attention, she then anticipates learning the state $\omega$ and deciding on the likelihood of retaining the incumbent $\nu^x_0$ conditional on this additional information.

We first discuss the voter’s belief formation. Although some sequences of play may be off the path of play given a low-ability incumbent’s strategy (for example, failure of a policy $x$ when a low-ability incumbent is believed to always choose $\neg x$) it is easily verified that sequentially consistent beliefs about the incumbent’s ability $\nu^x_0$ and the state $P(\omega = x|y = x)$ prior to the attentional decision $\rho^x$, as well as sequentially consistent beliefs $\mu^x_0$ for $\omega \in \{A, B\}$ about the incumbent’s ability after paying attention, are all unique and characterized by Bayes’ rule (as described in the main text). We start with two useful algebraic equalities.

**Lemma A.2.** $\Pr(\omega = x|y = x) \cdot \mu^x_0 = \mu^x$

**Proof:**

$$\Pr(\omega = x|y = x) \cdot \mu^x_0 = \frac{\Pr(y = x, \omega = x)}{\Pr(y = x)} \cdot \Pr(\lambda_I = H|y = x, \omega = x) = \frac{\Pr(\lambda_I = H, y = x, \omega = x)}{\Pr(y = x)}$$

$$= \frac{\Pr(y = x|\lambda_I = H, \omega = x) \Pr(\omega = x) \cdot \Pr(\lambda_I = H)}{\Pr(y = x)}$$

$$= \frac{(\Pr(y = x|\lambda_I = H, \omega = x) \Pr(\omega = x) + \Pr(y = x|\lambda_I = H, \omega \neq x) \Pr(\omega \neq x)) \cdot \Pr(\lambda_I = H)}{\Pr(y = x)}$$

$$= \frac{\Pr(y = x|\lambda_I = H) \cdot \Pr(\lambda_I = H)}{\Pr(y = x)} = \mu^x,$$

where the second-to-last equality follows from $\Pr(y = x|\lambda_I = H, \omega \neq x) = 0$. QED.

**Lemma A.3.** $\mu^x = \Pr(\omega = x|y = x)\mu^x_0 + \Pr(\omega = \neg x|y = x)\mu^x_{\neg x}$
Proof:
\[
\mu^x = \frac{\Pr(\lambda_I = H, y = x)}{\Pr(y = x)} = \frac{\Pr(\lambda_I = H, y = x, \omega = x) + \Pr(\lambda_I = H, y = x, \omega \neq x)}{\Pr(y = x)}
\]
\[
= \frac{\Pr(\omega = x, y = x) \Pr(\lambda_I = H|\omega = x, y = x) + \Pr(\omega \neq x, y = x) \Pr(\lambda_I = H|\omega \neq x, y = x)}{\Pr(y = x)}
\]
\[
= \Pr(\omega = x|y = x) \mu^x_x + \Pr(\omega \neq x|y = x) \mu^x_{x-}
\]
QED

With these beliefs in hand, it is easily verified that after observing first period policy \(y = x\), the voter’s expected utility from strategy \(\theta^x = (\nu_0^x, \rho^x, \nu_x^x, \nu_{x-})\) following \(x\) is:
\[
V(\theta^x|\eta) = \delta q + \delta (1 - q) \left( (1 - \rho^x) (\nu_0^x \mu^x + (1 - \nu_0^x) \gamma) + \rho^x \left( \Pr(\omega \neq x|y = x) (\nu_{x-} \mu^x_x + (1 - \nu_{x-}) \gamma) + \Pr(\omega = x|y = x) (\nu_x^x \mu^x_x + (1 - \nu_x^x) \gamma) \right) \right) - \rho^x c,
\]
where the unique sequentially-consistent values of \((\mu^x, \mu^x_x, \mu^x_{x-}, \Pr(\omega = x|y = x))\) depend on a low-ability incumbent’s strategy \(\eta\). It is next immediate that the voter’s retention probabilities \(\nu^x_s\) after \(s \in \{\emptyset, x, \neg x\}\) (where \(s = \emptyset\) denotes the decision to pay no attention and learn nothing about the state) will be sequentially rational if and only if \(\mu^x_s > (\gamma) \gamma \rightarrow \nu^x_s = 1(0)\).

To examine the voter’s attention decision \(\rho^x\), recall from the main text that the values of negative and positive attention \((\phi^x_x, \phi^x_{x+})\) following policy \(x\) are defined to be:
\[
\phi^x_x = \delta (1 - q) \cdot \Pr(\omega \neq x|y = x) (\gamma - \mu^x_{x-})
\]
\[
\phi^x_{x+} = \delta (1 - q) \cdot \Pr(\omega = x|y = x) (\mu^x_x - \gamma)
\]
It is straightforward that \(\phi^x_x\) is strictly increasing in \(\gamma\) (c.p.) while \(\phi^x_{x+}\) is strictly decreasing in \(\gamma\) (c.p.). The following lemma connects these values to the voter’s expected utility.

**Lemma A.4.** \(\mu^x - \gamma = \frac{1}{\delta (1 - q)} (\phi^x_{x+} - \phi^x_x)\)

**Proof:**
\[
\mu^x - \gamma = (\Pr(\omega = x|y = x) \mu^x_x + \Pr(\omega \neq x|y = x) \mu^x_{x-}) - \gamma
\]
\[
= \Pr(\omega = x|y = x) (\mu^x_x - \gamma) - \Pr(\omega \neq x|y = x) (\gamma - \mu^x_{x-})
\]
\[
= \frac{\phi^x_x - \phi^x_{x+}}{\delta (1 - q)}.
\]
QED

Finally, the following facilitates comparisons between the values of information across policies that will be useful later in the analysis.

**Lemma A.5.** \(\phi^x_{x+} > (\gamma) \phi^x_x \iff \mu - \Pr(y = \neg x|\omega = \neg x) \gamma > (\gamma) \frac{\Pr(y = x|\omega = \neg x) \gamma}{\Pr(y = \neg x)}\)

**Proof:** Observe from the definitions that \(\phi^x_{x+} > (\gamma) \phi^x_x \iff \Pr(\omega = \neg x|y = \neg x) (\mu^x_{x-} - \gamma) > (\gamma) \Pr(\omega = \neg x|y = x) \gamma\)
We first transform the lhs; we have that $\Pr(\omega = \neg x|y = \neg x) (\mu_{\neg x} - \gamma) = $ 
\[= \frac{\Pr(\omega = \neg x)}{\Pr(y = \neg x)} (\mu - \Pr(y = \neg x|\omega = \neg x) \gamma) \] (using $\Pr(y = \neg x|\lambda_I = H) = \Pr(\omega = \neg x)$).

We next transform the rhs; we have that $\Pr(\omega = \neg x|y = x) \gamma = \frac{\Pr(\omega = \neg x)}{\Pr(y = x)} \Pr(y = x|\omega = \neg x) \gamma$.

Substituting in and rearranging then yields the desired condition. QED

With Lemmas A.2-A.5 in hand, imposing sequential rationality on each $\nu_s^x$ and rearranging yields that the voter’s expected utility $V(\rho^x|\eta)$ conditional on $\rho^x$ is equal to:

\[V(\rho^x|\eta) = \delta q + \delta (1 - q) \max \{\mu^x, \gamma\} + \rho^x \max \{\min \{\phi^-, \phi^+_s\}, 0\} - c.\]

This immediately yields main text Lemma 1 which we restate formally here, letting $\Theta^x(\eta)$ denote the set of best responses following $x$ when a low-ability incumbent uses strategy $\eta$.

**Lemma 1 (revisited).** $\hat{x} \in \Theta^x(\eta) \iff \nu_{-x}^x = 0, \mu_s^x > (\leq) \gamma \Rightarrow \nu_s^x = 1(0) \forall s \in \{\emptyset, x\}$, and $c < (>) \phi^x = \min \{\phi_s^x, \phi_s^x\} \rightarrow \hat{\rho} = 1(0)

**Properties of Equilibrium**

We conclude this section by proving some basic properties of equilibrium and providing an intermediate characterization. The first property states that equilibrium may involve pandering or fake leadership, but not both.

**Lemma A.6.** In equilibrium, $\eta^x > 0$ for at most one $x$.

**Proof:** First observe that $\eta^x > 0 \rightarrow EU_{s=x}^x \geq EU_{s=x}^x \rightarrow v_{s=-x}^x(\theta) > v_{s=x}^x(\theta)$ since $P(\omega = \neg x|s = \neg x) > P(\omega = x|s = \neg x) > 0$. Next observe that $v_{s=x}^x(\theta) > v_{s=-x}^x(\theta) \rightarrow v_{s=x}^x(\theta)$ since $(v_{s=x}^x(\theta) - v_{s=-x}^x(\theta)) = \rho^x \cdot (P(\omega = x|s = x) - P(\omega = x|s = \neg x)) \cdot (v_{x}^x - v_{-x}^x)$,

which is $\geq 0$ since $v_{x}^x \geq v_{-x}^x$ in a best response and $P(\omega = x|s = x) > P(\omega = x|s = \neg x)$. Finally, the preceding yields $EU_{s=x}^x > EU_{s=-x}^x \rightarrow \eta^x = 0$ since $P(\omega = x|s = x) > P(\omega = \neg x|s = x) > 0$. QED

The second property states that any equilibrium involving a distortion must be mixed.

**Lemma A.7.** If $\eta^x > 0$ then $\eta^x < 1$.

**Proof:** Suppose $\eta^x = 1$ (so $\eta^{-x} = 0$). Then $\mu^{-x} = 1$ and $\phi^{-x} = 0$, so equilibrium requires $\nu_{0}^{-x} = 1$ and $\rho^{-x} = 0$, implying $v_{0}^{-x}(\theta) = 1 \geq v_{x}^{-x}(\theta)$. Since $P(\omega = \neg x|s = \neg x) > P(\omega = x|s = \neg x)$ we have $EU_{s=-x}^{y=x} > EU_{s=-x}^{y=-x}$, and $\eta^x > 0$ cannot be a best-response. QED.

Collecting the preceding yields an intermediate characterization of equilibrium as a corollary.
Corollary A.1. Profile \((\hat{\eta}, \hat{\theta})\) is a sequential equilibrium i.f.f. it satisfies Lemma 1 and either

- \(\hat{\eta}^x = 0\) and \(\Delta^x_{s=x}(\theta) \leq \hat{\Delta}^x_{s=x} \forall x \in \{A, B\}\) (the incumbent is truthful)

- \(\exists z\) s.t. \(\hat{\eta}^z \in (0, 1), \hat{\eta}^{-z} = 0,\) and \(\Delta^z_{s=-z}(\theta) = \hat{\Delta}^z_{s=-z}\) (the incumbent distorts toward \(z\))

B Equilibrium Characterization

Herein we continue the equilibrium analysis and prove Proposition 1. We first examine properties of the values of attention when the incumbent is truthful.

Lemma B.1. Let \(\hat{\phi}^x_s\) denote the values of attention when a low-ability incumbent is truthful and \(\hat{\phi}^x = \min\{\hat{\phi}^x_A, \hat{\phi}^x_B\}\). These values satisfy the following three properties: (i) \(\hat{\phi}^x_A > \hat{\phi}^x_B\) and \(\hat{\phi}^x_A < \hat{\phi}^x_B\), (ii) \(\hat{\phi}^x_B > \hat{\phi}^x_A \rightarrow \gamma < \hat{\mu}^A\), and (iii) \(\hat{\phi}^x_A > \hat{\phi}^x_B \rightarrow \gamma > \mu\).

Proof: From the definitions, \(\hat{\phi}^x_B > \hat{\phi}^x_A \iff \Pr(\omega = A|y = B) > \Pr(\omega = B|y = A) \iff \frac{\Pr(y = A|\omega = A)}{\Pr(y = A|\omega = B)} \left(\frac{\Pr(\omega = A)}{1 - \Pr(\omega = A)}\right) > \left(\frac{\Pr(y = B|\omega = B)}{\Pr(y = B|\omega = A)}\right) \left(\frac{1 - \Pr(\omega = A)}{\Pr(y = A|\omega = A)}\right).

When a low-ability incumbent is truthful, \(\Pr(y = A|\omega = A) = \frac{\mu + (1 - \mu)q}{1 - \mu} = \frac{\Pr(y = B|\omega = B)}{\Pr(y = B|\omega = A)}\), so the condition reduces to \(\Pr(\omega = A) = \pi > \frac{1}{2}\). Next, \(\hat{\phi}^x_A > (<)(=)\hat{\phi}^x_B \iff \Pr(\omega = A|y = A) > (<)(=)\Pr(\omega = B|y = B)\) when a low-ability incumbent is truthful (using that \(\hat{\mu}^A = \hat{\mu}^B\)) which in turn holds \(\iff \Pr(\omega = A|y = B) > \Pr(\omega = B|y = A)\), which is already shown.

The statement that \(\hat{\phi}^x_B > \hat{\phi}^x_A \rightarrow \gamma < \hat{\mu}^A\) follows trivially from the first property.

The final property is equivalent to \(\gamma \leq \mu \rightarrow \hat{\phi}^x_B \geq \hat{\phi}^x_A\). To show this we argue that \(\hat{\phi}^x_B(\mu) > \hat{\phi}^x_A(\mu)\). From this it is easy to verify the desired property using (i) \(\mu \in (\hat{\mu}^B, \hat{\mu}^A)\), (ii) \(\hat{\phi}^x_B > \hat{\phi}^x_A\), (iii) \(\phi^x(\gamma)\) decreasing in \(\gamma\), and (iv) \(\phi^x_A(\gamma)\) increasing in \(\gamma\). Observe from Lemma A.5 that \(\hat{\phi}^x_A > \phi^x_A\) i.f.f. \(Pr(y = A) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\Pr(y = A|\omega = B)}\right) > \Pr(y = B) \cdot \gamma\). Next observe that when \(\gamma = \mu\) the condition reduces to \(\Pr(y = A) > \Pr(y = B)\), which always holds when a low-ability incumbent is truthful. QED

We next examine how a low-ability incumbent’s strategy \(\eta\) affects the values of attention.

Lemma B.2. \(\Pr(\omega \neq x|y = x)\) is strictly increasing in \(\eta^x\) (when \(\eta^{-x} = 0\)) and strictly decreasing in \(\eta^{-x}\) (when \(\eta^x = 0\)).

Proof: \(\Pr(\omega \neq x|y = x) = \frac{\Pr(y = x|\omega \neq x) \cdot (1 - \pi^x)}{\Pr(y = x|\omega = x) \cdot \pi^x + \Pr(y = x|\omega \neq x) \cdot (1 - \pi^x)} = \frac{\Pr(y = x|\omega = x)}{\Pr(y = x|\omega \neq x)} \cdot \frac{\pi^x}{1 - \pi^x} + 1\). So \(\eta^x (\eta^{-x})\) affect the desired quantity solely through \(\Pr(y = x|\omega = x)\), where:

\[
\frac{\Pr(y = x|\omega = x)}{\Pr(y = x|\omega \neq x)} = \frac{\mu + (1 - \mu) \cdot (q (1 - \eta^{-x}) + (1 - q) \eta^x)}{(1 - \mu) \cdot ((1 - q) (1 - \eta^{-x}) + q \eta^x)}
\]
To perform comparative statics $\eta^x$, assume $\eta^{-x} = 0$ so
\[
\Pr(y = x|\omega = x) = \frac{\mu + (1 - \mu) \cdot (q + (1 - q) \eta^x)}{(1 - \mu) \cdot ((1 - q) + q \eta^x)}
\]
\[
\frac{\Pr(y = x|\omega \neq x)}{\Pr(y = x|\omega \neq x)} = \frac{\mu + (1 - \mu) \cdot (1 - q (1 - \eta^x) + (2q - 1)(1 - \eta^x))}{\eta^x} = 1 + \left(\frac{\mu}{1 - \mu}\right)\left(\frac{1}{1 - q (1 - \eta^x)}\right) + \frac{(2q - 1)(1 - \eta^x)}{1 - q (1 - \eta^x)}
\]
which is straightforwardly decreasing in $\eta^x$ when $q \geq \frac{1}{2}$.

To perform comparative statics in $\eta^{-x}$, assume that $\eta^x = 0$ so
\[
\frac{\Pr(y = x|\omega = x)}{\Pr(y = x|\omega \neq x)} = \frac{\mu + (1 - \mu) q (1 - \eta^{-x})}{(1 - \mu) \cdot (1 - (1 - q) (1 - \eta^{-x}))} = \frac{\mu}{1 - \eta^{-x}} + \frac{(1 - \mu) q}{(1 - \mu) (1 - q)}
\]
which is clearly strictly increasing in $\eta^{-x}$. QED

**Lemma B.3.** $\Pr(\omega = x|y = x)\left(\mu^x - \gamma\right)$ is strictly decreasing in $\eta^x$ (when $\eta^{-x} = 0$) and strictly increasing in $\eta^{-x}$ (when $\eta^x = 0$).

**Proof:** First $\Pr(\omega = x|y = x)$ is strictly decreasing (increasing) in $\eta^x (\eta^{-x})$ by Lemma B.2. Next $\mu^x = \frac{\mu}{\mu + (1 - \mu) q (1 - \eta^{-x}) + (1 - q) \eta^x}$ is strictly decreasing (increasing) in $\eta^x (\eta^{-x})$. QED

The preceding lemmas immediately yield comparative statics effects of $\eta^x \geq 0$ (when $\eta^{-x} = 0$) on the four relevant values of information ($\phi^x_-, \phi^x_+, \phi^{-x}_-, \phi^{-x}_+$) as a corollary.

**Corollary B.1.** Suppose that $\eta^{-x} = 0$. Then $\phi^x_-(\eta^x)$ and $\phi^x_+(\eta^x)$ are strictly increasing in $\eta^x$, while $\phi^{-x}_-(\eta^x)$ and $\phi^{-x}_+(\eta^x)$ are strictly decreasing in $\eta^x$.

We next use the preceding to examine how an anticipated distortion $\eta^z > 0$ toward some policy $z$ (with $\eta^{-z} = 0$) affects the electoral incentives of a low-ability incumbent when the voter best-responds. This analysis yields a key lemma which implies that the model is well behaved. The lemma states that (despite the greater complexity of the RA model), a greater distortion toward some policy $z$ still makes that policy relatively less electorally appealing once the voter best responds (as in the CHS model). To state the lemma formally, let
\[
\Delta^z_\eta(\eta^x) = \left\{\Delta : \exists \theta \text{ satisfying } \theta^x \in \bar{\Theta}_x(\eta^x) \quad \forall x \in \{A, B\} \text{ and } \Delta = \Delta^z_\eta(\theta)\right\}
\]
denote the re-election probability differences for an incumbent with information $\mathcal{I}$ between choosing $z$ vs. $\neg z$ that can be generated by a voter best response to $\eta^x$ (with $\eta^{-z} = 0$).

**Lemma B.4.** $\Delta^z_\eta(\eta^x)$ is an upper-hemi continuous, compact, convex-valued, decreasing correspondence that is constant and singleton everywhere except at (at most) four points.

**Proof:** Starting with the voter’s objective functions $V(\theta^x|\eta)$ and the best responses stated in main text Lemma 1 and Appendix Lemma A.1, it is straightforward to verify all properties of the correspondence using standard arguments except that it is decreasing.
To argue that $\Delta^z_I(\eta^z)$ is decreasing, first observe that:

$$\Delta^z_I(\eta^z) = V^z_I(\eta^z) - V^{\neg z}_I(\eta^z),$$

where $V^x_I(\eta^z) = \{v : \exists \theta^x \in \Theta(\eta^z) \text{ satisfying } v = v^z_I(\theta^x)\}$. Specifically, $V^z_I(\eta^z)$ the set of reelection probabilities following policy $x$ that can be generated by a voter best response to $\eta^z \in [0, 1]$ (with $\eta^z = 0$). To show the desired result we therefore argue that $V^z_I(\eta^z)$ is decreasing and $V^{\neg z}_I(\eta^z)$ is increasing.

To argue that $V^z_I(\eta^z)$ is decreasing, first observe by Lemma 1 and Corollary B.1 that $\phi^z(\eta^z) = \min\{\phi^z_-(\eta^z), \phi^z_+(\eta^z)\}$, with $\phi^z_-(\eta^z)$ strictly increasing in $\eta^z$ and $\phi^z_+(\eta^z)$ strictly decreasing in $\eta^z$. Thus, there $\exists$ some $\bar{\eta}^z$ where $\phi^z(\eta^z)$ achieves its strict maximum over $[0, 1]$, and moreover if $\eta^z \in (0, 1)$ then $\phi^z(\eta^z) \not< (>)\phi^z_-(\eta^z) \iff \eta^z < (>)\bar{\eta}^z$. Suppose first that $c \geq \phi^z(\bar{\eta}^z)$. By Lemma 1, if $\eta^z < \bar{\eta}^z$ then $\hat{\theta}^z \in \hat{\Theta}^z(\eta^z) \rightarrow \hat{\nu}^z_0 = 1 > \hat{\rho}^z = 0 \rightarrow V^z_I(\eta^z) = \{1\}$, and if $\eta^z > \bar{\eta}^z$ then $\hat{\theta}^z \in \hat{\Theta}^z(\eta^z) \rightarrow \hat{\nu}^z_0 = \hat{\rho}^z = 0 \rightarrow V^z_I(\eta^z) = \{0\}$. $V^z_I(\eta^z)$ decreasing then immediately follows. Suppose next that $c < \phi^z(\bar{\eta}^z)$; then there are three subcases.

(a) If $\eta^z < \bar{\eta}^z$ then by Lemma 1 we have $\hat{\theta}^z \in \hat{\Theta}^z(\eta^z) \iff \hat{\theta}^z$ satisfies (i) $\hat{\nu}^z_0 = \hat{\nu}^z_{\neg z} = 1 > \hat{\nu}^z_z = 0$, and (ii) $c > (\equiv)\phi^z_+(\eta^z) \rightarrow \hat{\rho}^z = 1(0)$. Since $\phi^z_+(\eta^z)$ is strictly increasing in $\eta^z$, it is easy to see that $\{\rho : \exists \hat{\theta}^z \in \hat{\Theta}^z \text{ with } \rho = \hat{\rho}^z\}$ is an increasing correspondence. Moreover, observe that $\nu^z_I(\rho^z|\hat{\nu}^z_0 = \hat{\nu}^z_{\neg z} = 1, \hat{\nu}^z_z = 0) = 1 - \rho^z \Pr(\omega = z|\mathcal{I})$ is decreasing in $\rho^z$ (that is, more attention to $z$ hurts reelection prospects when the voter’s posture is favorable). Thus it immediately follows that $V^z_I(\eta^z)$ is decreasing over the range $\eta^z < \bar{\eta}^z$.

(b) If $\eta^z > \bar{\eta}^z$ then by Lemma 1 we have $\hat{\theta}^z \in \hat{\Theta}^z(\eta^z) \iff \hat{\theta}^z$ satisfies (i) $\hat{\nu}^z_0 = \hat{\nu}^z_{\neg z} = 0$, (ii) $\phi^z_+(\eta^z) \not< (>)0 \rightarrow \hat{\nu}^z_z = 1(0)$, and (iii) $c > (\equiv)\phi^z_-(\eta^z) \rightarrow \hat{\rho}^z = 1(0)$. Since $\phi^z_-(\eta^z)$ is strictly decreasing in $\eta^z$, it is easy to see that both $\{\rho : \exists \hat{\theta}^z \in \hat{\Theta}^z \text{ with } \rho = \hat{\rho}^z\}$ and $\{\nu : \exists \hat{\nu}^z \in \hat{\Theta}^z \text{ with } \nu = \hat{\nu}^z\}$ are decreasing correspondences. Moreover, observe that $\nu^z_I(\rho^z|\hat{\nu}^z_0 = \hat{\nu}^z_{\neg z} = 0) = \rho^z \nu^z_z \cdot \Pr(\omega = z|\mathcal{I})$ is increasing in both $\nu^z_z$ and $\rho^z$ (that is, more attention to $z$ helps reelection prospects when the voter’s posture is adversarial). Thus it immediately follows that $V^z_I(\eta^z)$ is again decreasing over the range $\eta^z > \bar{\eta}^z$.

(c) If $\eta^z$ is sufficiently close to $\bar{\eta}^z$ then by Lemma 1 we have $\hat{\theta}^z \in \hat{\Theta}^z(\eta^z) \rightarrow \hat{\rho}^z = \hat{\nu}^z_{\neg z} = 1 > \hat{\nu}^z_z = 0 \rightarrow V^z_I(\eta^z) = \{\Pr(z = \omega|\mathcal{I})\}$ and constant.

Finally, exactly symmetric arguments show $V^{\neg z}_I(\eta^z)$ is increasing, beginning again with the observations (by Lemma 1 and Corollary B.1) that $\phi^{\neg z}(\eta^z) = \min\{\phi^{\neg z}_-(\eta^z), \phi^{\neg z}_+(\eta^z)\}$, but with $\phi^{\neg z}_-(\eta^z)$ strictly increasing in $\eta^z$ and $\phi^{\neg z}_+(\eta^z)$ strictly decreasing in $\eta^z$. QED

With the preceding lemma in hand, we first prove main text Lemma 2 stating that the incumbent is always truthful when $\pi = \frac{1}{2}$ (i.e., there is no ex-ante “popular” policy).

**Proof of Lemma 2** Applying Corollary A.1 and Lemma B.4, to rule out an equilibrium distorted toward a policy $x \in \{A, B\}$ ($\eta^x > 0, \eta^{\neg x} = 0$) it suffices to show $\min\{\Delta^{x-x}_z(0)\} \leq 0$ (intuitively, that there is no electoral benefit to policy $x$ after signal $\neg x$ when the incumbent
is believed to be truthful). Given ex-ante policy symmetry and incumbent truthfulness, there always exists a best-response \( \hat{\theta} \) in which the voter treats the incumbent identically after either policy, so \( \Delta_{x=x}^y(\hat{\theta}) = \rho^x(\Pr(\omega = -x|s = x) - \Pr(\omega = x|s = x)) \leq 0 \). QED

We next prove Proposition 1 ruling out “fake leadership” and both existence and uniqueness of generic uniqueness of sequential equilibria.

**Proof of Proposition 1** Applying Corollary A.1 and Lemma B.4, to rule out fake leadership equilibria \((\eta^A = 0, \eta^B \in (0, 1))\) it suffices to show that \( \min \{ \Delta_{s=A}^B(0) \} \leq 0 \). First recall from the main text that \( \mu^B < \mu < \hat{\mu}^A = \hat{\mu}^B \). Now suppose first that \( \gamma \in (\hat{\mu}^B, \hat{\mu}^A) \) so that \( \nu^A = 1 > \nu^B = 0 \) in a voter best response. Then it is easily verified that \( \min \{ \Delta_{s=A}^B(0) \} \leq - (2 \Pr(\omega = A|s = A) - 1) \leq 0 \). Suppose next that \( \gamma \leq \hat{\mu}^B \), so that the voter’s posture is favorable after both policies. Then \( \hat{\phi}^B > \hat{\phi}^A \) (by Lemma B.1), and there exists some \( \hat{\theta} \in \hat{\Theta}(0) \) with \( \hat{\nu}^x = \hat{\nu}^A = 1 > \hat{\nu}^x_{-x} = 0 \) \( \forall x \) and \( \hat{\rho}^B \geq \hat{\rho}^A \), so \( \Delta_{s=A}^B(\hat{\theta}) = -\hat{\rho}^B (2 \Pr(\omega = A|s = A) - 1) - (\hat{\rho}^B - \hat{\rho}^A) \Pr(\omega = A|s = A) - (1 - \hat{\rho}^B)(1 - \hat{\rho}^B) \leq 0 \).

Suppose next that \( \gamma \in [\hat{\mu}^A, \hat{\mu}^B] \) (recalling that \( \mu^A = \mu^B \)) so that the voter has an adversarial posture after both policies. Then \( \hat{\phi}^A > \hat{\phi}^B \) (by Lemma B.1), and there exists some \( \hat{\theta} \in \hat{\Theta}(0) \) with \( \hat{\nu}^x = 1 > \hat{\nu}^x_{-x} = \hat{\nu}^B = 0 \) \( \forall x \) and \( \hat{\rho}^A \geq \hat{\rho}^B \), so \( \Delta_{s=A}^B(\hat{\theta}) = -\hat{\rho}^B (2 \Pr(\omega = A|s = A) - 1) - (\hat{\rho}^A - \hat{\rho}^B) \Pr(\omega = A|s = A) - (1 - \hat{\rho}^A)\hat{\rho}^A \leq 0 \).

Finally suppose that \( \hat{\mu}^A = \hat{\mu}^B < \gamma \); then clearly \( \Delta_{s=A}^A(0) = \{0\} \). QED

**Lemma B.5.** A sequential equilibrium of the model exists and is generically unique.

**Proof:** It is straightforward to verify from the definitions that for generic model parameters \((\mu, \gamma, \pi, q, c) \in [0, 1]^4 \times \mathbb{R}^+ \) we have that (i) for any particular fixed \( \eta = (\eta^A, \eta^B) \), \( \Delta_{s=B}^A(\eta) \) is a singleton, and (ii) \( \Delta_{s=B}^A(0) \neq \bar{\Delta}_{s=B}^A \). Suppose first that \( \Delta_{s=B}^A(0) < \bar{\Delta}_{s=B}^A \); then by Corollary A.1 there exists a truthful equilibrium. Moreover, by Lemma B.4, \( \Delta_{s=B}^A(\eta^A) < \bar{\Delta}_{s=B}^A \) \( \forall \eta^A > 0 \). Hence again by Corollary A.1 there cannot exist a pandering equilibrium with \( \hat{\eta}^A > 0 \). Suppose next that \( \Delta_{s=B}^A(0) > \bar{\Delta}_{s=B}^A \); then by Corollary A.1 there does not exist a truthful equilibrium. In addition, by Lemma B.4, \( \Delta_{s=B}^A(\eta^A) \) is decreasing and satisfies \( \Delta_{s=B}^A(1) \leq 0 < \bar{\Delta}_{s=B}^A \in (0, 1) \). Thus, there \( \exists \) some \( \hat{\eta}^A > 0 \) with \( \bar{\Delta}_{s=B}^A \in \Delta_{s=B}^A(\hat{\eta}^A) \), so by Corollary A.1 a pandering equilibrium exists at \( \hat{\eta}^A \). Moreover, for generic parameters, \( \hat{\eta}^A \) must be equal to one of the (at most) four values where \( \Delta_{s=B}(\hat{\eta}^A) \) is non-singleton, with \( \bar{\Delta}_{s=B} \in (\min \{ \Delta_{s=B}^A(\hat{\eta}^A) \}, \max \{ \Delta_{s=B}^A(\hat{\eta}^A) \}) \). Thus, by Lemma B.4 we have \( \Delta_{s=B}^A(\eta^A) > ( < ) \bar{\Delta}_{s=B}^A \) for \( \eta^A < (>) \hat{\eta}^A \) and no other pandering equilibrium exists. QED
C Main Proofs

In this Appendix we prove Propositions 3 – 5 characterizing the form of equilibrium. Since fake leadership is ruled out we return to the notation in the main text, denoting the probability that a low-ability incumbent chooses A after signal B as \( \sigma \) (rather than \( \eta^A \)) and assuming that a low-ability incumbent is truthful after signal A (i.e. \( \eta^B = 0 \)).

C.1 Truthful Equilibria

Recall from Proposition 1 that a truthful equilibrium of the CHS model exists iff either (i) \( \gamma \not\in (\bar{\mu}^B, \bar{\mu}^A) \) or (ii) \( q \geq \hat{q} \). We now provide conditions for existence of a truthful equilibrium in the RA model; Lemmas 3 and 4 are then immediate corollaries.

Lemma C.1. There exists a truthful equilibrium of the RA model if and only if either (1) \( c \leq \min\{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\} \), (2) \( c \in \left(\min\{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\}, \max\{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\}\right) \) and \( q \geq \bar{q} \), or (3) \( c \geq \max\{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\} \) and either (i) \( \gamma \not\in (\bar{\mu}^B, \bar{\mu}^A) \) or (ii) \( q \geq \hat{q} \).

Proof: Suppose first that \( c \leq \min\{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\} \); then there exists a voter best response \( \hat{\theta} \) to truthfulness with full attention (\( \hat{\rho}^A = \hat{\rho}^B = 1 \)), for any such \( \hat{\theta} \) we have \( \Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\theta}) = \Pr(\omega = A|s = B) - \Pr(\omega = B|s = B) < 0 < \Delta^A_{s=B} \), so truthfulness is a best response to full attention, and a truthful equilibrium exists. Suppose next that \( c \in \left(\min\{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\}, \max\{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\}\right) \). Then in any best response \( \hat{\theta} \), either \( \hat{\rho}^B = 1 > \hat{\rho}^A = 0 \) and \( \gamma < \bar{\mu}^A \) implying \( \hat{\nu}^A = 1 \), or \( \hat{\rho}^A = 1 > \hat{\rho}^B = 0 \) and \( \gamma > \bar{\mu}^B \) implying \( \hat{\nu}^B = 1 \). In either case, \( \Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\theta}) = \Pr(\omega = A|s = B) \). This in turn is \( \leq \Delta^A_{s=B} \) (and thus a truthful equilibrium exists) i.f.f. \( q \geq \bar{q} \). Finally suppose that \( c \geq \max\{\bar{\phi}^A, \bar{\phi}^B\} \); then there exists a voter best response \( \hat{\theta} \) to truthfulness with no attention after either policy, and conditions on the remaining quantities for truthful equilibrium are trivially identical to conditions in the CHS model. QED.

C.2 Asymmetric Attention and Pandering Equilibria

The precise structure of equilibrium is relatively complex within the asymmetric attention region when a low-ability incumbent panders. To describe these equilibria first requires a closer examination of how pandering affects the value of attention after each policy.

C.2.1 The Value of Attention with Pandering

Consider two distinct values of attention \( \phi^x_s(\sigma) \) and \( \phi^{x'}_{s'}(\sigma) \), which are strictly monotonic in \( \sigma \). It is straightforward to see that their derivatives will have opposite signs, and hence cross at most once over \( \sigma \in [0,1] \), if either \( x = x' \) or \( s = s' \). However, single-crossing is not assured when both \( x \neq x' \) and \( s \neq s' \). In our analysis it will be necessary to compare the value of negative attention \( \phi^A_-(\sigma) \) after A and positive attention \( \phi^B_+(\sigma) \), which are both increasing in \( \sigma \). We first prove that these functions also cross at most once over \( \sigma \in [0,1] \).

Lemma C.2. \( \phi^A_-(\sigma) \) and \( \phi^B_+(\sigma) \) cross at most once over \([0,1]\).
Proof: By Lemma A.5, $\phi^B_+ > (=) \phi^A_+$ can be written both as $Z(\sigma, \gamma) > (=) \phi_A^-$, where $Z(\sigma, \gamma) = \Pr(y = A) \cdot (\mu - \Pr(y = B|\omega = B)\gamma) - \Pr(y = B) \cdot \Pr(y = A|\omega = B)\gamma$, and also $\dot{Z}(\sigma, \gamma) > (=) \phi_A^-$. Now $Z(\sigma, \gamma)$ is strictly decreasing in $\gamma$ and $Z(\sigma; \mu) = \Pr(y = A) - \Pr(y = B) > 0 \forall \sigma \in [0, 1]$; hence, $\phi^B_+ - \phi^A_- > 0 \forall \sigma \in [0, 1]$ when $\gamma \leq \mu$. Next observe that $\dot{Z}(\sigma; \gamma)$ is strictly increasing in $\sigma$ at any $(\gamma, \sigma)$ where both $\gamma > \mu$ and $\dot{Z}(\sigma; \gamma) \geq 0$ (since then $\gamma > \frac{\gamma - \mu}{\Pr(y = A|\omega = B)}$, so $\dot{Z}(\sigma; \gamma)$ and hence also $Z(\sigma; \gamma)$ and $\phi^B_+ - \phi^A_-$ satisfy single-crossing in $\sigma$. QED

We next introduce several useful definitions.

Definition C.1. For $(x, s) \in \{A, B\} \times \{-, +\}$, let $\tilde{\phi}^x_s(\sigma)$ denote the function extending $\phi^x_s(\sigma)$ linearly over $\mathbb{R}$, let $\sigma^{x, x'}_{s, s'}$ denote the unique solution to $\tilde{\phi}^x_s(\sigma) = \tilde{\phi}^{x'}_{s'}(\sigma)$, and let $\sigma^{x}(c)$ denote the inverse of $\tilde{\phi}^x_s(\sigma)$.

We now prove several essential properties of these cutpoints.

Lemma C.3. The cutpoints $\sigma^{x, x'}_{s, s'}$ satisfy the following:

- $\mu^x(\sigma^{x, x'}_{s, s'}(\gamma)) = \gamma \forall x \in \{A, B\}$ and $\sigma^x_N = \min\{\max\{\sigma^{A+}_N, 0\}, \max\{\sigma^{B+}_N, 0\}\}$

- $\sigma^{B-}_A(\gamma) \in (0, 1)$ and is constant in $\gamma$

- $\sigma^{B+}_A(\gamma) \in (0, 1)$ and is $< \sigma^{B+}_B$ when $\gamma > \mu$

- $\sigma^{B-}_A(\gamma)$ is strictly increasing in $\gamma$ when $\sigma^{B-}_A(\gamma) \in [0, 1]$, and there $\exists \gamma, \tilde{\gamma}$ with $\mu < \gamma < \tilde{\gamma} < \bar{\mu}^A$ such that $\sigma^{B+}_A(\gamma) = 0$ and $\sigma^{B+}_A(\tilde{\gamma}) = \sigma^{A+}_N(\gamma) = \sigma^x_N(\tilde{\gamma})$

Proof: The first property is an immediate implication of Lemma A.4 and Proposition 1, and the second is easily verified from the definitions.

Proof of third property: We argue that $\gamma > \mu \rightarrow \phi^A_+(\sigma^{B+}_B) < \phi^B_+(\sigma^{B+}_B)$; combined with $\phi^A_+(0) < \phi^B_+(0)$ (from Lemma B.1), $\phi^A_+(\sigma)$ decreasing in $\sigma$ and $\phi^B_+(\sigma)$ increasing in $\sigma$ (from Corollary B.1) this yields the desired property. First, there exists a unique level of pandering $\hat{\sigma} \in (0, 1)$ makes policy choice uninformative and thus satisfies $\mu^A(\hat{\sigma}) = \mu^B(\hat{\sigma}) = \mu$. Second, is easily verified that at $\hat{\sigma}$ we have $\Pr(y = x|\lambda_I = L) = \Pr(y = x|\lambda_I = H) = \Pr(\omega = x) \forall x$ (since a high ability incumbent always chooses correctly). Now suppose that $\mu < \gamma$. Then (i) $\mu^B(\hat{\sigma}) < \mu < \gamma$, (ii) $\mu^B(\sigma^{B+}_B) = \gamma$, and (iii) $\mu^B(\sigma)$ increasing jointly imply that $\hat{\sigma} < \sigma^{B+}_B$. We last argue $\phi^A_+(\hat{\sigma}) < \phi^B_+(\hat{\sigma})$, implying the desired property since $\phi^A_+(\sigma)$ is

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12Specifically, $\tilde{\phi}^x_s(\sigma) = \tilde{\phi}^x_s(\sigma)$ for $\sigma \in [0, 1]$, $\frac{\partial \tilde{\phi}^x_s(\sigma)}{\partial \sigma} \bigg|_{\sigma=0} \cdot \sigma$ for $\sigma < 0$, and $\frac{\partial \tilde{\phi}^x_s(\sigma)}{\partial \sigma} \bigg|_{\sigma=1} \cdot \sigma$ for $\sigma > 1$. 
decreasing and $\phi^B_+(\sigma)$ is increasing. Observe that $\phi^A_+(\hat{\sigma}) < \phi^B_+(\hat{\sigma})$ i.f.f.

$$\Pr(\omega = A|y = A) (\mu^A - \gamma) < \Pr(\omega = B|y = B) (\mu^B - \gamma)$$

$$\iff \mu^A - \Pr(\omega = A|y = A) \gamma < \mu^B - \Pr(\omega = B|y = B) \gamma$$

$$\iff \Pr(\omega = A|y = A) > \Pr(\omega = B|y = B)$$

$$\iff \mu \Pr(\omega = A|y = A, \lambda_t = H) + (1 - \mu) \Pr(\omega = A|y = A, \lambda_t = L) > \mu \Pr(\omega = B|y = B, \lambda_t = H) + (1 - \mu) \Pr(\omega = B|y = B, \lambda_t = L)$$

$$\iff \Pr(\omega = B|y = B, \lambda_t = H) > \Pr(\omega = B|y = B, \lambda_t = L)$$

$$\iff \Pr(\omega = A|\lambda_t = L) > \Pr(\omega = B|\lambda_t = L)$$

$$\iff q + (1 - q) \sigma > q (1 - \sigma), \text{ which holds } \forall \sigma > 0.$$ 

The first equality is from Lemma A.2, the second from $\mu^A(\hat{\sigma}) = \mu^B(\hat{\sigma}) = \mu$, the fourth from $\Pr(\omega = x|y = x, \lambda_t = H) = 1$, and the sixth from $\Pr(\omega = x|y = x, \lambda_t = L) = \Pr(\omega = x)$ at $\hat{\sigma}$.

**Proof of fourth property:** Recall from the proof of Lemma C.2 that $\phi^B_+(\sigma; \gamma) - \phi^A_+(\sigma; \gamma) > (\mu, \mu^A)$ solving $\sigma^A_-(\gamma) = 0$, which is equivalent to $\phi^B_+(0; \gamma) - \phi^A_+(0; \gamma) = 0$. To see this, observe that $Z(\sigma; \mu) = \Pr(y = A) - \Pr(y = B) > 0 \forall \sigma \in [0, 1]$ so $\phi^B_+(0; \mu) > \phi^A_+(0; \mu)$, and $\phi^A_+(0; \mu^A) = \phi^A_+(0; \mu) > \phi^B_+(0; \mu^A)$ (where the equality follows from $\sigma^A_-(\hat{\mu}) = 0$ and the inequality from Lemma A.4). Lastly, since $\sigma^B_+(-)\gamma)$ is strictly increasing in $\gamma$, $\sigma^A_+(\gamma)$ is strictly decreasing in $\gamma$, $\sigma^A_-(-)\gamma)$ and $\sigma^B_+(-)\hat{\mu}) = 0$, there exists a unique $\gamma \in (-)\gamma)$ where $\sigma^A_+(\gamma) = \gamma.$ QED

Having established properties of these critical cutpoints, we are now in a position to bound the equilibrium level of pandering $\sigma^*_\alpha$ under a variety of different conditions.

**Lemma C.4.** An equilibrium level of pandering $\sigma^*_\alpha$ in the RA model satisfies (i) $\gamma < \gamma \rightarrow \sigma^*_{\alpha} \leq \sigma^A_+$, (ii) $\gamma < \gamma \rightarrow \sigma^*_\alpha < \sigma^B_{\alpha}$, (iii) $\gamma \geq \gamma \rightarrow \sigma^*_\alpha < \sigma^B_{\alpha}$, (iv) when $\gamma \in [\gamma, \bar{\gamma}]$ we have $c > (\gamma)\phi^A_+(\sigma^B_{\alpha}) = \phi^B_+(\sigma^B_{\alpha}) \rightarrow \sigma^*_\alpha > (\gamma)\sigma^B_{\alpha}$.

**Proof:** We first argue $\gamma \leq \gamma \rightarrow \sigma^*_{\alpha} \leq \sigma^A_+$. Suppose alternatively that $\sigma^*_\alpha > \sigma^A_+$; then $\nu^A = 0$ in any best response. Supporting such an equilibrium requires that a low-ability incumbent who receives signal $B$ have a strict electoral incentive to choose $A$; it is easily verified that this in turn requires both that $\nu^B < 1$ (so $\sigma^*_{\alpha} \leq \sigma^B_{\alpha}$), and also that $\rho^A > \rho^B$ (so
Clearly we cannot have $\gamma \leq \mu$ since then $\sigma^A_+ \leq \sigma^A_-$, so suppose instead that $\gamma \in (\mu, \bar{\gamma}]$. Then we have $\sigma^A_+ = \sigma^A_+$, $\phi^A_-(\sigma^*_R) = \phi^A_+ (\sigma^*_R) < \phi^A_+ (\sigma^*_A) = \phi^B_+(\sigma^*_R)$ and $\phi^B_-(\sigma^*_R) = \phi^B_+ (\sigma^*_R) > \phi^B_+ (\sigma^*_A) = \phi^B_+ (\sigma^*_A)$. But by the definition of $\bar{\gamma}$ we have $\phi^A_+(\sigma^*_R) > \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_R)$ implying $\phi^B(\sigma^*_R) > \phi^A(\sigma^*_R)$, a contradiction.

We next argue $\gamma \leq \bar{\gamma} \rightarrow \sigma^*_R < \sigma^A_-$. By the definition of $\bar{\gamma}$ we have that $\phi^A_+(\sigma) < \phi^B_+(\sigma) \forall \sigma$ so $\sigma^A_+ < \sigma^A_-$. Thus $\phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^B_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^B_+(\sigma^*_A)$. Now consider a voter best response $\theta$ to $\sigma^A_-$. If $c > \phi^B_-(\sigma^*_A)$ then in any best response, $\nu^B = 1 > \rho^B = 0$; but then $\Delta_{s=B}(\theta) \leq 0 < \Delta_{s=B}^A$ so $\sigma^*_R < \sigma^A_-$. Alternatively, if $c < \phi^B_-(\sigma^*_A)$ then in any best response $\theta$ we have $\rho^B = 1$, and either have $\rho^A = 1$ (if $\phi^A_-(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A)$) or $\rho^A = \nu^A = 0$ (if $\phi^A_-(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A)$); in either case $\Delta_{s=B}(\theta) \leq -(\Pr (\omega = B|s = B) - \Pr (\omega = A|s = B)) < 0 < \Delta_{s=B}^A$, so again $\sigma^*_R < \sigma^A_-$. 

We next argue that $\gamma \geq \bar{\gamma} \rightarrow \sigma^*_R \leq \sigma^A_+$. By the definition of $\bar{\gamma}$ we have that $\sigma^A_+ \leq \sigma^A_+ \leq \sigma^A_+$. Hence $\phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A)$. We now consider a voter best response $\theta$ to $\sigma^A_+$. If $c > \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^B_+ (\sigma^*_A)$, then the voter will replace the incumbent outright after either policy, so $\Delta_{s=B}(\theta) = 0 < \Delta_{s=B}^A$, implying $\sigma^*_R < \sigma^A_-$. Alternatively, if $c < \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^B_+ (\sigma^*_A)$ then the voter will pay attention after either policy, so $\Delta_{s=B}(\theta) = -(\Pr (\omega = B|s = B) - \Pr (\omega = A|s = B)) < 0 < \Delta_{s=B}^A$, again implying $\sigma^*_R < \sigma^A_-$. 

We last argue that when $\gamma \in [\gamma, \bar{\gamma}]$ we have $\sigma^*_R > (\sigma^*_A)$ when $c > (\sigma^*_A)$ $\phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A)$. Observe that by the definitions of $\gamma$ and $\bar{\gamma}$ we have that $\sigma^A_+ \leq \sigma^A_+ \leq \sigma^A_+ < \sigma^A_-$. Hence $\phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A)$. Now consider a voter best response $\theta$ to $\sigma^A_+$. If $c > \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^B_+(\sigma^*_A)$ then the voter will retain the incumbent after $A$ and replace her after $B$, so $\Delta_{s=B}(\theta) = 1 < \Delta_{s=B}^A$, implying $\sigma^*_R > \sigma^A_-$. Alternatively, if $c < \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_A) = \phi^B_+(\sigma^*_A)$ then the voter will pay attention after either policy, so $\Delta_{s=B}(\theta) = -(\Pr (\omega = B|s = B) - \Pr (\omega = A|s = B)) < 0 < \Delta_{s=B}^A$, implying $\sigma^*_R < \sigma^A_-$. QED

Finally, we can characterize equilibrium in the asymmetric attention region; the following expanded proposition encompasses Propositions 2 and 4 in the main text.

**Proposition C.1.** In an equilibrium of the rational attention model, the voter pays the same level of attention after either policy ($\rho^A = \rho^B$) if and only if either:

- $c < \min\{\phi^A(0), \phi^B(0)\}$, so that the voter pays full attention after both policies ($\rho^A = \rho^B = 1$) and the incumbent never panders

- $c > \max\{\phi^A(\sigma^*_A), \phi^B(\sigma^*_A)\}$, so that the voter never pays attention after either policy ($\rho^A = \rho^B = 0$), and the incumbent panders to the same degree $\sigma^*_N$ as in the CHS model
Moreover, there exists some $\gamma \in (\mu, \tilde{\mu}_A)$ at which $\phi^B(0)$ crosses $\phi^A(0)$, and another $\bar{\gamma} \in (\gamma, \tilde{\mu}_A)$ at which $\phi^B(\sigma_N(\gamma))$ crosses $\phi^A(\sigma_N(\gamma))$, such that

- if $\gamma < \bar{\gamma}$ then the voter pays more attention after policy $B$
- if $\gamma > \bar{\gamma}$ then the voter pays more attention after policy $A$
- if $\gamma \in [\gamma, \bar{\gamma}]$ then the voter pays more attention after policy $B$ (A) if $c > (\prec) \phi^B_+ (\sigma^B_+) = \phi^A_+ (\sigma^A_+)$

Proof We first argue that $\gamma < \gamma < \bar{\gamma} \rightarrow \phi^B(\sigma^R_+) > \phi^A(\sigma^R_N)$, implying $\rho^B \geq \rho^A$. By the definition of $\gamma$ we have $\phi^B_+ (\sigma^*_R) > \phi^A_+ (\sigma^*_N)$, and by Lemma C.4 we have $\sigma^*_R \in [0, \sigma^A_-)$ which $\rightarrow \phi^B(\sigma^*_R) > \phi^A(\sigma^*_R)$. Thus $\phi^B(\sigma^*_R) = \min \{\phi^B_+ (\sigma^*_R), \phi^B_- (\sigma^*_R)\} > \phi^A_+ (\sigma^*_R) \geq \phi^A(\sigma^*_R)$.

We next argue that $\gamma > \bar{\gamma} > \gamma \rightarrow \phi^A(\sigma^*_R) > \phi^B(\sigma^*_N)$, implying $\rho^A \geq \rho^B$. By Lemma C.4 we have that $\sigma^*_R \in [0, \sigma^A_+]$, and by Lemma C.3 we have $\sigma^A_+ < \sigma^B_-$. Hence $\phi^A_+ (\sigma^*_R) > \phi^B_+ (\sigma^*_R) = \phi^B(\sigma^*_R)$. Now if $\sigma^*_R \geq \sigma^A_+$ then $\phi^A(\sigma^*_R) = \phi^A_+ (\sigma^*_R)$ which yields the desired property, whereas if $\sigma^*_R \leq \sigma^A_+ \leq \sigma^*_N$ then $\phi^A(\sigma^*_R) = \phi^A_+ (\sigma^*_R) = \phi^B_+(\sigma^*_R)$ from the definition of $\gamma$, again yielding the desired property.

We last argue that if $\gamma \in [\gamma, \bar{\gamma}]$ we have $c > (\prec) \phi^B_+ (\sigma^B_+) = \phi^A_+ (\sigma^A_+) \rightarrow \rho^B \leq (\geq) \rho^A$. Observe that $\sigma^*_N = \sigma^A_+$, by the definitions of $\gamma$ and $\bar{\gamma}$ we have $\sigma^B_- \leq \sigma^B_+ \leq \sigma^A_+$, and also $\sigma^A_+ < \sigma^B_+$ since $\mu < \gamma$. Hence $\forall \sigma \in [0, \sigma^A_+]$ we have $\phi^A(\sigma) = \phi^A_- (\sigma)$ and $\phi^B(\sigma) = \phi^B_+ (\sigma)$. Finally by Lemma C.4 we have $c > \phi^B_+ (\sigma^B_+) \rightarrow \sigma_R > \sigma^B_- \rightarrow \phi^A_+ (\sigma^*_R) \rightarrow \phi^B(\sigma^*_R) \rightarrow \rho^A \geq \rho^B$ and $c < \phi^B_- (\sigma^B_+) \rightarrow \sigma_R < \sigma^B_- \rightarrow \phi^A_+ (\sigma^*_R) < \phi^B(\sigma^*_R) \rightarrow \rho^B \geq \rho^A$. QED.

C.2.2 Equilibrium with Moderate-Quality Information

We now use the preceding to fully characterize equilibrium in the asymmetric attention attention region when a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality information. Proposition 4 in the main text is a corollary of this more complete characterization.

Case 1. Suppose that $c \in (\min \{\phi^A(0), \phi^B(0)\}, \max \{\phi^A(0), \phi^B(0)\})$. Then by Lemma C.1, there exists a truthful equilibrium.

Case 2. Suppose that $c \in (\max \{\phi^A(0), \phi^B(0)\}, \max \{\phi^A(\sigma_N^*), \phi^B(\sigma_N^*)\})$. Then $\sigma^*_N \neq 0$ and $\gamma \in (\tilde{\mu}_B, \tilde{\mu}_A)$. Then in any best response $\hat{\theta}$ to truthfulness we have $\hat{\nu}^A = 1 > \hat{\nu}^B = \hat{\rho}^A = \hat{\rho}^B = 0$, implying $\Delta^A_{\mathit{true}}(\hat{\theta}) = 1 > \Delta^A_{\mathit{true}}$, so truthfulness is not a best response to $\hat{\theta}$.

Subcase 2.1: $\gamma \in (\tilde{\mu}_B, \tilde{\mu}_A)$. First, since $\phi^A(\sigma) = \phi^A_- (\sigma) < \phi^A_+ (\sigma)$ for all $\sigma \in [0, \sigma^*_N]$ (since $\sigma^*_N = \min \{\sigma^B_-, \sigma^A_+\}$) by Lemma C.3 the condition reduces to $c \in (\phi^B_+(0), \phi^A_+(\sigma_N^*))$. Thus, there exists a well-defined cutpoint $\sigma^B(c) \in (0, \sigma^*_N)$; we argue that there exist an equilibrium with $\tilde{\sigma}_R = \sigma^B(c)$. First observe that since $\phi^A_+ (\sigma) < \phi^B_+ (\sigma) \forall \sigma \in [0, \sigma^*_N]$, we have
that $\hat{\nu}^A = 1 > \hat{\rho}^A = 0$ is a best response after $A$. Next observe that since $\sigma_+^B(c) < \sigma_N^* = \min \{\sigma_{A-}^+, \sigma_B^{B+}\}$, $\hat{\theta}$ is a best-response to $\sigma_+^B(c) \iff \hat{\nu}^B = 0$. Since,

\[
\Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\rho}^B = 0; \hat{\theta}) = 1 > \hat{\Delta}^A_{s=B} > \Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\rho}^B = 1; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr(\omega = A|s = B),
\]

there exists a best response $\hat{\theta}$ with partial attention $\hat{\rho}^B \in (0, 1)$ after $B$ and no attention $\hat{\rho}^A = 0$ after $A$ that supports an equilibrium.

**Subcase 2.2:** $\gamma \in (\gamma, \gamma)$. By Lemma C.3 we have $0 < \sigma_{A-}^{B+} < \sigma_{B+}^{B+} < \sigma_{A-}^{A+}$, so the condition reduces to $c \in (\phi_-(0), \phi_+^A(\sigma_+^A))$ where $\sigma_{A-}^{A+} = \sigma_N^*$. Thus, there exists a well-defined cutpoint $\min \{\sigma_-(c), \sigma_+(c)\} \in (0, \sigma_N^*)$; we argue that there exists an equilibrium with $\hat{\sigma}_R = \min \{\sigma_+(c), \sigma_-(c)\}$.

If $\hat{\sigma}_R = \sigma_+(c)$ then $\phi_+(\sigma_+(c) \leq \phi_+^A(\sigma_+(c) = c$, and $\hat{\theta}^A$ with $\hat{\nu}^A = 1 > \hat{\rho}^A = 0$ is a best response after $A$. Next observe that since $\sigma_+(c) < \sigma_N^* = \min \{\sigma_{A-}^+, \sigma_B^{B+}\}$, $\hat{\theta}$ is a best-response to $\sigma_+(c) \iff \hat{\nu}^B = 0$. Since

\[
\Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\rho}^B = 0; \hat{\theta}) = 1 > \hat{\Delta}^A_{s=B} > \Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\rho}^B = 1; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr(\omega = A|s = B),
\]

there exists a best response $\hat{\theta}$ with partial attention $\hat{\rho}^B \in (0, 1)$ after $B$ and no attention $\hat{\rho}^A = 0$ after $A$ that supports an equilibrium.

If $\hat{\sigma}_R = \sigma_-(c)$ then $\phi_-(\sigma_-(c) \leq \phi_+^A(\sigma_-(c) = c$, and $\hat{\theta}^B$ with $\hat{\rho}^B = \hat{\nu}^B = 0$ is a best response after $A$. Next, observe that since $\sigma_-(c) < \sigma_N^* = \min \{\sigma_{A-}^+, \sigma_B^{B+}\}$, $\hat{\theta}^A$ is a best response to $\sigma_-(c) \iff \hat{\nu}^A = 1$. Since

\[
\Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\rho}^A = 0; \hat{\theta}) = 1 > \hat{\Delta}^A_{s=B} > \Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\rho}^A = 1; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr(\omega = A|s = B),
\]

there exists a best response $\hat{\theta}$ with partial attention $\hat{\rho}^A \in (0, 1)$ after $A$ and no attention $\hat{\rho} = 0$ after $B$ that supports an equilibrium. QED

**C.2.3 Equilibrium with Poor-Quality Information**

We last fully characterize equilibria in the asymmetric attention attention region when a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information $(q \in (\pi, \tilde{q}))$. Proposition 5 is a corollary of this more complete characterization. Recall that $q < \hat{q} \iff \hat{\Delta}^A_{s=B} < \Pr(\omega =
CASE 1: \( \gamma \in (0, \gamma) \). We begin by arguing that (i) \( \min \{ \phi^A(0), \phi^B(0) \} = \phi^A_-(0) \) and (ii) \( \max \{ \phi^A(\sigma^*_N), \phi^B(\sigma^*_N) \} = \phi^B(\sigma^*_N) \), so that the asymmetric attention condition reduces to
\[
c \in (\phi^A_-(0), \phi^B(\sigma^*_N))
\]
First observe that \( \gamma < \hat{\mu}^A \to \phi^A_-(0) < \phi^B_+(0) \). Second recall from Lemma B.1 that \( \phi^A_-(0) < \phi^B_+(0) \). Third recall that \( \gamma < \gamma \to \phi^A_+(\sigma) < \phi^B_+(\sigma) \) \( \forall \sigma \in [0, 1] \). These immediately yield (i), as well as (ii) when \( \gamma \leq \hat{\mu}^B \) so that \( \sigma^0 = 0 \). Finally, whenever \( \gamma \in (\hat{\mu}^B, \hat{\mu}^A) \) we have \( \phi^B(\sigma^*_N) = \phi^B_+(\sigma^*_N) \) and \( \phi^A(\sigma^*_N) = \phi^A_+(\sigma^*_N) \) which again yields (ii).

We now argue that there exists a pandering equilibrium at
\[
\hat{\sigma}_R = \min\{\sigma^B(c), \sigma^A_-(c), \sigma^A_-(c)\}.
\]
To do so observe that \( \gamma < \hat{\mu}^A \to \sigma^A_+ \in (0, 1) \) and \( \sigma^A_- \) is constant in \( \gamma \). We now examine three exhaustive and mutually exclusive conditions on the cost of attention \( c \).

**Subcase 1.1 (High Attention).** \( c \in (\phi^A_-(0), \phi^A_-(\min \{ \sigma^A_+, \sigma^B_- \})) \). It is easily verified that \( 0 < \sigma^A_-(c) < \min \{ \sigma^B_-, \sigma^A_+ \} \) so \( \hat{\sigma}_R = \sigma^A_-(c) \). Clearly, any \( \hat{\theta}^A \) s.t. \( \hat{\nu}^A = 1 \) is a best response to \( \sigma^A_-(c) \). Next we have \( c = \phi^A_+(\sigma^A_-(c)) \) and \( \phi^A_-(\sigma^A_-(c)) < \phi^B_+(\sigma^A_-(c)) \) and \( \phi^A_-(\sigma^A_-(c)) < \phi^B_+(\sigma^A_-(c)) \), so any \( \hat{\theta}^B \) that is a best response to \( \sigma^A_-(c) \) must have \( \hat{\nu}^B = 1 \). So
\[
\Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\nu}^A = 0; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr(\omega = A|s = B) > \Delta^A_{s=B} > \Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\nu}^A = 1; \hat{\theta}) = - (\Pr(\omega = B|s = B) - \Pr(\omega = A|s = B)),
\]
and there exists a best response to \( \sigma^A_-(c) \) with partial attention \( \hat{\nu}^A \in (0, 1) \) and a favorable posture \( \hat{\nu}^A = 1 \) after \( A \), and full attention \( \hat{\nu}^B = 1 \) after \( B \).

**Subcase 1.2 (Medium Attention).** \( c \in (\phi^A_-(\min \{ \sigma^A_+, \sigma^B_- \}), \phi^B(\min \{ \sigma^A_+, \sigma^B_- \})) \).

We first argue that for this case to hold, \( \gamma \) must be such that \( \sigma^A_+ < \sigma^B_- \). First recall that by Lemma C.3 that \( \phi^B_+(\sigma) > \phi^A_+(\sigma) \) \( \forall \sigma \) when \( \gamma < \gamma \), which \( \to \sigma^B_- < \sigma^A_+ \). Next, if instead we had \( \sigma^B_- < \sigma^A_+ \) then the interval would reduce to \( (\phi^A_-(\sigma^B_-), \phi^B_-(\sigma^B_-)) \) which is empty. Concluding, this case may be simplified to \( \sigma^A_+ < \sigma^B_- \) and
\[
c \in (\phi^A_+(\sigma^A_+), \phi^B(\sigma^A_+)),
\]
It is easily verified that \( \sigma^A_+ < \min \{ \sigma^B_-(c), \sigma^A_-(c) \} \) so \( \hat{\sigma}_R = \sigma^A_+ \).

Now clearly any \( \hat{\theta}^A \) with \( \hat{\nu}^A = 0 \) is a best response to \( \sigma^A_+ \), and any \( \hat{\theta}^B \) with \( \hat{\nu}^B = 1 \) is a best response to \( \sigma^A_+ \). Thus, we have that
\[
\Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\nu}^A = 1; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr(\omega = A|s = B) > \Delta^A_{s=B} > \Delta^A_{s=B}(\hat{\nu}^A = 0; \hat{\theta}) = - (\Pr(\omega = B|s = B) - \Pr(\omega = A|s = B)),
\]
and there exists a best response to \( \sigma^A_+ \) with no attention \( \hat{\nu}^A = 0 \) and a mixed posture \( \hat{\nu}^A \in (0, 1) \) after \( A \), and full attention \( \hat{\nu}^B = 1 \) after \( B \).

**Subcase 1.3 (Low Attention).** \( c \in (\phi^B(\min \{ \sigma^A_+, \sigma^B_- \}), \phi^B(\sigma^*_N)) \).
We first argue that this case may be simplified to $\gamma < \mu$ and
\[
c \in \left( \phi^B_{\pm} \left( \min \left\{ \sigma_{A+}^+, \sigma_{A-}^- \right\} \right), \phi^B_{\pm} \left( \max \left\{ \sigma_{B+}^+, 0 \right\} \right) \right).
\]
To see this, first observe that when $\gamma = \mu$ we have $\sigma_N^* = \sigma_{A+}^+ = \sigma_{B-}^-$, so $\phi^B_{\pm}(\sigma_N^*) = \phi^B_{\pm}(\sigma_N^*) > \phi^A_{\pm}(\sigma_N^*)$ (from $\mu < \gamma$) implying $\sigma_{B-}^+ = \sigma_{A+}^+ < \sigma_{A-}^-$. Next since $\sigma_{B+}^+$ is increasing in $\gamma$, $\sigma_{A+}^+$ is decreasing in $\gamma$, and $\sigma_{B-}^-$ is constant in $\gamma$ (by Lemma C.3), we have that $\sigma_{A+}^+ < \sigma_{A-}^-$ for $\gamma \in [\mu, \gamma]$ and $\sigma_{B+}^+ < \sigma_{A-}^-$ for $\gamma < \mu$. Consequently, the condition reduces to $c \in \left( \phi^B_{\pm}(\sigma_{A+}^+), \phi^B_{\pm}(\sigma_{A-}^-) \right)$ when $\gamma \in [\mu, \gamma)$ (which is empty) and $c \in \left( \phi^B_{\pm}(\min \{\sigma_{A+}^+, \sigma_{B-}^-\}), \phi^B_{\pm}(\max \{\sigma_{B+}^+, 0\}) \right)$ when $\gamma < \mu$, which is always nonempty since $\phi^B_{\pm}(\sigma)$ is decreasing in $\sigma$ and $\sigma_{B+}^+ < \min \{\sigma_{A+}^+, \sigma_{A-}^-\}$.

Next, it is easily verified that $0 < \sigma_{B-}^+ < \sigma_{A+}^+ < \sigma_{A-}^-$ so $\hat{\sigma}_R = \sigma_{B-}^+ (c)$. Clearly, any $\hat{\theta}^B$ such that $\hat{\nu}^B = 1$ is a best response to $\sigma_{B-}^+ (c)$. Next, $\phi^A_{\pm}(\sigma_{B-}^+ (c)) = \phi^A_{\pm}(\sigma_{B-}^- (c))$ (by $\sigma_{B-}^+ (c) < \sigma_{A+}^+$), which is $0 < \phi^B_{\pm}(\sigma_{B-}^+(c))$ (by $\sigma_{B-}^+ (c) < \sigma_{B+}^+$) which is, so $\hat{\theta}^A$ is a best response to $\sigma_{B-}^+ (c)$ i.f.f. $\hat{\nu}^A = 1 > \hat{\rho}^A = 0$. Thus, we have that:
\[
\Delta_{s=B}^A(\hat{\rho}^B = 1; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr (\omega = A|s = B) > \Delta_{s=B}^A > \Delta_{s=B}^A(\hat{\rho}^B = 0; \hat{\theta}) = 0,
\]
so there exists a best response to $\sigma_{B-}^+ (c)$ with partial attention $\hat{\rho}^B \in (0, 1)$ and a favorable posture $\hat{\nu}^B = 1$ after $B$, and no attention $\hat{\rho}^A = 0$ with a favorable posture $\hat{\nu}^A = 1$ after $A$.

**CASE 2:** $\gamma \in [\gamma, \gamma]$. We begin by recalling useful observations from Lemma C.3: (i) $\mu < \gamma < \gamma \rightarrow \sigma_N^* = \max \{0, \sigma_{A+}^+\} < \sigma_{B+}^-$ and also $\phi^R_{\pm}(\sigma) = \phi^R_{\pm}(\sigma) \forall \sigma \in [0, \sigma_N^*]$], (ii) $\sigma_{B+}^+ \in (0, \sigma_N^*)$, and (iii) $\phi^A_{\pm}(0) > \phi^B_{\pm}(0)$ (and so $\sigma_{B+}^+ \in (0, 1)$). Combining these observations yields that the cost condition reduces to
\[
c \in \left( \phi^B_{\pm}(0), \phi^B_{\pm}(\sigma_N^*) \right).
\]
From these properties it is also easily verified that $0 < \sigma_{B+}^- < \sigma_{B+}^+ < \sigma_{A+}^+ < \phi_{B+}^-$. We now argue that there exists a pandering equilibrium at
\[
\hat{\sigma}_R = \min \left\{ \max \{\sigma_{B+}^+, \sigma_{A+}^-\}, \sigma_{A+}^+ \right\}.
\]
To do we examine three exhaustive mutually exclusive conditions on the cost.

**Subcase 2.1 (High attention favoring A):** $c \in (\phi^B_{\pm}(0), \phi^B_{\pm}(\sigma_{B+}^-))$

It is easily verified that $\sigma_{B+}^- > \sigma_{A+}^+ < \phi_{B+}^-$. We argue that there exists an equilibrium with $\hat{\sigma}_R = \sigma_{B+}^+ (c)$. Using this we have that $\hat{\theta}^A$ is a best response after $A$ i.f.f. $\hat{\nu}_A = \hat{\rho}^A = 1$ and $\hat{\theta}^B$ is a best response after $B$ i.f.f. $\hat{\nu}_B = 0$. Thus, we have that:
\[
\Delta_{s=B}^A(\hat{\rho}^B = 0; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr (\omega = A|s = B) > \Delta_{s=B}^A > \Delta_{s=B}^A(\hat{\rho}^B = 1; \hat{\theta}) = -\left( \Pr (\omega = B|s = B) - \Pr (\omega = A|s = B) \right),
\]
so there exists a best response to $\sigma_{B+}^+ (c)$ with partial attention $\hat{\rho}^B \in (0, 1)$ and an adversarial posture $\hat{\nu}^B = 0$ after $B$, and full attention $\hat{\rho}^A = 1$ after $A$.

**Subcase 2.2 (High attention favoring B):** $c \in (\phi^B_{\pm}(\sigma_{B+}^-), \phi^B_{\pm}(\sigma_{A+}^-))$
It is easily verified that \( \sigma_B^+ (c) < \sigma_A^+ (c) < \sigma_A^+ \); we argue that there exists an equilibrium with \( \hat{\sigma}_R = \sigma_A^- (c) \). Using this we have that \( \hat{\theta}^A \) is a best response after \( A \) i.f.f. \( \hat{\nu}_A = 1 \) and \( \hat{\theta}^B \) is a best response after \( B \) i.f.f. \( \hat{\nu}_B = 0 < \hat{\rho}_B = 1 \). Thus, we have:

\[
\Delta_s^A (\hat{\nu}^A = 0; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr (\omega = A | s = B) > \Delta_s^A > \Delta_s^B (\hat{\rho}^A = 1; \hat{\theta}) = (\Pr (\omega = B | s = B) - \Pr (\omega = A | s = B)),
\]
and there exists a best response to \( \sigma_A^+ (c) \) with partial attention \( \hat{\rho}^A \in (0, 1) \) and a favorable posture \( \hat{\nu}^A = 1 \) after \( A \), and full attention \( \hat{\rho}^B = 1 \) after \( B \).

**Subcase 2.3 (Medium attention):** \( c \in (\phi_A^+ (\sigma_A^+), \phi_B^+ (\sigma_A^+) ) \)

It is easily verified that \( \sigma_B^+ (c) < \sigma_A^+ < \sigma_A^+ (c) \); we argue that there exists an equilibrium with \( \hat{\sigma}_R = \sigma_A^+ \). Using this we have that \( \hat{\theta}^A \) is a best response after \( A \) i.f.f. \( \hat{\rho}_A = 0 \) and that every \( \hat{\theta}^B \) that is a best response after \( B \) satisfies \( \hat{\rho}^B = 1 \). Thus, we have that

\[
\Delta_s^A (\hat{\nu}^A = 1; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr (\omega = A | s = B) > \Delta_s^A > \Delta_s^B (\hat{\rho}^A = 0; \hat{\theta}) = - (\Pr (\omega = B | s = B) - \Pr (\omega = A | s = B)),
\]
and there exists a best response to \( \sigma_A^+ \) with no attention \( \hat{\rho}^A = 0 \) and a mixed posture \( \hat{\nu}^A \in (0, 1) \) after \( A \), and full attention \( \hat{\rho}^B = 1 \) after \( B \).

**CASE 3:** \( \gamma \in (\bar{\gamma}, 1) \). We begin by recalling useful observations from Lemma C.3: (i) \( \mu < \bar{\gamma} < \gamma \rightarrow \sigma_N^A = \max \{ 0, \sigma_A^+ \} < \sigma_B^+ \), (ii) \( \phi^x (\sigma) = \phi^x_+ (\sigma) \) \( \forall \sigma \in [0, \sigma_N^A] \), (iii) \( \phi^B_+ (\sigma) < \phi^A (\sigma) \) for \( \sigma \in [0, \sigma_N^A] \), and (iv) \( \phi^A_+ (0) > \phi^B_+ (0) \) (and so \( \sigma_A^+ \in (0, 1) \)), and (v) \( 0 < \sigma_A^+ < \sigma_B^+ \). Combining these observation yields that the cost condition reduces to \( c \in (\phi^B_+ (0), \phi^A_+ (\sigma_N^A) \) From these properties it is also easily verified that \( \sigma_A^+ < \sigma_B^+ < \sigma_A^+ \). We now argue that there exists a pandering equilibrium at \( \hat{\sigma}_R = \min \{ \sigma_B^+ (c), \sigma_A^+ (c) \} \). To do so we examine two exhaustive and mutually exclusive conditions on the cost \( c \).

**Subcase 3.1 (High attention):** \( c \in (\phi^B_+ (0), \phi^A_+ (\phi_B^+)) \)

It is straightforward that \( \sigma_b^+ (c) < \sigma_A^+ (c) \); we argue that there exists an equilibrium with \( \hat{\sigma}_R = \sigma_B^+ (c) \). Since \( \sigma_B^+ (c) < \sigma_B^+ \) we have that \( \hat{\theta}^B \) is a best response to \( \sigma_B^+ (c) \) if and only if \( \hat{\nu}_B = 0 \). Next we argue that \( c < \min \{ \phi_A^+ (\sigma_B^+ (c)), \phi_A^+ (\sigma_B^+ (c)) \} \) so that in any best response \( \hat{\theta}^A \) to \( \sigma_B^+ (c) \) we must have \( \hat{\rho}^A = 1 \). To see this, observe that (a) \( \gamma > \bar{\gamma} \rightarrow \phi^B_+ (\sigma) < \phi_A^+ (\sigma) \) \( \forall \sigma \in [0, 1] \) (by Lemma C.3) so \( c = \phi^B_+ (\sigma_B^+ (c)) < \phi_A^+ (\sigma_B^+ (c)) \), and (b) \( c = \phi^B_+ (\sigma_B^+ (c)) < \phi^B_+ (\sigma_B^+ ) < \phi^A_+ (\sigma_B^+ (c)) \). Thus, we have that:

\[
\Delta_s^A (\hat{\rho}^B = 0; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr (\omega = A | s = B) > \Delta_s^A > \Delta_s^B (\hat{\rho}^B = 1; \hat{\theta}) = - (\Pr (\omega = B | s = B) - \Pr (\omega = A | s = B)),
\]
so there exists a best response to \( \sigma_A^+ (c) \) with partial attention \( \hat{\rho}^B \in (0, 1) \) and an adversarial posture \( \hat{\nu}_B = 0 \) after \( B \), and full attention \( \hat{\rho}^A = 1 \) after \( A \).

**Subcase 3.2 (Low attention):** \( c \in (\phi_A^+ (\sigma_B^+), \phi_A^+ (\sigma_A^-)) \)

It is easy to see that \( \sigma_A^+ (c) < \sigma_B^+ (c) \); we argue there exists an equilibrium with \( \hat{\sigma}_R = \sigma_A^+ (c) \).
Since \( \sigma_A^+(c) \in (\sigma_A^{+1}, \sigma_B^{+1}) \), we have that \( \hat{\theta}^A \) is a best response to \( \sigma_A^+(c) \) if and only if \( \hat{\nu}^A = 0 \).
Next, since \( \sigma_A^+(c) < \sigma_B^{+1} < \sigma_B^{1-} \) we have that \( c = \phi_A^+(\sigma_A^+(c)) > \phi_B^+(\sigma_A^+(c)) = \phi_B^-(\sigma_A^+(c)) \), so that \( \hat{\theta}^B \) is a best response to \( \sigma_A^+(c) \) if and only if \( \hat{\nu}^B = \hat{\rho}^B = 0 \). Thus, we have:

\[
\Delta_{s=B}^A(\hat{\rho}^A = 1; \hat{\theta}) = \Pr(\omega = A|s = B) > \Delta_{s=B}^A > \Delta_{s=B}^A(\hat{\rho}^A = 0; \hat{\theta}) = 0,
\]

so there exists a best response to \( \sigma_A^+(c) \) with partial attention \( \hat{\rho}^A \in (0,1) \) and an adversarial posture \( \hat{\nu}^A = 0 \) after \( A \), and no attention \( \hat{\rho}^B = 0 \) and an adversarial posture \( \hat{\nu}^B = 0 \) after \( B \).

\section{Voter Welfare}

In this Appendix we prove results about welfare, beginning with an accessory Lemma.

\begin{lemma}
The voter’s equilibrium utility difference between the rational attention and CHS models may be written as

\[
U_V^R - U_V^N = \Pr(y = A) \cdot \max \{ \phi_s^A - c, 0 \} + \Pr(y = B) \cdot \max \{ \phi_s^B - c, 0 \} - (1 - \mu)(q - \pi)(\sigma_R^* - \sigma_N^*),
\]

where \( s = - \) if \( \gamma \leq \mu \) and \( s = + \) if \( \gamma \geq \mu \).

All quantities are evaluated with respect to \( \sigma_R^* \) unless explicitly indicated otherwise.
\end{lemma}

\begin{proof}
First observe that the voter’s first period voter expected utility in either model is

\[
\mu + (1 - \mu) \left( \pi(q + (1 - q)\sigma^*) + (1 - \pi)q(1 - \sigma^*) \right),
\]

where \( \sigma^* \) is the equilibrium pandering level. Taking the difference between the two models and simplifying yields

\[
-(1 - \mu)(q - \pi)(\sigma_R^* - \sigma_N^*)
\]

Next, the first two terms represent the expected second period benefit of paying attention. Let \( h^R \) and \( h^N \) denote the probability that the second-period officeholder is high-ability. For general value of \( h \), the second period expected benefit is \( \delta(h + (1 - h)q) \); thus, the second period net benefit (excluding the cost of attention) in the rational attention model is

\[
\delta(h^R + (1 - h^R)q) - \delta(h^N + (1 - h^N)q) = \delta(1 - q)(h^R - h^N)
\]

Now we need to calculate \( \delta(1 - q)(h^R - h^N) \). There are several cases to consider.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{High Attention} (\( \rho^x > 0 \ \forall x \)): If attention is at least sometimes acquired after either policy then \( \phi^x = \min\{\phi^x_-, \phi^x_+\} \geq c \ \forall x \). In the rational attention model expected utility can therefore be calculated “as if” the voter was always pays attention, so

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pr(y = A) \Pr(\omega = A|y = A)\mu_A^R + \Pr(\omega = B|y = A)\gamma + \\
\Pr(y = B) \Pr(\omega = B|y = B)\mu_B^R + \Pr(\omega = A|y = B)\gamma
\end{align*}
\]

As for \( h^N \) there are two cases:
\item \textbf{\( \gamma < \mu \)}: In the CHS equilibrium \( \nu^x > 0 \ \forall x \), so expected utility can be calculated “as if” the incumbent is always reelected and

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu = \Pr(y = A) \Pr(\omega = A|y = A)\mu_A^R + \Pr(\omega = B|y = A)\mu_B^R + \\
\Pr(y = B) \Pr(\omega = B|y = B)\mu_B^R + \Pr(\omega = A|y = B)\mu_A^R,
\end{align*}
\]
where the quantities in the decomposition that depend on the incumbent’s strategy are calculated using the equilibrium pandering level $\sigma_k^n$ in the rational attention model. Therefore the anticipated net benefit of attention is:

$$
\delta(1-q)(h^R - h^N) - c = Pr(y = A)(\delta(1-q)Pr(\omega = B|y = A)(\gamma - \mu_A^B) - c) + Pr(y = B)(\delta(1-q)Pr(\omega = A|y = B)(\gamma - \mu_B^A) - c)
$$

$$
= Pr(y = A)(\phi_A^A - c) + Pr(y = B)(\phi_B^A - c)
$$

($\gamma > \mu$): In the CHS equilibrium $\nu^x < 1 \forall x$, so expected utility may be calculated ”as if” the incumbent is never reelected, and

$$
h^N = \gamma = Pr(y = A)(Pr(\omega = A|y = A)\gamma + Pr(\omega = B|y = A)\gamma) + Pr(y = B)(Pr(\omega = B|y = B)\gamma + Pr(\omega = A|y = B)\gamma),
$$

where again the quantities in the decomposition are calculated using $\sigma_k^n$. Therefore the anticipated net benefit of information is:

$$
\delta(1-q)(h^R - h^N) - c = Pr(y = A)(\delta(1-q)Pr(\omega = A|y = A)(\mu_A^A - \gamma) - c) + Pr(y = B)(\delta(1-q)Pr(\omega = B|y = B)(\mu_B^B - \gamma) - c) =
$$

$$
Pr(y = A)(\phi_A^A - c) + Pr(y = B)(\phi_B^B - c)
$$

**Medium Attention** ($\rho_A = 1 > \rho^A = 0 \forall x$): In the rational attention model the voter always pays attention after $B$ but never after $A$ and is indifferent between incumbent and challenger. ($\gamma < \mu$): We can calculate expected utility in the rational attention model as if the voter never acquires information and always retains the incumbent after policy $A$, so

$$
h^R = Pr(y = A)(Pr(\omega = A|y = A)\mu_A^A + Pr(\omega = B|y = A)\mu_A^B) + Pr(y = B)(Pr(\omega = B|y = B)\mu_B^B + Pr(\omega = A|y = B)\gamma)
$$

and the overall second period net benefit of information is

$$
\delta(1-q)(h^R - h^N) - P(y = B)c = Pr(y = B)(\delta(1-q)Pr(\omega = A|y = B)(\gamma - \mu_B^A) - c) = Pr(y = B)(\phi_B^B - c)
$$

($\gamma > \mu$): We can calculate expected utility in the rational attention model as if the voter never pays attention and always replaces the incumbent after policy $A$, so

$$
h^R = Pr(y = A)(Pr(\omega = A|y = A)\gamma + Pr(\omega = B|y = A)\gamma) + Pr(y = B)(Pr(\omega = B|y = B)\mu_B^B + Pr(\omega = A|y = B)\gamma)
$$

and the overall second period net benefit of information is

$$
\delta(1-q)(h^R - h^N) - P(y = B)c = Pr(y = B)(\delta(1-q)Pr(\omega = A|y = B)(\mu_B^B - \gamma) - c) = Pr(y = B)(\phi_B^A - c)
$$

Observe that in this case, for Rational attention model we have $\phi^A = \min\{\phi_A^A, \phi_A^B\} < c$. 19
Low Attention ($\rho^x < 1 \ \forall x$) In the rational attention equilibrium the voter at least sometimes chooses not to pay attention after either policy. It is also easily verified that in low attention regions we have $\nu^x > 0 \ \forall x$ if the incumbent is strong ($\gamma < \mu$) and $\nu^x < 1 \ \forall x$ if the incumbent is weak ($\gamma > \mu$). Hence, expected utility in the rational attention model can be calculated as if the voter never pays attention, always retains a strong incumbent, and never retains a weak incumbent. In the CHS model expected utility can also be calculated as if the voter always retains a strong incumbent and never retains a weak incumbent, so there is no anticipated net benefit of attention. Further in the RA model we have $\phi^x = \min \{\phi^x_-, \phi^x_+ \} \leq c \ \forall x$. QED

Proof of Lemma D.1 and Proposition 6 We prove the following expanded version of the proposition.

Proposition D.1. When a low-ability incumbent receives moderate-quality information, the voter is always weakly better off in the rational attention model, and strictly better off i.f.f. she pays some attention in equilibrium ($\exists x \in \{A, B\}$ s.t. $\rho^x > 0$).

When a low-ability incumbent receives poor-quality information, there is a unique cost cutpoint $\hat{c}(\gamma)$ such that that the voter is strictly worse off in the rational attention model i.f.f. $c \in (\hat{c}(\gamma), \max \{\phi^A(\sigma^*_N), \phi^B(\sigma^*_N)\})$. If $\gamma < \mu$ then $\hat{c}(\gamma) \in (\phi^A(0), \max \{\phi^B(\sigma^B_{A-}), \phi^B(\sigma^B_{A+})\})$; if $\gamma \in (\gamma, \bar{\mu}^x)$ then $\hat{c}(\gamma) \in (\phi^B(0), \phi^A(\sigma^B_{A+}))$; otherwise $\hat{c}(\gamma) = \max \{\phi^A(\sigma^*_N), \phi^B(\sigma^*_N)\}$.

Proof (Moderate-quality information) We have $\sigma^*_R \leq \sigma^*_N$, so

$$U^R_V - U^N_V = \Pr(y = A) \cdot \max_{\geq 0} \{\phi^A_s - c, 0\} \leq 0 \quad \Pr(y = B) \cdot \max_{\geq 0} \{\phi^B_s - c, 0\} \geq 0$$

When the voter pays attention after at least one policy, $\sigma^*_R < \sigma^*_N$ so the third term becomes strictly positive and rational attention strictly increases the expected utility of the voter. Alternatively, when the voter never pays attention, $\sigma^*_R = \sigma^*_N$ and the entire equals 0.

(Poor-quality information) We explicitly consider $\gamma < \mu$; the case of $\gamma \in (\bar{\gamma}, \bar{\mu}^x)$ is shown with symmetric but slightly simplified arguments, and for the remaining cases it is straightforward to verify that $\sigma^*_R \leq \sigma^*_N$ so the voter is at least weakly better off in the RA model.

If $c > \phi^B(\sigma^*_N)$ the voter never pays attention, equilibrium of the two models is identical, and so the voter’s utility is the same in both models.

If $c < \phi^A(0)$ the incumbent is truthful in both models, so there is no accountability cost.
From the equilibrium characterization we generically have $\rho^x = 1 \implies \phi^x - c > 0 \ \forall x$, so
\[
U^R_V - U^N_V = \Pr(y = A) \cdot \max\left\{ \phi^A_x - c, 0 \right\} + \Pr(y = B) \cdot \max\left\{ \phi^B_x - c, 0 \right\}
\]
\[
- \frac{1 - \mu}{>0} (q - \pi) \left( \sigma^*_R - \sigma^*_N \right) > 0
\]
and the voter is strictly better off in the rational attention model.

If $c \in \left( \max\{\phi^B_x(\sigma^B_{-A}), \phi^B_x(\sigma^A_{+A})\}, \phi^B_x(\sigma^N_N) \right)$ it is easily verified from the equilibrium characterization that $\sigma^*_R > \sigma^*_N$ (either $\sigma^*_R > 0 = \sigma^*_N$ or $\sigma^*_R > \sigma^B_{B+} = \sigma^*_N$). Thus, the accountability cost is strictly positive. Moreover, from construction of the equilibrium we have $\rho^x < 1 \implies \phi^x_x(\sigma^*_R) - c \leq 0$ and $\phi^x_x(\sigma^*_R) = \phi^x_x(\sigma^*_R) \ \forall x$ so
\[
U^R_V - U^N_V = \Pr(y = A) \cdot \max\left\{ \phi^A_x - c, 0 \right\} + \Pr(y = B) \cdot \max\left\{ \phi^B_x - c, 0 \right\}
\]
\[
- \frac{1 - \mu}{>0} (q - \pi) \left( \sigma^*_R - \sigma^*_N \right) < 0.
\]

Finally, if $c \in \left( \phi^A_x(0), \max\{\phi^B_x(\sigma^B_{-A}), \phi^B_x(\sigma^A_{+A})\} \right)$ we show there is a unique cost cutoff $\hat{c}(\gamma)$ by showing $U^R_V - U^N_V$ is strictly decreasing in $c$. First, $\sigma^*_R = \min\{\sigma^*_R, \sigma^A_{+A}\}$ where $\phi^A_x(\sigma^*_R) = c$. Since $\phi^A_x$ is increasing in $\sigma$ we have $\phi^A_x(\sigma^*_R) \leq c$. Moreover $\sigma^*_R$ is weakly increasing in $c$ and $\phi^B_x$ is strictly decreasing in $\sigma$, $\Pr(y = B)$ is strictly decreasing in $\sigma$ and therefore it is weakly decreasing in $c$ ($\sigma^*_R$ is weakly increasing in $c$). Overall, when $c$ increases:
\[
U^R_V - U^N_V = \Pr(y = A) \cdot \max\left\{ \phi^A_x - c, 0 \right\} + \Pr(y = B) \cdot \max\left\{ \phi^B_x - c, 0 \right\}
\]
\[
- \frac{1 - \mu}{>0} (q - \pi) \left( \sigma^*_R - \sigma^*_N \right).
\]

It is then straightforward that $U^R_V - U^N_V$ is weakly decreasing in $c$. To see $U^R_V - U^N_V$ is also strictly decreasing in $c$, first observe that if $\sigma^*_R$ is not constant in $c$ then it is strictly increasing, so the third term is strictly decreasing. Conversely, if $\sigma^*_R$ is constant in $c$ then $c \in \left( \phi^A_x(\sigma^A_{-A}), \phi^B_x(\sigma^A_{+A}) \right)$, the equilibrium of the rational attention model satisfies $\sigma^*_R = \sigma^A_{-A}$ and $c < \phi^B_x(\sigma^*_R = \sigma^A_{-A})$, so the second term is strictly decreasing in $c$. QED